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PhD Abstract.   
 
   From the closing decades of the twentieth century, the philosophy of Walter 
Benjamin has been readily employed by academics seeking to legitimate lens-based 
art as critical practice and challenge the ideals of high modernism. Yet this situation 
has engendered a compulsion to read Benjamin as a harbinger of post-modernism, a 
tendency responsible for severe miss-interpretations of his work. This is most evident 
in accounts of arguably his most famous thesis: the philosophy of the aura. 
   For scholars aiming to renounce autonomy, originality and genius in artistic labour, 
Benjamin’s reading of the aura’s decline has become a weapon of choice. However, 
although the auratic holds immediate significance for creative practice, what is often 
overlooked by invocations of Benjamin’s study is the fact that the aura does not 
describe a material or phenomenal quality that objects may or may not possess. On 
the contrary, the aura is a form of perceptual experience, a sensation analogous to 
reverie or contemplation.  
   It is in response to claims that Benjamin’s thesis has been misconstrued that Aura, 
Craft and Labour is conceived. My dissertation sets out to re-stage the critical study 
of the auratic and thus revivify the philosophical, political and psychological motifs at 
play in Benjamin’s work. But to achieve this I do not intend to bypass subjects of 
artistic production and aesthetics. Rather, I aim to explore the sensory and 
experiential matrix of the auratic against the context of a critical dialogue between 
photography and painting, thereby identifying how an assessment of the breaks and 
ruptures that mark revolutions in creative practice can illuminate our insight into the 
aura debate.   
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Introduction. 
 
 
I: The Return to Aura. 
 
   Recent decades have seen scholars grapple with two key problems: the drive to 
legitimate lens based art as critical practice and the simultaneous retrieval of the 
Avant-Garde from the marginalised position it assumed under the rubric of high 
modernism. In both cases, the work of Walter Benjamin has provided the 
ideological framework against which such campaigns seek validation. However, 
the academic legacy formed by these debates has proven to be highly 
problematic. From the vantage of the present, it can be argued that their legacy 
enabled Benjaminian philosophy to be considered an antecedent of post-
modernism’s re-theorization of art.
1
 As Esther Leslie put it, the 1980s saw much 
effort spent to portray the writer as “a proto-poststructuralist, cut off by slippery 
signifiers from the concerns of Marxism”.
2
  
   Benjamin’s centrality to the post-modern reading of creative practice can be 
confirmed with reference to Jean-François Lyotard. Writing in The Post-Modern 
Condition he identified a theme that all readers of Walter Benjamin could easily 
identify, one that may be understood as follows: the notion that the industrial or 
mechanical might replace artisanal production becomes problematic only if one 
believes art to be a process whereby the “individuality of genius” is expressed 
through a mastery of craft-based skills.3  
   The problem with such interpretations hinges on their potential to engender a 
serious misinterpretation of Benjamin’s ideas: specifically, the regressive 
application of the philosopher’s work to limited debates seeking to compare the 
particular merits of photography and painting.
4
 Again, Lyotard provides a useful 
source with which to expound this claim. His reading of Benjamin culminates in 
                                                
1
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3
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4
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 7 
the proposition that still and cinematic photography can achieve both narrative 
and pictorial realism with a level of speed and accuracy that traditional modes of 
creative labour will struggle to match. Moreover, further evidence of 
photography’s supremacy over easel art is located in Benjamin’s identification of 
the camera as an apparatus that can disseminate its products to an audience of far 
greater size than the small number who might visit a gallery or museum.
5
 Thus 
Lyotard finds in Benjamin’s prose the blueprints of a project that, if properly 
executed, would see photography succeed painting as the pre-eminent medium of 
pictorial communication.  
   However, attempts to prove this declaration have simplified Benjamin’s ideas 
into a discourse regularly put forward to assert the camera’s radicalism against 
the negativity of the brush,
6
 a tendency that has aroused profound scorn. In 
particular, Diarmuid Costello has avowed that the perpetuation of such readings 
fosters a narrow interpretation of Benjamin’s most crucial and enigmatic thesis: 
the philosophy of the aura. To some extent this claim is valid. But the exchange 
between photography and painting cannot be considered a wholly superficial 
debate as it has a key role to play in critical studies of the auratic, and hence in 
any account seeking to reclaim or update that project. Yet before exploring the 
exact nature of this contribution, I will outline the factors that influenced 
Costello’s position.    
   The feedback elicited by late 1970s and early 1980s Neo-Expressionism was 
central to post-modernism’s appropriation of Benjamin’s work. Contemporary 
attitudes to the 1981 Royal Academy exhibition A New Spirit in Painting are key 
in this respect. Curated by Christos M. Joachimides, Norman Rosenthal and 
Nicholas Serota, the show avowed that gestural, expressive painting was the 
medium most able to explore human experience. As Jason Gaiger notes, the 
spectacle formed a manifesto designed to affirm the triumph of artistic tradition 
and belittle the achievements of conceptualism. Yet such positions have been 
viewed as untenable, a denouncement underpinned by Hal Foster’s argument that 
restaging past styles will ultimately undermine the fact that artistic forms are 
conceived against specific cultural and social contexts. Consequently, we can 
only deduce that attempting to revivify a particular practice by claiming it 
                                                
5
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possessed a “natural” purchase on the human condition would be 
counterproductive.
7
  
   Foster famously defined such events as symptomatic of the crises faced by 
modernism, a discourse associated with the development of science and art 
according to their own internal, autonomous laws. For Foster, this project had to 
be replaced, a task that would represent a concern central to all critical artistic 
projects. But the issue of how this practice would be realised was itself 
contentious, anticipating wider conflicts between two emerging factions: the 
“post-modernism of reaction” and the “post-modernism of resistance”. The latter 
can be interpreted as an attempt to deconstruct modernism and renounce its 
traditions and histories, while the former can be considered a discourse opposed 
to both the ivory tower of modernism, and also the “false normativity of a 
reactionary postmodernism”. As Foster observes, “resistant post-modernism” 
attempts a “critical deconstruction of tradition”. That is, a “critique of origins” 
rather than a revivification of conventional methodologies.
8
 Accordingly, 
Costello contends that lens and technology based art became key to resistant 
critiques opposing creativity, uniqueness, authenticity, emotional expression, 
individualism and craft, categories central to canonical modernism and 
consequently the New Spirit in Painting. Hence he presents Benjamin’s critique 
of traditional aesthetics, and assertion of photography as an opposed form of 
creative labour, as crucial to those rallying against the “new-painting”.
9
  
   However, to assume that such debates represented the only outlet for 
Benjamin’s ideas would be uninformed. In the 1970s Screen provided a forum 
for critical readings of the philosopher’s work, printing English translations of 
texts such as ‘A Small History of Photography’ as early as 1972. The editorial to 
that very issue identifies Benjamin’s thoughts on “technological innovation” in 
art and aesthetics as crucial to the development of realism in contemporary 
cinema.
10
 Furthermore, Screen exerted a formative influence over Victor 
Burgin’s “Constructed Image” practice, a methodology that subsequently 
                                                
7
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9
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underscored photography’s pivotal position in postmodernist discourse.
11
 For 
example, Peter Wollen’s discussion of Benjamin’s antipathy towards 
photographic pictorialism and attendant validation of the medium’s archival 
potential
12
 is typical of the debates that resurface in Burgin’s later claim that 
photography, unlike painting, sits on the side of information and is readily 
accessible throughout the social sphere.
13
  
   That Costello overlooks such dialogues is consequential of the focus he placed 
on reclaiming Benjamin’s ideas from the resistant post-modernism of Douglas 
Crimp, a critic who sought to reawaken the aura debate through the work of 
Robert Rauschenberg. Commenting upon the artist’s defiant move from 
techniques of production to techniques of reproduction, Crimp claimed that 
Rauschenberg destroyed the “originality, authenticity and presence”, crucial to 
the “ordered discourse” of the museum space. Accordingly, by following 
Benjamin’s advocacy of mechanical reproduction Rauschenberg was able to 
create a post-modern practice that refuted the properties of the auratic.
14
  
   Yet for Costello, such readings are indicative of scholarship that pays little 
more than lip service to Benjamin’s thought. Crimp’s reading thus follows a 
failing endemic to summary accounts of the “aura debate” and portrays the thesis 
as a struggle acted out between an entrenched support for high modernism and a 
desire to engage the “technical – mechanical” situation of twentieth century 
life.
15
 Such perspectives are inaccurate, and anticipate a crisis that can be 
resolved only if auratic is approached as a subject that encompasses notions 
beyond these boundaries. What must be emphasised is that the aura denotes a 
category of experience and memory, and can be thus interpreted as pertinent to 
the subject, as opposed to object, of perception, and hence read as a sensation 
manifest through the exchange between subject and object. However, this 
assertion also suggests an important conclusion: namely, that if the subject’s 
ability to perceive “auratically” is diminished then the phenomenon of the aura 
will decline in tandem. It is in response to such debates that Costello outlines the 
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aura as that which not only demands a perceiving subject, but which also 
requires the subject to experience a specific, historically determined category of 
perception.
16
 Referring to Benjamin’s original text will help to explain this idea. 
   “What is genuine aura?” Benjamin asks this question in ‘A Small History of 
Photography’. In a later essay he provides the beginnings of an answer. “In no 
sense”, he writes, can the concept be viewed as analogous to the fantastical, 
magic rays of light described by spiritualists and documented in texts exploring 
the realms of mysticism.
17
 Accordingly, it should be noted from the outset that 
the category under discussion should not be confused with “Kirlian” 
photography, the practice that aims to document the alleged “aura” or  
“luminescence” which some people claim to perceive as glowing energy field 
surrounding the human body.
18
 On the contrary, Benjamin states that the aura 
can be best understood as “a strange weave of space and time”. That is, as the 
unique “appearance or semblance of distance” created by an object regardless of 
how close it may seem be.
19
 
   Against this background the question of how we feel or encounter aura 
becomes prudent. Responding to this dilemma, Benjamin found a useful 
metaphor in nature. In a famous passage from ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’ he suggests that the individual who relaxes on a 
summer afternoon and allows their eye to become immersed in the sight of a 
distant mountain range, or who pauses to gaze at the branch of a sunlit tree that 
casts its shadow upon them, will “breathe” the aura of the mountains, of that 
branch.
20
  
   In other words, the aura emanates from that which holds or arrests the viewer’s 
contemplation, an act that likewise imbues the object of concentration with a 
sense of auratic distance. Thus the auratic can be identified as a perceptual 
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sensation encountered by the individual who approaches nature in a silent, 
meditative state: “the vision of someone who is submerged in a halcyon 
world”.
21
 It is in relation to the work of art that the full impact of such claims 
may be revealed. As Theodore Adorno argues in Aesthetic Theory, if we follow 
Benjamin’s attempt to explain the notion of aura in relation to the natural world, 
we can also reason that to encounter the aura of nature is to become aware of that 
aspect of the nature that represents the “defining element” of the work of art.22 
   For Adorno, the aura is an “objective signification” that exceeds all “subjective 
intentions”. Thus for an artwork to convey aura it must reveal an “objective 
quality” that is greater than the “projection of the subject”. This notion of 
projection is crucial, for in Adorno’s philosophy the individual identifies with the 
work by loosing himself or herself in the acts of beholding, listening or reading. 
In other words, Adorno contends that artworks are mobilised by silent 
contemplation. Hence in an ideal situation the individual will effect their 
“identification” with an artwork not by assimilating the artefact unto himself or 
herself, but by assimilating themselves unto the work. Leslie has sought to 
contextualise such encounters against the auratic itself, describing the sensory 
experience of genuine aura as a moment in which subject and object of 
perception achieve a state of union.
23
  
   Yet Adorno also avows that the work of art cannot be thought of as a mere 
“receptacle” for the beholder’s psychology. Indeed, he claims interaction with 
the psyche is disastrous precisely because approaching art as an empty vessel 
enlivened and animated only by acts of subjective projection robs art of its 
distinctive character. If this occurs the object will be reified into an echo of the 
spectator, and thereby forced to say only that which the spectator wants it to say. 
As an example, Adorno cites the “banausic” reader whose assessment of literary 
texts rests upon the extent to which they can identify with the novel’s 
protagonists. While such acts may reduce the distance between beholder and 
work, false identification with fictional but “nevertheless empirical characters” is 
deeply problematic as it ignores the vital element of art that falls beyond the 
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 Esther Leslie: Walter Benjamin, Overpowering Conformism, 2000, pp 51 – 52. 
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 Theodore Adorno: Aesthetic Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984 p386. 
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 Esther Leslie: Walter Benjamin, Overpowering Conformism, 2000, p52. 
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sphere of empirical reality and therefore defies both factual description and 
reification.
24
  
   This element may be defined as the “atmosphere” of the work, the objective 
trait formed within the artefact by the “connection of its moments insofar as they 
point beyond themselves, singly and together”. In this context, the atmosphere of 
the object corresponds to what Adorno calls the “plus of appearance” of the 
artwork, the surplus content mediated by the whole that is responsible for staging 
its transcendent quality. This idea confirms the parallel between art and nature, 
for nature’s beauty likewise stems from the fact that it is able to say more than 
the sum of its parts. Hence by revealing an objective quality beyond the subject’s 
interpretive projection, the “plus of appearance” becomes analogous to the notion 
of aura.
25
 Yet as with nature, it is only through sensory immersion that the 
beholder can experience the phenomenon. The template for this model of 
objectivity, Adorno argues, is feeling of melancholia or tranquillity that is 
engendered by nature when it is not viewed as something to be acted upon. In 
other words, the individual who cannot perceive that nature possesses a 
transcendent quality that does not exist to satisfy any rational use-value will have 
no capacity for artistic experience. However, gazing at nature in this manner – as 
if it were wholly removed from any practical end – creates an effect of 
distancing. As Adorno observes, the “sense of distance from the artwork”, that 
underpins Benjamin’s notion of aura, is based upon the separation formed 
through this act of looking.
26
 Thus the sensation of phenomenal distance created 
by contemplative, perceptual immersion becomes constitutive of auratic 
experience. 
   In Costello’s analysis, Crimp is accused of overlooking these perceptual and 
experiential classifications, a failing that is associated with both his 
unwillingness to consider the concept of aura in relation to the structure of 
perception and his subsequent engagement with the un-dialectical assumption 
that Benjamin champions the “transformation of perception”.
27
 Crimp’s focus on 
such themes is evident in ‘On the Museum’s Ruins’, a text that echoes Lyotard’s 
reading of Benjamin and which recounts the camera’s ability to irreducibly 
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transform creative practice. As Crimp contends, the value of Benjamin’s work 
hinged on the fact that it highlighted photography’s potential to irreducibly 
transform the nature of creative practice, and thus imagine a future in which the 
art of painting would be rendered archaic following the destruction of its once 
important aura through the effects of mechanical reproduction.28 
    For Costello, such arguments abstract Benjamin’s ideas from their true focus
 
and ignore the aura’s status as a category of perceptual experience that is 
vulnerable to transformations over periods of time.
29
 But for all Costello’s 
eloquence, this position must not be accepted as the only viable interpretation of 
Benjamin’s philosophy. An alternative reading of the “aura debate” exists, and 
engaging with this discourse implies that undermining the exchange between 
lens-based art and traditional practice threatens to discount a dialogue that holds 
crucial implications for the study of auratic experience. While it is certainly true 
that Benjamin defined the aura as a perceptual experience patterned upon the 
subject’s response to natural forms, it must also be noted that in describing this 
sensation he was also anticipating a definite historical development: the impact 
technological production has upon art’s ability to foster an immersive, auratic 
response.
30
 Therefore, we must revisit an aforementioned project and assess the 
interplay between photography and painting in greater detail.  
    
II: Photography and Painting. 
 
   The importance of such themes to Benjamin’s ideology can be illustrated with 
reference to the ‘Paris Diary’ of 1930, and to the entry penned on the 4
th
 
February in particular. The passage in question describes a visit to La Maison des 
Amis des Livres, the famous bookshop owned by Adrienne Monnier that served 
as a forum for the work of authors such as James Joyce and Paul Valéry. Upon 
entering this space, Benjamin moves past the numerous tables adorned with 
“modern first editions”, towards Monnier. He describes her as an individual to 
whom “one can never show enough respect”. Together they sit at her narrow, 
book covered desk and discuss the intellectual issues of the day, notably the 
                                                
28
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occult influence present in André Breton’s second Surrealist Manifesto. As they 
talk the shop becomes crowded, and Benjamin fears that he is keeping her from 
her customers, but then he confesses his fascination for her eager “defence of 
photographs of works of art”. Earlier in their discussion Benjamin had 
commented that it was easier to “enjoy” paintings and architectural or sculptural 
works as photographs, a viewpoint he suggests that Monnier seems to have 
shared.
31
 To illustrate this he recounts her words. For Monnier, works of art 
cannot be identified as the products of individuals. Rather, they are “collective 
objects” of such power that a reduction of their stature becomes a necessary 
condition of their reception. Crucially, it is mechanical reproduction that allows 
this to be achieved. The facsimile permits the beholder a sense of power over the 
object that subsequently enables and enhances their enjoyment of it.32  
   As Charles W. Haxthausen notes, there is a direct lineage between Monnier’s 
comments and the later ‘Little History of Photography’, a text in which Benjamin 
presents the following argument. He begins by claiming that it is inherently 
easier to receive and enjoy both painterly and sculptural works in photographs 
than in their original object form. But his central point rests on the fact that the 
development of such techniques of mass reproduction has transformed the 
manner in which the masses come to perceive and understand works of art. As 
Benjamin contends, it is no longer possible to speak of artworks as the product of 
the labour of a single individual. Rather, they have mutated into collective 
objects so powerful that any attempt to engage them first requires a reduction in 
their size. In this context, the techniques of mechanical reproduction are 
presented as a development that enables people to attain a “degree of power over 
the works without which they simply could not make use of them”.
33
 
   Essential to Haxthausen’s study of these extracts is the shift in language that 
occurs between the texts in question: “enjoy” (genißen) becomes “assimilate” 
(assimilieren), while “enjoyment” (genuß) is recast as “use” (verwendung). In his 
reading, such terms correspond to a key passage from the ‘Artwork Essay’.
34
 In 
section three Benjamin argues that the modern public’s need to “get hold of an 
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object at close range in an image” will become progressively stronger. This drive 
is attributed to the masses unending drive to bring things closer to them both 
“spatially and humanly”, an impulse that threatens the uniqueness and authority 
of the original.
35
 This suggests that the potential of photographic technology rests 
on its ability to – in Benjamin’s words – peal away the “shell” of the privileged 
object, hence destroying the auratic distance that separates it from the masses.
36
 
Authenticity is thus lost; the painting’s originality is replaced with an infinite 
number of copies and a detachment from tradition ensues.
37
  
   It was Crimp’s interpretation of this idea to which Costello objected. Yet by 
referring to Benjamin’s original text it is possible to reconsider his intentions. 
The shattering of tradition is, for Benjamin, an emancipatory, rejuvenating force. 
Once reproduced, the object will be granted access to situations that were 
previously beyond reach and will thus able to engage the beholder in their own 
environment.
38
 Moreover, far from ignoring the mechanics of perceptual 
experience, such actions are deeply entwined with a radical re-working of auratic 
contemplation and therefore have a decisive impact upon the phenomenon.  
   Reading the ‘Artwork Essay’, Leslie reasons that aura is associated with a 
work’s “uniqueness”, a status derived not from an object’s specific properties but 
from its physical or “metaphorical” separation from the beholder. The connection 
between art and nature is again pertinent. Leslie argues that the auratic work “is 
not immediately accessible to perception” but is hidden and removed, distant and 
separated from the viewer. However, the distance in question does not describe a 
physical space between viewer and painting. It refers to the creation of a 
“psychological unapproachability”, a classification that allows auratic perception 
to be defined as that fostered by reactions to an authority derived from the 
artwork’s position within a tradition or social order.
39
 As Stephen Heath writes, 
distance is a “demonstration of relations between structures”, a critical dialectics 
operative between “representation and production, image and material, subject 
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and language”.
40
 The spacing created by the exchange between art and tradition 
can be approached in a similar context.  
   In Benjamin’s thesis, the cultic roots of art are key to understanding such 
claims. From its emergence in primitive times he contends that the art object has 
operated within systems of myth and ritual. Pre-historic cave paintings can be 
considered exemplars of this type, as each image was conceived as a magical 
offering designed to appease the spirits.
41
 After magic came religion and in the 
secular, post-renaissance age the cult of beauty. Though different in principle, 
each discourse shares a common drive to venerate the artwork, establishing a 
ritualistic function as inseparable from its existence.  
   As Benjamin summarised: the unique value and original utility of the 
“authentic” work of art can be traced to the domain of the ritual.
42
 It is this 
historic connection to varying notions of the sacred that forms the aura of the 
object, the experience of psychological distance that the beholder cannot 
surmount. As the philosopher concludes, if genuine aura denotes a unique 
appearance of distance regardless of how close a thing may be, then we can 
claim that the sensation in question is analogous to the phenomenal distance that 
develops between the subject and the cultic work of art, a separation which is 
born of the beholder’s perceptual and experiential response to the object of their 
vision. Although the spectator may be standing in physical proximity to a totemic 
or mythical form, it will remain unapproachable in the psychological sense. Thus 
“the nearness one may gain from its substance does not impair the distance 
which it retains in its apparition”.
43
     
   A clear parallel with Adorno’s reading of aura can be formed in response to 
this point. As we have seen, Adorno claimed that, like the beauty of nature, art 
possesses a transcendent quality that cannot be readily qualified because it exists 
beyond the realm of factual description and empirical reality. Following 
Benjamin, however, this phenomenon can be attributed to the magical or cultic 
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aspects of the work, for by definition such spiritual, supernatural categories will 
not interact with everyday experience. Therefore, like the splendour of the 
natural world, their intrinsic attachment to myth ensures that artistic forms are 
approached only as an object removed from the viewers practical ends. 
Consequently, the reception of art will be dominated by a state of reverent 
contemplation through which the “atmosphere” or “plus of appearance” of the 
work can be engaged. The separation fostered by this act is crucial to the 
sensation of phenomenal distance the spectator encounters before the art object, 
which subsequently creates the register of auratic perception. 
   It is possible to confirm this proposition with reference to Benjamin’s 
discussion of the art of Ancient Greece. The first version of the ‘Artwork Essay’, 
dating from 1935, sees Benjamin identify the art of this era with the need to 
represent “eternal values” and therefore create work intended to last for eternity. 
The impossibility of technical reproduction beyond the processes that enabled 
the production of “bronzes, terra cottas and coins”
44
 necessitated such measures. 
Uniqueness and eternal validity thus emerge in response to technological 
deficiency, the implications of which are decisive. As Howard Caygill observes, 
the emphasis that the ancient Greeks placed upon uniqueness served to engender 
a contemplative or cultic response to the artwork, thereby making it the 
“incarnation of eternal perfection or divinity”.
45
 The mythical categories alluded 
to in this description highlight the ritualistic traditions that develop over time and 
influence the beholder’s interaction with works of art. 
   But the effect of the reproduction is to detach the authentic work from 
tradition, thereby removing it from the sphere of ritual. With this achieved, the 
perceptual experience of the spectator will no longer be influenced by the 
contemplation of cult values. As Leslie suggests: because photography renders 
the representation of beauty a task for the sciences, objects and matter will no 
longer be “possessed” or “made transcendent”. Hence an image or painting will 
no longer speak the ideals it was once required to utter. That is, it will no longer 
suggest a universal truth or offer a glimpse of some spiritual absolute.
46
 The spell 
of auratic contemplation will be broken because technology allows existing 
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pieces to be reproduced while simultaneously making reproducibility an intrinsic 
factor of new, photographic works. An argument from the Arcades Project 
confirms this assumption: the decimation of the aura in the age of mass 
production is perpetuated by the mass reproduction of the image.
47
  
 
III: Critical Problems. 
 
   Exploring such motifs brings two key issues to light. Firstly, Costello’s 
dismissal of the exchange between photography and painting as parochial 
emerges as problematic. Even when viewed independently of the aura debate, 
there is compelling evidence to support this claim. That the dispute has engaged 
writers as diverse as Charles Baudelaire, Sergi Tret’iakov and Roland Barthes, to 
name but a few, indicates the weight of history that presses against any present or 
future accounts. Reflecting on the subject, Benjamin himself claimed that 
nineteenth-century debates seeking to assess the creative merit of photography 
seemed to be marked by confusion. Yet crucially, he also believed that this 
diminution would never mask the significance of the dialogue in question.
48
 A 
similar degree of confusion today clouds suggestions that re-engaging the topic is 
a reductive activity. The contrary is in fact true. What cannot be overlooked is 
the long and intricate exchange between these practices that stems from the first 
experiments of Daguerre and Fox Talbot. As Anne Rorimer comments, the 
history of photography’s search for fine art status is both “enriched and 
complicated” by the medium’s complex relation to painting.
49
 There are 
numerous accounts able to expound this claim, but for now Eugene Delacroix’s 
opinions will prove instructive. 
   For Delacroix the daguerreotype offered more than a mere tracing. It created a 
mirror image in which details neglected by draughtsmen, artists or any other 
party concerned with the depiction of natural or material objects were made 
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evident, thereby allowing the painter to develop a greater insight into the laws of 
shape and form.
50
 
   Here the camera is presented as a superior drawing aid, a support apparatus 
subordinate to the artist’s genuine creative practice. However, this position can 
be set against ideas Antione Joseph Wiertz published in Le National in 1855, a 
text noteworthy for the esteem in which Benjamin held it. Titled ‘La 
Photographie’, the article in question counters the assumption that the 
daguerreotype deals a fatal blow to the work of art. On the contrary, it asserts 
that the practice “only kills the work of patience and pays homage to the work of 
thought”. Thus Wiertz argues that when photography has developed beyond its 
infancy – and its true power and promise have been revealed – artists will view 
the camera as an ally rather than an enemy, and will seek to integrate its 
technology into their work.51  
   Benjamin viewed this as a “prophecy”.
52
 The connotation is that he identifies 
the dialogue between photography and painting as pivotal to the evolution of 
creative practice. Revisiting this exchange today can be thus understood as a 
critical contribution to an ongoing narrative, rather than a prosaic or diminished 
line of thought. Therefore, while it is not my intention at this stage to champion 
or decry specific interpretations of these motifs, it is necessary to emphasise the 
depth and scope of the subject at hand.  
   Secondly, the conflicting responses to Benjamin outlined above indicate that in 
contemporary theory the auratic has become a site of critical dispute, with 
contrasting viewpoints forming limited readings of the phenomenon. Without 
doubt the interplay between notions of aura and radical ideology has numbered 
among the most contentious issues in recent debates. Pivotal to Benjamin’s thesis 
is the potential of mechanically reproduced, non-auratic art to convey critical 
content, transforming itself thereby into a weapon primed and ready to fire from 
the frontline of class struggle. Freed from the constraints of aura, Benjamin 
claimed that creative labour would build an “art of the proletariat”; an art of a 
classless society that forsakes archaic notions like creativity, genius, eternal 
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value and mystery.
53
 Yet from the 1930s onwards this impulse has been 
deformed by a problematic reassertion of such categories, and consequently of 
artistic aura, in creative practice.  
   For example, revisiting the work of Victor Burgin, Steve Edwards identifies a 
parody of Benjamin’s commitment to dismantle the “metaphysical ideologies of 
art”. In Edwards’ analysis this distortion finds its legacy in the “Burgin School”, 
a “house style” comprising a combination of “tangential text” and studio based 
images either inspired by, or directly assimilating, paintings of the female form 
gleaned from art history.
54
 Burgin’s 1984 work I’vegno per menarvi a l’altra 
riva is taken as representative of this practice. Equally problematic is Burgin’s 
endless recycling of visual material. In Jessica Evans’ reading, the intertextuality 
that emerges through Burgin’s use of appropriation paradoxically brings his 
work into contact with Greenbergian modernism. The critique of self referential, 
autonomous practice may be key to Burgin’s End of Art Theory (1986), yet the 
artist’s focus upon the coded signification operative in visual media and mass 
culture establishes his subject as the “form of representation” itself, thereby 
situating his work within the methodologies of formalism.
55
 Moreover, she 
contends that post-modernism’s intent to eradicate the distinction that separates 
high and low culture through appropriative methodologies actively contributes to 
the inversion of its creative goals, for such strategies are confined solely to the 
level of the image. As Evans concludes, making works that plunder and 
appropriate the motifs of popular culture will not shatter the distinction between 
“high” and “low” culture because the work will remain within the realm of the 
former, and will thus continue to operate within its conventions.56 
   Furthermore, the distance such projects hold from the sphere of the everyday is 
identified as essential to their status as objects of critique, for if removed from 
the institutional context of the gallery there is seemingly very little to prevent 
work that plunders the cultural forms of mass media from being assimilated back 
into the “culture industry” that perpetuates the images appropriated by the artist. 
As Evans avows, this crisis can be resolved only by preserving art’s distance 
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from empirical life. The post-modernist is therefore compelled to re-engage 
Greenberg’s distinction between the avant-garde and “kitsch” in order to 
differentiate their work from the disposable categories of pop culture. Against 
this framework, Edwards contends that Burgin does not follow Benjamin’s 
attempt to demolish art’s “privileged object” but reinstates “the art object into the 
privileged space of eternity”. As Caygill’s reading implies, eternity was key to 
Benjamin’s thoughts upon the cultic content of art, as the unique value associated 
with the eternal influenced a ritualistic reception and auratic contemplation of the 
work. Hence if Edwards’ analysis were to be advanced, it might be concluded 
that by repositioning the art object within this perceptual system Burgin ensures 
his work is met with the same sense of reverence. Therefore, while Burgin pays 
“formal homage to Benjamin”, it can be concluded that his post-modern version 
of the avant-garde nevertheless reverses Benjaminian philosophy and “reinstates 
the aura”.
57
 Yet as Evans’ reading suggests, without the distancing from 
empirical reality affected by auratic experience Burgin’s work would not be able 
to operate as a critical practice. 
   Again, the auratic becomes contested territory, with its reception and 
interpretation identified as points of controversy. But Edwards’ voice has not 
been unopposed. Critical essays have challenged his denunciations and professed 
that the phenomenon need not be viewed disparagingly. Such arguments are 
indebted to Adorno’s work. As Robert Kaufman argues, Adorno polarised 
Benjamin’s position and emphasised the auratic as a revolutionary force in 
creative practice, defending it as “indispensable rather than anathema to Marxian 
dialectics and other progressive or radically intended ideologies”. Referring to 
this reading, Kaufman notes that for Adorno it is “auratic or autonomous art” 
which enables critical debate and “socio-political praxis”. Thus, ideologies which 
validate the non-art or anti-aesthetic, and present a one sided critique of creative 
autonomy, contribute to the erosion of a critical response. Clearly, this refutes 
Benjamin’s support for artistic products derived from strategies of technical 
reproduction that divest and negate aura in favour of political content. 
Consequently, we face the possibility that in an age dominated by post-
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modernism’s valorisation of “endless technological reproduction” there may well 
be a new vocation for auratic works of art.
58
  
   Re-staging the critique of the aura may thus yield the conclusion that the 
phenomenon is vital to critical practice, an assumption that would grant painting 
– or the methodologies of subjective labour and creativity associated with the 
medium – a renewed purchase. In fact Adorno maintained that Benjamin was 
unwilling, albeit in conversation, to completely discount contemporary painting. 
Regardless of his commitment to mechanical reproduction, Adorno asserted that 
his contemporary believed that the traditions and histories of painting had to be 
preserved for times less harrowing than those of his lifetime.
59
 Moreover, Leslie 
states that photography will be unable to deny the sensations of auratic 
perception if creative practice continues to explore certain subjects and if certain 
social relations remain unaltered.
60
 As such, we may conclude that the aura 
always possesses the potential to re-emerge.  
 
IV: Aura and Society. 
 
   In light of such conflicts we can say with conviction that a return to the 
philosophical study of aura is urgently required. This thesis proposes to address 
this imbalance and re-stage the critique of the phenomenon accordingly. Yet 
before undertaking this project it is vital to consider the relationship between 
auratic and social experience. Indeed, the aura atrophies alongside developments 
in social and technological spheres, and not in response to the influence of 
photographic practice alone.
61
 Yet it would be unwise to fully discount critical 
artistic debates when approaching such conceptions. Benjamin confirms this by 
suggesting that the conflict between painting and photography was symptomatic 
of wider historical transformations, the true implications of which were not 
understood by either of the rivals.
62
  
   The extent to which Karl Marx influences such ideas cannot be underestimated. 
The condensed discussion of base and superstructure that precedes the ‘Artwork 
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Essay’ highlights the importance of the thesis to Benjamin’s study. Following 
Marx the dichotomy in question can be given greater clarity, and defined as a 
system of relations operative between humanity and the social forces of 
production. As Marx argued, the totality of the social relations of production 
creates the economic structure of society, the foundation on which is constructed 
a “legal and political superstructure”, and thus the forms and modes of 
contemporary social consciousness. Hence the modes of production dominant in 
“material life” determine the conditions of “social, political and intellectual life”. 
But Marx also claims that at a certain points in history the forces of material 
production will clash with the “existing relations of production”, creating a 
change in the “economic foundation” visible as a re-ordering of the entire 
superstructure. The shift from Feudalism to Capitalism – with its division of 
artisanal processes into their constituent parts, and emphasis upon the generation 
of surplus-value as the governing principle of commodity production and 
exchange – represents just such a revolution. Yet when approaching economic 
transformations of this type Marx warns that one must always differentiate 
between the “material transformation of the economic conditions of production”, 
which can be engaged through natural science, and the transformations manifest 
in legal, political, religious, artistic and philosophical contexts: the ideological 
forms through which individuals become aware of changes in economic life and 
respond to them.
63
 Thus Marx reasons that it is inappropriate to judge a period of 
economic transformation by assessing its consciousness. Rather, one has to do 
the opposite. That is, we must assess and explain the social consciousness 
manifest in periods marked by transformations in the economic base by engaging 
the conflict operative between the “social forces of production” and the “social 
relations of production” specific to that era.64  
   In Benjamin’s study, the perceptual and experiential registers of aura are 
positioned within this conceptual framework. As he argues: the development of 
human sense perception, and the mediums through which those changes are 
staged, are influenced by social factors as well as by nature. Consequently, 
perception emerges as a form of consciousness situated within the ideological 
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categories of superstructure, a faculty subject to the influence of developments in 
economy and production. That Marx places art within this context allows it to 
become the discourse through which such fluctuations may be cognized. 
Benjamin viewed the art of the fifth century in precisely such terms. This era, 
which saw the emergence of the “late Roman art industry”, is credited with the 
formation of an art that was not only different from antiquity but which also 
created a new form of perception. But Benjamin reasons that scholastic research 
into the subject, for instance that of Alois Reigl, approached it from a formalist 
perspective unable to account for the social transformations expressed by these 
changes in perceptual sensation. Reigl’s declaration that “the Christian 
monuments of late antiquity” have not been studied from a perspective focused 
upon their formal properties
65
 may have secured the impetuous for his project, 
but it also represents the focus of Benjamin’s concerns.
66
     
   However, Benjamin also claimed that the potential for similar insights was 
favourable in the present. The influence of photography upon creative practice is 
the focus of this proposition, for, as Leslie notes, Benjamin believed that 
fluctuations in perception were consequential of wider patterns of technological 
innovation. To be sure, the philosopher avowed that new artistic forms resulted 
from changes in human perception; the changes in question being those fostered 
by the visual shocks endemic in the everyday life of modernity. Such 
relationships may be summarised as follows: transformations in industrial, 
economic substructure create new perceptual demands that must be 
accommodated by revolutions in artistic production.
67
  
   Crucially, the aura’s status as a perceptual sensation created or refused by the 
interplay staged between beholder and artwork
68
 suggests it too will be 
influenced by such factors. Benjamin himself advanced a similar idea, arguing 
that if transformations in the “medium of present-day perception” can be 
understood as indicative of the aura’s debasement then it becomes possible to 
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trace the social roots of its decay.
69
 In this context, the exchange between 
photography and painting – which impacts directly upon auratic contemplation – 
becomes symptomatic of the wider social basis of the phenomenon’s decline. To 
interpret this exchange the correlation between patterns of perceptual experience 
staged by works of art and the experiential matrix fostered by the social 
transformations of modernity needs clarification, as the elements are intertwined 
and co-dependant. Therefore we might deduce that Costello’s definition of aura 
as a mode of perceptual experience that is subject to transformations over time is 
accurate but incomplete, for it is by studying the dialogue between photography 
and painting and its interplay with the conditions of everyday life that the sources 
underpinning such developments may be revealed. This discourse, combined 
with the ideas presented so far, will form the basis of my thesis. 
   Titled ‘Walking Saturn’s Rings’, chapter one will focus upon the cultural 
landscape of the Second Republic and the Second Empire, as it is against the 
background of nineteenth century France that Benjamin locates the origins of the 
aura debate. Baudelaire will become a key figure in this context, as his depiction 
of modernity proved vital to Benjamin’s thinking, along with the revised systems 
of labour, economy and commodity exchange staged within Hausmann’s Paris. 
Such factors will initially be explored against Benjamin’s interpretation of the 
modern world as a dreamscape or phantasmagoria, then through the 
philosopher’s reading of the crisis of experience fostered by such environments. 
The critical and philosophical questions aroused by these motifs will be 
approached in relation to notions of aura, and contextualised against the art of the 
era; notably that of Courbet, Manet and the illustrator J. J. Grandville. 
Baudelaire’s thesis on the painting of modern life, Benjamin’s Arcades Project 
and the figure of the Flâneur will provide important points of reference.  
   The evolution of photography, and the medium’s interplay with the avant-
garde, will structure the second chapter. ‘Documents For Artists’ will emphasise 
the camera’s centrality to Constructivism and Surrealism, and will engage early 
dilemmas concerning the camera’s respective position within systems of art, 
science and industry. Attempts to implicate the photographic form within 
patterns of artistic convention will be subject to similar scrutiny. At stake here 
                                                
69
 Walter Benjamin: “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility (Third 
Version)”, 2003, p255. 
 26 
will be issues of mechanical reproduction, mass dissemination, the political 
potential of non-auratic art, and the re-theorization of photography as a 
revolutionary artistic medium. A key debate will be the impact that conceptions 
of artistic genius have upon a work’s capacity to foster acts of auratic experience, 
a subject that will be explored through the prose poems of Baudelaire and the 
paintings of Vincent Van Gogh. This discussion will be followed by an 
exploration of the extent to which photography’s impact upon patterns of 
creative production and notions of artistic authorship influences an object’s 
ability to trigger an immersive, meditative response. These last points will be 
elucidated with reference to the work of Eugène Atget and John Heartfield. 
   ‘Memory Traces’ will explore the notion of empathy and its relationship to 
contemplative patterns of beholding. Specifically, it will expound the idea that to 
experience auratic immersion is to invest objects of perception with it the ability 
to look back. In raising this issue, the essay will expand a point referenced, albeit 
briefly, in connection with Adorno’s reading of aura, namely the notion of the 
viewer assimilating himself or herself to the work. Pivotal to chapter three will 
be the theoretical writings of Michael Fried, notably his study of the German 
painter Adolph Menzel. The artist’s work will be explored in relation to 
Benjamin’s study of the experiential exchange that characterises the act of 
storytelling. Furthermore, it will be argued that the Freudian methodology the 
philosopher later employed to account for the transformation of experience 
responsible for the decline of the aura in Baudelaire can be used to illuminate the 
fluctuating status of empathy in creative practice. Key themes will be the 
influence that industrial labour and the sensory climate of modernity exert over 
the operations of memory and consciousness, a discussion that will be concluded 
in relation to Benjamin’s notion of reception-in-distraction.  
   Chapter four will have dual points of focus. Firstly, it will engage Adorno’s 
response to Benjamin, and the attendant assertion of autonomy as crucial to 
creative practice, and secondly, it will address the exchange between 
photography and painting staged by the “Neo-Avant-Garde”. The essay will open 
a critical connection between the autonomous and the auratic by comparing the 
perceptual sensations staged by objects of pure beauty with the conditions of 
auratic experience. Central to this discussion will be a study of Jackson Pollock 
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and Abstract Expressionism. From here, I will address the political implications 
of autonomous art and explore the status of the aura in such debates.  
   The critical background established by these dialogues will be used to assess 
the legacy of gestural abstraction. I will question how ensuing generations 
reacted to a climate in which expressive, autonomous painting became prominent 
in the gallery, and will ask how the products of their response impacted on the 
auratic. Therefore, a significant area of debate will be the role photography 
played in the methodologies of conceptual and post-conceptual practice and the 
extent to which the camera’s influence re-shaped relationships between beholder 
and artwork. The art of Robert Smithson will provide a framework against which 
such ideas are explored.  
   Following these chapter outlines it becomes advantageous to highlight a key 
discourse of my thesis. Put simply, I intend to elucidate the auratic in relation to 
three specific categories: empathy, mimesis and autonomy. Specifically, I will 
explore the divergent roles these different categories play in the development and 
formation of auratic experience and, moreover, will ask whether or not we can 
identify genuine aura as equivalent to, or consequential of, the subjects under 
discussion. Is aura the same as empathy, and if so how? What are the 
connections between auratic and mimesis, and do these interrelations render 
them indivisible? Finally, what is the exact nature of the exchange between 
Benjamin’s strange weave of time and space and the autonomous? These are 
debates I aim to resolve. 
   The conclusion to my dissertation will explore a climate in which the camera 
has transcended its non-art status to become an accepted form of creative 
practice. Accordingly, I will look at the use of photography to revivify critical 
painterly practice, and consider the work of Jeff Wall in this context. It is 
patently possible that any notions of medium specificity will be exploded amid 
this critical framework. Costello formulates this idea with reference to Fried, 
who avowed that art becomes great only when it achieves an “exemplarity” in its 
given medium, an exemplarity that is judged against a work’s ability to 
assimilate the historical zenith attained by past practice. This proclamation 
suggests a contentious conclusion: if a photographer were to rival the “highest 
achievements of past painting” would it be possible to view their work as a great 
painting rather than as a great photograph? The reverse situation is equally 
 28 
applicable. If a painter were to equal the pinnacles of photographic labour, would 
the feat allow them to be perceived as a talented photographer rather than a pre-
eminent exponent of their own discipline?
70
 
   The initial response may well be “No”, but closer inspection of Fried’s thesis 
suggests answers to the contrary. As Costello reasons, the idea that we cannot 
say a-priori what may classify a work as an example of a particular medium 
beyond the assumption that it must pertain to the practice considered exemplary 
of the medium, raises an important conclusion. Specifically, the notion that if a 
photographer is able to make paintings by employing technology particular to 
photography – or if a painter can make photographs through the medium of paint 
– then we must ask whether it is still feasible to differentiate between the media 
in question?71   
   This hypothesis will raise many implications, but their impact can be gauged 
only if several issues are afforded greater definition. Crucially, the reasons why 
such cross-disciplinary practice has developed need greater consideration. As Jan 
Baetens writes: “Interdisciplinarity is not a decontextualized and dehistoricized 
phenomenon”.
72
 Thus we must ask what forces prompt photography to engage 
methodologies specific to painting, and vice versa? Similarly, if new forms of art 
parallel revolutions in the economic base, and if the perceptual transformations 
staged by such practices are symptomatic of social changes that impact upon the 
phenomenon of aura, then what factors, be they cultural, political or 
philosophical, inspire an exchange or union between the mediums? Furthermore, 
what implications will this situation hold for the auratic itself?  
   To close my introduction I thus offer the following summary of the issues that I 
believe must be addressed if the true focus of the aura debate is to be revealed. 
Firstly, if the aura denotes an experiential category, then the precise nature of 
auratic experience and the factors that engender such encounters must be 
clarified. Similarly, the forces that may debase such sensations have to be 
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identified. Secondly, we need to ask how artworks might foster conditions of 
auratic engagement, and also consider what impact such acts might have upon 
the object in question. Thirdly, we need to explore the interplay operative 
between the perceptual experiences manifest in everyday life and those staged by 
works of art, and decipher what implications such connections hold for the 
auratic. Fourth, it is imperative that a cogent assessment of how art objects 
become purged of the capacity to enact genuine aura is formed. Finally, we must 
consider the legacy of the above issues and ask whether the aura is crucial or 
detrimental to critical practice. The possibilities and dilemmas suggested by a 
non-auratic artwork have to be explored.  
   Together, these themes mark the intellectual territory against which my 
research is conceived. I intend to re-stage the critical study of the aura and thus 
enhance our understanding of one of the most influential, yet elusive, discourses 
of the modern age.    
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“Walking Saturn’s Rings”. 
 
I: Grandville. 
 
   If Paris is a city of dreams then, following Benjamin, we might conclude that 
the aura represents its greatest enigma. It was through Baudelaire’s vision of the 
French capital that Benjamin first located the conditions of aura’s decline, and 
thus began his philosophical study of the phenomenon. If it is our intention to re-
stage this critique, then the environments Benjamin studied will likewise provide 
our point of departure. In the above introduction, I presented aura as a category 
of perceptual experience subject to the influence of transformations in the 
economic base. To test this hypothesis therefore entails considering the auratic 
against the context of social and political change. Paris, and the cultural climate 
of nineteenth century France, will provide a background against which this can 
be achieved. As such, this chapter will focus upon an era of revolution, an age 
marked by transformations in the mode of production, industry and everyday life. 
I will begin by sketching the landscape forged by these fluctuations, in which 
commodity production and exchange came to dominate both personal and social 
relations, before exploring the factors that shaped this reality. With this 
framework established, I will explore the implications such formations hold for 
the sensory matrix of the auratic. 
   In 1867 Edouard Manet painted a view of L’Exposition Universelle, a 
landscape of freshly watered flowers, carefully tended strips of lawn and passers 
by treading the path of a softly curving promenade. Behind this foreground lay 
the vista of halls and towers constructed solely for the occasion. As T. J. Clark 
comments, the Paris depicted was pure “pantomime”. The spectacle even attracts 
a hot air balloonist who pilots his craft lazily across the canvas, giving him a 
birds-eye view of proceedings below. Crucially, event organisers spared little 
effort to grant the public a similarly unobstructed outlook. The scene Manet 
paints, for instance, was created by a literal act of earth moving. A hill, the Bulle 
de Chaillot, was lowered by twenty feet to make the aspect more harmonious. 
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The comic value of this intervention was not lost on Clark, who claimed that the 
act provided a point of attraction in its own right. Yet this detail would not be the 
picture’s only source of amusement. Equally humorous are the figures that enjoy 
the exhibition whilst ensuring that their enjoyment does not go unnoticed. 
Manet’s spectators attempt theatrical grandeur and make animated gestures 
towards what might be considered a magnificent stage set. The gentleman 
surveying events through a pair of binoculars and his female companion looking 
out from the shade of a powder blue parasol are exemplars of this social 
pageantry. The work thus becomes a comedy of fashions, a “parade of types” 
unfolding against an apt location.
1
  
   Benjamin reflected on the phenomenon of world exhibitions in his 1935 
exposé, ‘Paris, The Capital of the Nineteenth Century’. He dubbed them “places 
of pilgrimage to the commodity fetish” and traced their origins to the national 
industrial exhibitions, the first of which took place on the Champ de Mars in 
1789. Subsequent events were held from 1801 to 1899, each citing a wish to 
“entertain the working classes” as their principal aim. For Benjamin, however, 
this goal was misjudged. Rather than presenting festivals of emancipation they 
glorified the commodity’s exchange value, forming a glamorous veneer under 
which its use-value was obscured. Such environments were attuned to the 
pleasure of distraction and the Exposition Universelle of 1867 represented the 
purest distillation of this experience, the most beautiful blossoming of capitalist 
culture.
2
  
   The words of Adolphe Démy guide the reader through this spectacle. In his 
account of the event he describes the layout developed by Le Play, the chief of 
the exhibition committee, in particular detail. As he recounts, all items were 
categorised into specific groups and then placed into one of eight “concentric 
galleries”. The products of many nations were exhibited in these spaces. Hence 
walking around the galleries allowed individuals to survey the divergent 
industries operative in different countries. Onlookers were even able to identify a 
specific branch of industry and, by moving between specific sections of the 
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event, identify which country had achieved the greatest success in any given 
process or occupation.
3
 
   The global ambition of the 1867 fair is confirmed by a review cited in the 
Arcades Project. Echoing Démy’s description, the writer declares that to walk 
through this place was like travelling around the world, for all countries had 
come to sell their wares.
4
 No quarter could escape the grand exhibitions of 
Imperial Paris and their opulent bounty of commodities: the urge to buy touched 
all.
5
 The impact such events had upon local industry proved similarly massive, 
establishing a legacy that permeated the language of advertising and locked 
French stores in a race to become the largest on the planet.6 
   In Benjamin’s analysis, the art of J. J. Grandville – and notably Le Pont des 
Planètes – could be viewed against such phenomena. Taken from Grandville’s 
Another World (1844), the picture evokes the journey of a “fantastic little 
hobgoblin” who makes an adventurous quest across outer space, and depicts an 
extraordinary piece of architecture, the length of which spans the solar system. 
The image shows a huge interstellar bridge, which is so large that its foundations 
are set into planets. The “three-hundred-thirty-three-thousandth pier”, Benjamin 
tells us, rested on Saturn. As the goblin walks past this particular section he is 
surprised to notice that the planet’s famous rings have been clad in iron, forming 
a circular promenade around which those who lived on Saturn could stroll, as if 
to take a breath of evening air.
7
 
   This fantastical image can be associated with the world exhibitions, as event 
organisers would often construct cast iron balconies designed to represent the 
rings of Saturn. Accordingly, those who traversed such structures entered a 
“phantasmagoria” whereby they became the population of Saturn.
8
 The 
structures built to house the 1867 showcase were no exception, and many 
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compared them to extraterrestrial forms. After visiting the site Théophile Gautier 
avowed that its decoration evoked distant planets and alien landscapes that 
human eyes had never before encountered.
9
 For Benjamin, the link between such 
wondrous sensations, and the cosmic journey evoked by Grandville, cast the 
“enthronement of the commodity” as the hidden theme of his art.
10
 However, to 
fully understand this reading of commodity culture as a landscape of fantasy and 
dreams it is appropriate to follow Benjamin and turn to Marx.  
 
II: Marx. 
 
    Discussing the commodity, Marx argued that it would be a mistake to accept it 
as “trivial”. In contrast, he claimed that a matrix of “metaphysical subtleties” and 
“theological niceties” abound in its structure. Benjamin would famously remark 
upon Grandville’s ability to convey such qualities in his art. However, this 
“mystical character” would not originate in the commodity’s use-value. That is, 
from the fact that humanity uses the application of specific skills to turn natural 
materials into items able to satisfy particular wants. On the contrary, it would 
stem from the fact that commodities possess both exchange values and use-
values;
11
 a fact Benjamin hints at above.  
   As Marx writes in Capital, every product of human labour can be identified as 
an item that possesses a use-value. But it is only at specific points in the 
development of society that a transformation will occur that allows an object of 
utility to be identified as a commodity. The transformation in question will take 
place when society comes to view the labour expended in order to make a utility 
as a quality that determines the value of that item.
12
  
   Under such systems, the complexity of labour utilized by acts of manufacture, 
and the value of objects created through that manufacture, become proportionally 
linked. For example, turning a piece of wood into a table expends the “human 
brain, nerves” and “muscles”; an outlay that subsequently determines the value 
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of the finished product. The implications raised by these ideas can be phrased as 
follows. An efficient labour process will necessitate a comparatively short 
amount of “labour-time” in order to produce an object. As such, because a brief 
quantity of labour is required to make it, the artefact wrought by an efficient 
labour process will be of a correspondingly low value. Conversely, where labour 
is less efficient a greater amount of work will be needed to complete a 
production process. Accordingly, when this situation is manifest the resulting 
item will be of higher value because an increased level of toil will have been 
spent in its manufacture.
13
 Moreover, against the background of these arguments 
Marx asserted that whenever an individual makes a commodity in order to 
exchange it with other producers, the social relationships that would have once 
existed between such parties will be replaced by a form of social relationship 
manifest between the products of their toil.
14
  
   This idea may be elucidated as follows. Socially independent producers make 
commodities and view them as sources of exchange value. Articles of this type 
are subsequently exchanged with other producers, who both recognise and need 
the utility they embody. This process occurs through systems of “barter” in 
which money (or a form of money such as land, live-stock or other items) 
equivalent to the labour value expended in the construction of the commodity is 
exchanged for the article in question.
15
 Hence the interplay between the “labour 
of the individual” and the wider “labour of society” is established not as a direct 
social relation between individuals, but as material relations between producers 
of goods and social relations manifest between the products of their labour. To 
find an analogy for this situation Marx argues that we must turn to the discourse 
of religion, for in that world items wrought by human skill become 
“autonomous” objects imbued with a subjective essence that enables them to 
form relationships with other people. That the exchange and production of 
commodities allows inanimate matter to enter into relationships with other 
people means that the commodity will take on the same character as the cultic 
icon. Thus when Marx speaks of the fetishism of the commodities he is referring 
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to the capacity of such artefacts to re-stage the social relations fostered by the 
fetishistic form.16  
   However, Marx also believed the commodity held the potential to induce 
alienation, a situation that could be considered consequential of capitalist 
industry. Like the individual producer, the capitalist seeks to make commodities 
that can be sold or exchanged, but crucially he also aims to produce items with 
an exchange-value greater than his original investment. In other words, he seeks 
to generate surplus value through the manufacturing process itself. To achieve 
this, he or she employs workers to make artefacts while simultaneously accruing 
surplus labour from his employees, for surplus value is formed only by the 
creation of excess of labour, by a “lengthening of one and the same labour 
processes”.
17
  
   As Marx argues, the worker views their labour power as a commodity that can 
be sold in order to maintain their subsistence. This labour can have a cost 
indicative of its intricacy, e.g. six “shillings” for one day’s toil. But in order to 
accumulate surplus labour, and hence surplus value, the businessman must 
extend the working day beyond the time it takes the employee to realise the wage 
value of their labour power. Consequently, if it takes six hours toil to meet the 
cost of the worker’s subsistence and the capitalist’s expenditure, then surplus 
value can be gleaned by lengthening the working day from between 8 – 18 hours, 
depending upon physical, social, mental and environmental limitations.
18
 
However, such acts were considered by many to be deeply immoral and in 
England were constrained by the parliamentary “Factory Acts” of 1833 – 64, 
which sought to standardise a ten-hour working shift and protect the labourer’s 
health and sanity against exploitation. Marx would illustrate the urgency of this 
need with reference to numerous case studies, notably that of Mary Anne 
Walkerly, who died at 20 through excess work, insufficient food and gradual 
suffocation caused by a lack of air in her workspace.
19
 The problem facing the 
capitalist thus became how to generate surplus value without overworking their 
employees. This issue anticipates a more general concern faced by factory 
owners across Europe, the quandary of how to increase profits?   
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   This was a complex dilemma. “Raw materials”, “auxiliary materials” and 
“instruments of labour” represented fixed aspects of production that could not be 
negated.
20
 Likewise, the workers’ pay could not be reduced, as this would not 
correspond to their needs of subsistence or to the value of their labour. Therefore, 
rather than cutting the amount spent on goods or wages, the employers’ only 
option would be to find some way of diminishing the actual value of the labour 
performed by the worker.
21
 This demanded the objectification of only socially 
necessary labour in the production process, which in turn required a 
maximisation of efficiency.  
   As Marx explains, factory owners achieved this by dividing complex tasks into 
their constituent parts, thereby replacing the individual craftsman with a group of 
workers, each focused on a specific aspect of an object’s manufacture. The 
notion of an individual crafting a unique product is thus rendered archaic, insofar 
as a collective chain of workers is established in his or her place. Skill levels are 
consequently reduced, because the dexterity of the artisan is broken down, 
simplified and shared, an act that cheapens the value of labour itself. A working 
day can therefore comprise a higher percentage of surplus labour, as the time to 
realise the monetary value of the worker’s labour will fall. And as the value of 
each commodity hinges upon the amount of labour expelled in its production, 
this additional work yields surplus value in commodity form. Furthermore, 
because each worker develops the raw materials processed by the previous link 
in the chain, a natural time limit is enforced upon each stage of production, 
enabling such articles to be manufactured with great speed. Once sold or 
exchanged, these artefacts realise the capitalist’s goal of profit upon the capital 
advanced to begin production. Automation perpetuates this situation by casting 
the worker in the further debased role of machine operator.
22
 Whereas the worker 
once utilized a tool, a machine now utilizes him or her. Thus the value of their 
labour will fall again.
23
 Consequently, even less time will elapse before the 
worker’s vocation realises its equivalent value, increasing both the surplus labour 
and surplus value produced.  
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III: Dream World. 
 
   However, mechanization and division of labour engender a state of uniform 
perfection, whereby all goods are produced with identical precision. The marks 
of human skill thus vanish amid a stream of homogenised artefacts.
24
 As Esther 
Leslie observed, any evidence of craft and skill will be masked, as if to conceal 
the fact that the individual who exchanges commodities did not make the 
artefacts but “appropriated the work contained in them”.
25
 Under such systems, 
items fashioned by the subject will confront him as something alien because, as 
he completes acts of productive labour he will become estranged from himself.
26
  
   As Marx argued, man possesses the conscious free will to create an “objective 
world” through the “fashioning of inorganic nature”. Animals, it is true, also 
build their own environment, but do so only in response to specific needs. A 
beehive, for example, satisfies the wants of shelter and safety. Humanity, 
however, is not fettered by immediate physical demands, and can fashion articles 
that satisfy other desires, like beauty. It is through such acts that man 
“reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and 
actually”. That is, the individual is able to contemplate themselves in a world that 
they have created, allowing the objects wrought by human endeavour to become 
part of human consciousness. Accordingly, the subject meets himself in the 
objects of his labour and meets others in the forms they have fashioned. Yet 
when the worker becomes estranged from the outcomes of their toil, when they 
can no longer contemplate themselves in the things they have fashioned, this 
exchange can no longer endure and a detachment from reality ensues.
27
 The 
automation of modern industry provoked this exact experience. Because 
capitalist economy purged all evidence of the workers’ craft, the products of their 
labour were returned to them as fantastic objects that appeared to be the creation 
of some divine or magical force.
28
 
   Such ideas informed Benjamin’s reading of nineteenth century culture. But this 
was less an economic inquiry than a “philosophy of historical experience” 
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exploring the sensations fostered by the age of high capitalism.
29
 Key to this 
study would be the Parisian arcades, a site of enduring fascination for the writer.  
   In 1852, the Illustrated Guide to Paris described the “inner boulevards” as a 
luxurious innovation in the field of modern consumerism. The arcades boasted 
glass ceilings and marble-clad corridors that stretched through whole buildings 
that had been altered to accommodate them. Lit from above, these halls were 
lined on either side with beautiful shops, effectively forming a miniature indoor 
city. Within the customer would find everything they needed, they could even 
shelter from a sudden storm and promenade safely through its gleaming 
avenues.
30
  
   Once safely ensconced, the consumer would enjoy an enticing display. The 
arrangement of goods was like a picture puzzle: hair dryers would hang next to 
figurines of the Venus de Milo, “prosthesis and letter writing manual” were 
brought into juxtaposition, and always a swift interchange of colour would 
delight.
31
 A letter written to Gretel Adorno in March 1939 reveals the impact this 
landscape had upon Benjamin’s work. Speaking of his ongoing Arcades Project, 
the philosopher remarks how he has “busied” himself with one of the key 
concepts of his research, placing at the centre of his study the contention that the 
commodity-producing society creates a cultural phantasmagoria.
32
  
   We encountered the term “Phantasmagoria” in Benjamin’s discussion of 
Grandville, but only now are we able to assess its significance. The word 
originally referred to a machine of nineteenth century origin, a device that 
conveyed a sequence of spectral images to its audience. Watching such displays 
would be an illusory, dreamlike experience, as the beholder would see things that 
were not literally real. A similar dreamscape would account for the subject’s 
reception of modernity. As Leslie contends, the misinterpretations of reality 
encountered by the individuals who beheld the ghostly projections of the 
phantasmagoria would mirror the manner in which people perceived the contents 
of their everyday worlds.
33
 The fleeting, fragmented impressions cast by an 
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accelerated pace of life accounted, in part, for such sensations. Yet Benjamin 
also discerned an economic base to the phenomenon, which he identified with 
reference to Marx. As he argued, “the property appertaining to the commodity as 
its fetish character” also attaches itself to the “commodity producing society”, 
but only when it begins to overlook or abstract itself from the fact that is engaged 
in the production of commodities.
34
 
   In other words, the estrangement caused by an economy that masked all traces 
of human involvement in the manufacture of goods compelled the worker to 
forget their status as producers, forming a misappropriation central to Benjamin’s 
notion of the social phantasmagoria. For Benjamin, the masses would experience 
reality as a dream world or phantasmagoria precisely because the “relations of 
production” caused them to overlook the fact that they were makers of 
commodities.
35
 This situation engenders numerous debates, yet they can be 
engaged only if the political formations underpinning the culture of nineteenth 
century France are explored. It becomes necessary, therefore, to contextualise the 
reign of Louis Napoleon against the preceding age of the Second Republic. 
Events beginning in 1848 hence become a crucial point of focus. 
 
IV: Revolution. 
 
   1848 was the year of the February revolution. For three days an “alliance of 
classes” fought to secure rights of universal suffrage across the population, 
ousting the “July Monarchy” formed by Louis Phillipe in 1830. However, this 
union was itself riddled with division, comprising as it did the polarised groups 
of proletariat and bourgeoisie. Honoré Daumier anticipated the problems born of 
this coalition. Writing to his mother in 1847, he speculated that Paris might spiral 
into revolution. Yet he was not fearful of the threat posed by the people, but 
rather that of the bourgeoisie. His chief concern was that the middle classes 
would exploit the ensuing power vacuum and ordain themselves “the new 
royalty”.
36
 For Kristin Ross, such prophecies were historically accurate. As she 
argues, Marx maintained that the uprising of 1848 succeeded only in 
                                                
34
 Walter Benjamin: The Arcades Project, [X13,a], 1999, pp 669 – 700.  
35
 Esther Leslie: Walter Benjamin: Overpowering Conformism, 2000, p193.  
36
 T. J. Clark: The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France 1848 – 1851, London, 
Thames and Hudson, 1973, pp 9 – 11. 
 41 
“transferring power from one faction to another”.
37
 Key to this process would be 
an attempt to transfigure events so that Parisian businessmen and proprietors 
would be heroised for their part in the insurgency.   
   The February revolution was fought and won on the barricades, a tactic that 
had historical precedent in France. Barricades were structures that stretched 
across whole streets and offered insurgents a defensive shield. A description of 
one such construction dating from 1840 notes that its components included 
upturned carts, boxes intended to hold fruits, wheels of various sizes and 
numerous small fires that spewed forth plumes of blue smoke.38  
   Such scenes were emblematic of working class emancipation. But the vision of 
the worker as radical was not one the bourgeoisie supported; hence they sought 
to invest the barricade with their own symbolism. They claimed it represented 
the triumph of “good will” over “tyranny”, integrating it into the myth that the 
self-made man had constructed the nation. Yet this myth was exactly that. While 
artisans and labourers alike met government forces during the February uprising, 
their wealthy counterparts were more likely to have merely refused the state’s 
plea for defence against the insurgents. In this context, the workers fighting on 
the barricade become akin to “serfs fighting their masters battles”.
39
  
   Against this divided background, the utopianism of the Second Republic 
rapidly declined, with many of its social promises going unfulfilled. The 
establishment of “national workshops” to support the unemployed, the 
introduction of a standardized ten hour working day and the nationalisation of 
the country’s railways numbered among the most contentious issues. Civil unrest 
became outright rebellion when a resolution drafted on the 22
nd
 June 1848 
cancelled the national workshop programme. By the following evening a long 
line of barricades had been erected, stretching across the city and dividing it in 
two. In the eastern half, the working class region of the city, a total of 50,000 
men and women took arms and were mobilized against the Republic. Initially 
they gained ground, but the response of the government was swift. The Garde 
Mobile, with their armoury of heavy guns, was deployed and the revolt was 
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quelled by 26
th
 June. Marx defined these “June Days” as the “Ugly” revolution, 
contrasting them with the beauty of the February uprising.
40
 For T.J. Clark, 
however, they were a war for civilization, which saw the bourgeoisie fighting to 
defend social order and the workers fighting for their social rights.
41
 Crucially, 
this social disharmony would swell and impact upon artistic practice. As 
Théophile Thoré commented, following the onset of social unrest the arts have 
been forced to “fend for themselves”.
42
  
   Describing the demands created by the February revolution, Théophile Gautier 
speculated that, in order to echo the new social climate, the buildings and 
monuments of Paris should have been decorated with a fantastic range of 
masterpieces evocative of the new sense of liberty that dominated the 
metropolis.
43
 However, such plans never reached fruition and the Republic failed 
to find an image to unite its disparate parts. Festivals of art and fraternity were 
staged, but quickly became objects of ridicule. Ambitions to adorn the ‘Arc de 
Triomphe’ with potent symbols of uprising, such as a “giant eagle” or “bronze 
colossus of liberty”, went unrealised, and an intended programme of state 
sponsorship for the arts fell into decline.
44
  
   Similarly problematic was a competition announced in March 1848, offering 
artists the opportunity to design a painting, sculpture or medallion “of the 
Republic”. Essentially asking: “what was the Republic and how should it be 
represented”, the brief was too ambiguous and those seeking advice were given 
only “vague rhetoric or pedantic instructions”. Many artists simply yielded to 
those in power and followed the schema relayed by a “ministry spokesman” who 
advocated the unification of “liberty, equality and fraternity” in a single figure. 
This personification of the Republic was to be seated, to impress notions of 
stability upon the spectator, and the tricolor of red, white and blue had to 
dominate the composition. Entries thus became programmatic depictions of a 
female protagonist who was either seated upon, or placed in front of, a large 
throne, and who held in her hand the symbols of the “Republican trinity”. Such 
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uniformity provoked the cartoonist’s satire, and was greeted with the critic’s 
scorn.
45
   
 
V: Courbet. 
 
   To find an artistic expression of 1848 thus entails looking beyond the 
boundaries of state sponsorship. Indeed, Clark claimed that the true avant-garde 
of mid nineteenth-century France was populated by those who viewed the 
tumultuous events of Paris from a distance. Jean-François Millet fled to Barbizon 
in 1849, Daumier lived “furtively” in Quai d’Anjou, Baudelaire claimed to be 
forever estranged from the “respectable world” by his “tastes and principles”, 
while Gustave Courbet made his most crucial work at Ornans.
46
 Of such works it 
is Courbet’s masterpiece, The Burial at Ornans (1849-50), which proves most 
useful when considering the political tensions inherent to the Second Republic.  
   The Burial depicts a funeral procession set against a rural landscape, a subject 
that was far from simplistic. Indeed, images of country society became politically 
sensitive following February 1848. The elections of 29
th
 May 1849 were key in 
this context. Though traditionally perceived to be Conservative and loyal to the 
influence of landowners and “notables”, the ballot saw masses of rural voters 
break their stereotype and support the “democrates-socialistes”, the newly 
formed leftist coalition. This swing created “La France rouge”, a haven of 
Socialism built in response to the impoverishment triggered by wealthy citizens 
who forged their prosperity in the provinces.  
   Initially, the Right dismissed this as a temporary shift, but nationally the 
political stance grew ever closer to the spirit of 1789. Land shortage underpinned 
this new radicalism. There were simply too many people living in rural districts 
and not enough farms to support them. As a result, there was a sharp increase in 
the price of land itself, inviting estates to buy up acres and reap profit. Large 
farms thus expanded while smallholdings were engulfed: the middle classes grew 
wealthy on the worker’s debasement.
47
 Rather than working their own land, and 
growing crops that could be used as food or sold to other producers in order to 
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generate extra income, the peasant would be forced to live as a tenant. 
Consequently, they would be compelled to transfer a percentage of their produce 
to the landowner in return for the right to till their earth. Therefore, their toil 
would supply the wealthy with a stream of saleable commodities, rather than 
supporting their own subsistence.
48
 
   Courbet’s work derived its intensity from this social climate, with The Burial 
in particular revealing the class struggles of rural life. However, Michael Fried 
has claimed that while Clark correctly defines the picture as one suffused with 
political significance, he ultimately fails to explain the precise nature of the 
painting’s impact.
49
 What follows is an attempt to redress this imbalance and 
reclaim something of The Burial’s radicalism.     
   As a canvas the painting was vast, measuring roughly twenty feet in width and 
touching almost twelve feet in height. Across these dimensions snaked a cortège 
of over fifty life size figures.
50
 The rural bourgeois populated this crowd and 
their demeanour betrayed the greed that drove their oppression of the poor. 
Responding to claims that the painting was “ugly” Champfleury argued that the 
painter had in fact been faithful to their appearance. Their vile faces, wrinkled 
skin and hollow eyes were all consequential of their way of life. The pursuit of 
money, the insatiable need to boost their fragile egos and the petty squabbles that 
emerged between them and their contemporaries had taken their toll. Thus, for 
Champleury, by painting an ugly picture Courbet had portrayed the bourgeoisie 
in their truest state.51  
   It is the gravedigger, kneeling beside the freshly dug earth, who represents the 
poor. Like Courbet’s StoneBreakers (1849-50) he works the land, but here he 
possesses a strength that belies his status. While they wait for the corpse to be 
lowered, the wealthy onlookers are struck by the thought that they too will meet 
this fate, a realisation to which Bouchon gave poetic description.  As he noted, 
Death offered no observation of social status, and would lead all condemned 
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souls in the same macabre dance regardless of the exalted position they may have 
held in life.
52
  
   When that day arrives, the gravedigger will be the capitalist’s final link to the 
living world. Like Charon ferrying souls across the river Styx, he will induct 
them into the afterlife. Accordingly, he will not just put men to rest, but will bury 
the worker’s master and avenge those to whom circumstance have assigned years 
of misery and toil. The gravedigger is thus empowered, and assumes authority in 
the composition. As Bouchon comments, he is the sole figure who commands 
any semblance of authority in the composition. That he is the only figure to 
attempt eye contact with the priest, the conductor of this religious ceremony, 
attests to his fortitude.  
   By bringing such paintings to the Salon, Courbet effectively transferred class-
conflict into the exhibition space. Undoubtedly, this act generated great 
controversy, leading Champfleury to mock the public outcry against the The 
Burial’s inclusion in the Salon of 1850. His satire centred upon the sense of fear 
that gripped those who had witnessed the canvas, and their subsequent attempts 
to remove the offending work from public display. Indeed, he described the 
terror of the conservative visitors who claimed that that Courbet was the child of 
the 1848 revolution, and as such should be expelled from the gallery.53  
   Key to such unease was the fact that radicals such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
actively championed Courbet’s work. As Benjamin observed, Proudhon sought 
to integrate the painter’s work into his own ideological and political campaigns.
54
 
In this context, Courbet’s art emerged as a potential catalyst for future acts of 
social revolt, a banner under which the disaffected and dispossessed could unite 
once more. To be sure, the Left were quick to identify him as a figurehead of the 
February revolution and the ideals for which it stood. For example, Benjamin 
remarks upon a leaflet designed to present the heroes of 1848 to the masses, a 
publication in which Courbet was shown speaking the following words: 
humanity shall experience no peace or happiness “until the day the republic 
sends the son of God back to the carpenter’s shop of monsieur his father”.
55
 That 
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the artist was shown uttering such declarations is testament to his standing as a 
supporter of insurgency, as a man of the people.  
   In fact, it was Courbet’s wish that Paris would one day become a city governed 
by a “citizen created order”, an order that would grant each individual the 
freedom to pursue his or her own interests.
56
 The radicalism that drove this 
yearning for an egalitarian society was captured for eternity by a famous 
caricature. Titled Actualité, the sketch shows Courbet standing, palette in hand, 
amid the rubble of the smashed Vendôme Column, a structure built as a 
monument to the achievements of Napoleon I. The Commune of 1871 destroyed 
this statue in a final defiance of the old order, and crucially Courbet would be 
implicated in – and later imprisoned for – the crime in question.
57
 Accordingly, 
although such events would be unknown to the bourgeois of 1850 they 
nevertheless reveal the politics of the man whom Benjamin would call the “great 
communard painter”,
58
 thereby confirming why conservative Parisians had good 
reason to fear both his presence and his art.  
   A further explanation of why Courbet’s work proved so controversial when 
exhibited in the French capital can be traced through Steve Edwards’ reading of 
Marx. Although not written in reference to Courbet, the following argument – 
with its allusions to Mary Shelley – becomes significant when contextualised 
against The Burial.
59
  
   For Edwards, Shelley’s Frankenstein offers an important thesis upon on the 
“class dynamics of fear” in nineteenth century capitalism. Central to this claim is 
an analogy drawn between Frankenstein’s relation to his monster and the social 
dynamic that connects proletariat and bourgeois. In Edwards’ analysis, the 
capitalist’s fate echoes that of Frankenstein because the production processes 
they initiate will foster a dilemma similar to that endured by the protagonist of 
Shelley’s tale. Like Frankenstein, factory owners will be bound to an ogre from 
which they will never escape, an ogre that threatens their very existence. As 
Edwards concludes with reference to Marx, in addition to financial gain the 
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bourgeoisie thus produces their own “grave-diggers”. The “possessing class” 
becomes the “possessed”.
60
 
   Such claims can be elucidated as follows. If modern manufacture is focused 
upon the generation of surplus value – which in turn hinges upon the extraction 
of surplus labour from the worker – and if such feats require the creation of a de-
skilled mass of labourers who are transformed from artisans to machine 
operators, then the very class that perpetuates the evolution of capitalist economy 
simultaneously holds the potential to instigate its downfall. Indeed, if the 
proletariat rebel against their employers, then the prosperity they have forged 
will be destroyed. Furthermore, there is no way in which the factory owner could 
avoid this possibility, for without the labouring classes – and the labour-power 
commodity they offer – there can be no surplus value, and hence no profit. As 
Marx confirmed: the proletariat was both formed by and essential to capitalist 
accumulation.
61
  The entrepreneur is thus fated to conjure the threat of their own 
decline in tandem with their success. This explanation undoubtedly applies to the 
French bourgeoisie, for the “classe dangereuse”
62
 – the unruly horde of labourers 
that the notable citizens feared with such intensity – was their creation, albeit one 
of economics and not macabre science. Consequently, they too would live in 
perpetual dread of the society upon which their advancement was founded.   
   Crucially, the central figure in The Burial at Ornans embodied this very 
danger. Both literally and metaphorically, Courbet’s painting evoked the idea 
that the bourgeoisie will create their own gravediggers through their exploitation 
of the poor. In the canvas, the peasant digs the graves of wealthy men because he 
is obliged to do so by his situation in life. But if he rises up against his masters 
and the repression fostered by their drive to purchase land – an impulse that has 
denied him the means of subsistence and compelled him to servitude – then he 
threatens to assign their business interests a similar fate. Moreover, this situation 
would not be limited to the countryside and the social systems it sustained. Like 
the figure patiently waiting beside his pile of freshly dug earth, the masses 
employed in Parisian industries possessed the potential to condemn their 
employers through acts of insurgency. Any image that disclosed this state of 
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affairs would thus engender anxiety in the Right, while conversely being 
appropriated by radicals and revolutionaries alike. Undoubtedly, The Burial 
possessed this power, and therefore threatened to destabilise the state by inciting 
the people to take arms against their oppressors. However, the capital would 
soon see attempts to sooth this fear by subduing the spectre of workers’ revolt. 
 
VI: Haussmann. 
 
   The Second Republic ended in 1851, following Louis Napoleon’s December 
coup d’état. The Second Empire was born, yet social tensions between rich and 
poor remained constant. However, the new regime’s response was both elaborate 
and far-reaching. At its centre was the Second Empire’s most ambitious project: 
the attempt to re-design and re-construct Paris itself. Consequently, the architect 
Baron Haussmann was commissioned to re-shape the French capital into the 
image craved by its masters.
63
 Remarking upon his achievements, Le Corbusier 
commented that Haussmann gouged great holes through the metropolis and 
worked with such ferocity that it seemed unlikely that Paris would survive his 
“surgical” experiments. Yet in spite of these concerns, he concedes that the 
Baron’s “daring and courage” resulted in the city’s celebrated beauty.
64
 But the 
architect’s objectives were not solely aesthetic. Crucially, he was also employed 
to transform Paris into a space that could no longer stage revolution; a city that 
the workers could not besiege.  
   As Benjamin avowed, the driving force of Haussmann’s project was an attempt 
to secure the city from the threat of uprising. Specifically, he sought to eradicate 
any possibility that barricades might one day be constructed in the metropolis. 
He widened the existing streets in order to hamper anyone wishing to construct a 
line of defence redolent of those that had perpetuated the February uprising. 
Furthermore, he constructed new streets designed to offer a short, direct route 
between the working class regions of Paris and the barracks of soldiers stationed 
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in the capital. Thus if any unrest were to spark it could be quelled with speed and 
precision.65 
   A more satirical explanation of such projects emerges through suggestions that 
the decision to widen the streets was “necessitated by the crinoline”,
66
 yet this 
proposition is not as frivolous as it seems. Although superficially different, the 
pursuit of fashion and the preservation of civil order share one key characteristic: 
both are concerns of the wealthy. As such, their twin role in shaping the new city 
confirms how the rise of the bourgeoisie was inscribed upon Paris, acre after 
acre, through Haussmann’s “architectural and social reorganisation”. To be sure, 
the “Artist of Demolition”
67
 sought to divide the capital according to class 
boundaries, a process that saw the uprooting and relocation of the proletariat 
from their traditional homes in the quartiers of central Paris to the northeastern 
districts of Belleville and Menilmontant.
68
  
   Hausmann’s railways, aqueducts, sanitation systems, gas lighting, public 
transportation, opera houses, cemeteries and tree-lined promenades necessitated 
the eviction of an estimated 350,000 people. Such individuals were lured with 
the promise of jobs in the factories that had been relocated to the “Banlieue”, the 
landscape van Gogh portrayed as the melancholic realm of rag pickers, gypsies 
and washerwomen.
69
 Segregating rich and poor in this manner created “active” 
and “passive” zones within the city itself, splitting its geography into the 
“privileged spaces” where decisions were made and the submissive districts 
compelled to follow such rulings.
70
 This scheme began a chain reaction that 
would transform the economy of the capital. 
   Prior to the embellishments, the economy of the quartier had defined Parisian 
industry. It was a system in which the workshops supporting various production 
processes were gathered in single streets, enabling the price of labour and raw 
materials to remain constant. As Clark comments, “business and sociability were 
bound together”. Each district would have a wholesaler or négociant, who 
imported goods and products from quartiers across the city, effectively making 
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him the equivalent of a bourgeois shopkeeper. These communities were a 
characteristic image of old Paris. However, Haussmann’s clearances intruded 
upon and replaced such networks, homogenizing the city’s businesses by 
building a society in which the notion of individual producers became obsolete.
71
  
   The ‘Grand Magasins de Nouveautés’ were crucial in this context. Using 
money generated by “property speculation”, Haussmann lined his new streets 
with large department stores readily equipped to accommodate articles produced 
en-masse. These buildings provided natural outlets for the intensively 
manufactured goods generated by capitalism. They made bartering redundant, 
introduced systems of rapid turnover, and transformed the shop floor into a space 
where the consumer was prompted and invited by the commodity. By the mid 
1860’s, the majority of Parisian trade was housed within their walls. The 
craftsmen who remained in the quartiers thus faced extensive competition from 
the imported goods and cheap labour that flooded Paris via Haussmann’s new 
streets, likewise from the burgeoning systems of collective labour housed in the 
factories of the Banlieue. To find an outlet for their wares, the artisans’ only 
option would be to seek contracts with the new stores. But once employed, they 
would be compelled to use the low quality materials provided for them by the 
“agents” of the Grand Magasins, and accept the long hours and standardised pay 
dictated by the same parties. Crucially, these conditions generated surplus labour 
and hence goods with exchange values greater than the cost of their creation. 
Further division and mechanization of production followed in order to increase 
profit margins, fostering a climate that eventually subsumed the old way of life.
72
  
   For Edouard Fournier, the term “boulevard” was itself indicative of this 
transformation. Discussing the etymology of the word he claimed that it was a 
mutation of the word bouleversement, meaning “commotion” or “upheaval”
73
. 
Therefore, to bathe the capital in the light of prosperity, Haussmann created an 
illusory vision of equality that masked the vast profits private investors gleaned 
from his schemes.
74
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   Paris thus became a stage on which Louis Napoleon’s promotion of 
“investment capital” could enjoy free reign
75
, a transformation embodied by the 
world exhibition of 1867, which symbolized the Second Empire’s ascendancy.
76
 
Moreover, by openly intending to improve the health and morality conditions of 
the workers,
77
 such showcases performed political functions that harmonised 
with the need to preserve social order.  
   Indeed, academics have traced a dialogue between the economic 
transformations initiated by Haussmann and the Second Empire’s drive to nullify 
civil unrest. As Buck-Morss contends, the Empire used the world fairs to present 
industry and technology as “mythic powers” imbued with the potential to create 
futures of “world peace, class harmony, and abundance”. Hence they offered the 
masses glimpses of a new and better reality. Yet because the utopia conveyed by 
such spectacles would be achieved through economics rather than revolution, its 
dissemination throughout society would effectively numb the dangers of class 
conflict.
78
 Buck-Morss identifies a key example of this effect. Echoing 
Benjamin’s claim that such events were conceived as entertainment for the 
working class, she notes that up to four hundred thousand labourers attended the 
Exposition of 1867. But unlike the other visitors they received free tickets and 
were thus encouraged to enter the place where they could behold the marvellous 
products that their labour had created – but which they could not afford to own – 
and gaze in wonderment at the new machines that would soon render their 
craftsmanship obsolete.
79
  
   Therefore, the automation and division of labour that flourished following the 
dissolution of the quartier economy not only estranged the workers from the 
products of their craft, but also allowed the endless arrays of goods housed by the 
exhibitions and Grands Magasins to be returned to their makers as symbols of the 
progress miraculously generated by the new age. Haussmann’s Paris became a 
mirage of magical objects and stunning fashions, all of which appeared to be 
supernaturally conjured from thin air.
80
 Consequently, labourers were compelled 
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to overlook the fact that the self-perpetuating utopia before them was driven by 
their own toil, and focus instead upon the wondrous era in which they lived.  
   Furthermore, the exhibitions contained physical representations of the model 
worker this situation would create. In the 1867 event, Le Play designed a section 
called Petits Métiers, in which both male and female craftspeople could be seen 
making commodities such as lace, artificial flowers and chocolate. In organising 
these attractions, Le Play was keen to express the independence and autonomy of 
such people, and to emphasise that their trades could employ whole family 
units.
81
 This last point was key to the overall image he sought to convey. As Ross 
observes, his goal was to create an image of a model worker for the newly 
industrialised society, a feat he attempted by combining the morality and family 
values of the rural labourer with the skills and energy possessed by their urban 
counterpart.82  
   Reconstructing the worker as religious, moralistic and productive figure can be 
thus viewed as an attempt to ensure that the proletariat extolled middle-class 
values rather than opposing them. Such character traits were sold to the masses 
in an attempt to purge them of sublimisme, the disease of insubordination, 
drunkenness and idleness that threatened to sow seeds of revolution in the 
labourer’s consciousness. With these poisons eradicated, the public would be 
happy to work, earn and buy back the results of their toil.
83
   
   Analogous ideas reverberate through the “Mirror File” of the Arcades Project, 
in which Benjamin points towards a similar exchange between worker, economy 
and society.
84
 He compared the glasslike surface of Parisian streets, the 
illuminated shops and cafes that flanked them, and the shining walls that 
decorated their interiors, to an ancient sorcery designed to lull people into 
“seductive bazaars”.
85
 In this “city of mirrors”,
86
 workers would see their 
likeness wherever they went. Yet because such reflections obscured the social 
realities of manufacture, it would be returned to them as a “commodity fixated” 
consumer rather than a producer.
87
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   Such experiences are captured by Baudelaire’s prose poem ‘The Eyes of the 
Poor’ (1864), which describes an impoverished family who gaze at a sparkling 
café, resplendent with “blindingly white walls” and a “dazzling expanse of 
mirrors”.  
   The prose relays, in particular, the wonder and amazement the spectacle 
engenders in the onlookers. In the work, the father looks upon the establishment 
and his eyes become captivated by the majesty displayed before him. The eyes of 
his eldest son are similarly charmed. He badly wants to enter, but his impulse is 
tempered by recognition of the fact that a poor child such as he would surely be 
turned away from such a place. Finally, the youngest child is described as being 
simply too awestruck by the façade to express any rational reaction.88 
   The sense of longing such descriptions evoke suggests how the promise of 
consumption, of owning the signs of advancement wrought by their own hand, 
captivated the masses and announced itself as a mode of development against 
which civil insurgence became archaic. Even though the father acknowledges the 
inequality that allowed such façades to prosper – a realisation evident in his 
claim that the cafe is decorated with “the gold of the poor” – he is nevertheless 
entranced. Consequently, such accounts reveal how – like the joyous illusion 
conveyed by the World Exhibitions in which man-made goods appeared as gifts 
from ‘outer space’ and the consumer became an interstellar traveller – the public 
encountered but a flickering spectre of reality, not a concrete actuality of 
everyday life. Any disaffection arising from the economic revolutions of 
Haussmann’s metropolis would be divested from this mirage, thereby 
domesticating the mob and extinguishing the revolutionary spark that Courbet’s 
art threatened to ignite.
89
 Such would be the legacy of the cultural 
phantasmagoria, of the dream world formed by a city that masked the social 
relations of production.  
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VII: Allegory. 
 
   As ‘The Eyes of the Poor’ suggests, Baudelaire’s work was entwined with the 
sensory and experiential landscape of Haussmann’s metropolis.
90
 Benjamin 
viewed the poet in this exact context. Following Marx, he defined cultural 
artefacts as evocations of “underlying economic patterns”, as discourses against 
which the interplay between the economic base and ideological superstructure 
might be subject to critical enquiry.
91
 The beginnings of this idea take shape in 
the Arcades Project. Here Benjamin anticipates a debate that will exceed Marx’s 
initial link between “economy and culture” by investigating not only the 
“economic origins of culture” but also the expression of the economic patterns in 
the products of creative labour. Undoubtedly, Baudelaire’s work could be read in 
such terms. Indeed, reflecting on the evolution of nineteenth century art, 
Benjamin suggested that the middle decades of that era were subject to a 
profound transformation. As he argued, this change hinged on the fact that the 
commodity form became directly imposed upon the artwork. For Benjamin, this 
rupture was most keenly felt in the practice of lyric poetry. Thus he argued that 
the unique achievement of Les Fleurs du Mal was Baudelaire’s ability to respond 
to the conditions fostered by a new economic climate with a volume of poems.
92
 
   Benjamin’s interpretation of Baudelaire hinged upon a dialectical exchange 
between allegory and the commodity, or as Graeme Gilloch put it, a “relationship 
between poetic form and industrial product”.
93
 This focus likewise underpins the 
exposé of 1935, in which Baudelaire is described as an “allegorical genius” who 
makes Paris the subject of lyric poetry. But Benjamin also believed that the gaze 
the allegorical genius cast upon the city was born of “profound alienation”. Key 
to such claims is the interplay he established between Baudelaire and the figure 
of the flâneur, the nineteenth century stroller who “goes botanizing on the 
asphalt”.
94
 As Benjamin argued: the allegorical gaze belonged to the flâneur.
95
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   The flâneur was the observer of modern life, but he was no pedestrian; he 
insisted upon “elbow room” and refused to sacrifice the life enjoyed by a 
“gentlemen of leisure”.
96
 Abandoning himself unto the city, he would encounter 
sensations akin to drunkenness.
97
 Benjamin famously gave this experience an 
idealised veneer, likening the pleasure born of the flâneur’s leisurely stroll to that 
of intoxication. In his interpretation, each step would enhance the flâneur’s 
curiosity about what his journey may uncover. Thus the lure of the capital’s bars 
and bistros, an attraction that might have otherwise have enticed an individual off 
the pavement, would give way to the magnetic pull of finding out what might lie 
hidden behind a distant street corner.98  
   Buck-Morss places Baudelaire’s methodologies in this context, avowing that 
he composed his work “during his flânerie”. As Nadar notes, the poet would 
move through Paris with a manner at once anxious and feline. Speaking of one 
particular encounter, the photographer observed his compatriot walking “like a 
cat”, his uneven footsteps delicately selecting their route as if his feet were 
walking not on solid ground, but on eggshells.
99
 Such movements were essential 
to Baudelaire’s craft. He transformed the experience of drifting into a form of 
creative labour.
100
 This is voiced most strikingly in ‘The Sun’ (1857), a work that 
contains Baudelaire’s famous description of composing verses as he paced the 
city streets, stumbling over words as if they were paving stones.101 
   The arcades allowed similar journeys to be rehearsed. The vogue for walking 
tortoises through their “marble-panelled passageways” set the pace for flânerie’s 
nonchalant gait.
102
 They offered the idler a safe haven from traffic that would be 
without equal until Haussmann’s wide avenues replaced the city’s narrow streets. 
Once constructed however, these boulevards became the flâneur’s habitat. As 
one account put it, the large streets and wide sidewalks provided new locations 
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for the joyous flânerie that was previously confined to the arcades.
103
 
Accordingly, the figure who drifted through the city would look upon the signs 
of businesses and establishments as a wealthy citizen might view a painting that 
hangs in their private quarters.
104
  
    Through such explorations, Baudelaire would have gazed upon the mass-
produced object. As Benjamin reasoned: the flâneur was a figure who came to 
empathise with the commodity, and through that experience would open an 
empathic relationship with exchange-value itself.
105
 Like the worker, the flâneur 
would encounter his reflection in shop windows. He would see in such displays 
“the fulfilment of his desires” and hence become the ideal consumer.
106
 As he 
paced the city, Baudelaire became an exemplar of this role. But he did not just 
observe. On the contrary, Benjamin would contend that he “empathized himself 
into the soul of the commodity”. A feat enabled by a “mimetic capacity” that 
mirrored the commodity’s ability to adopt multiple meanings.
107
  
   The capacity in question was captured by Courbet’s portrait of the poet, a work 
that stands as unique in the artist’s oeuvre. Indeed, the painting negates visual 
realism in favour of a blurred effect, a technique consciously employed to 
capture the sitter’s chameleonic character.
108
 As Benjamin observed, 
Baudelaire’s physiognomy was akin to that of a mime, prompting Courbet to 
bemoan the difficulties of portraying a subject whose appearance changed 
daily.
109
 The enigmatic quality of the final image results, no doubt, from these 
concerns, from Baudelaire’s ability to assume different guises.  
   To understand how the commodity performed similar feats, it is necessary to 
consider the concept of allegory in greater detail. In allegory, the themes or 
motifs engaged by works of art evoke something beyond that to which they 
initially seem to refer. Allegorical works possess a supplementary meaning that 
the artist has consciously created by developing a representational system 
whereby the selected subject matter is used to convey seemingly unrelated ideas 
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or concepts.
110
 Benjamin applied this concept to the commodity, claiming that it 
becomes an allegorical object precisely because it emerges from a production 
system whereby the exchange-value of the artefact replaces its intended use 
value and hence its original meaning.
111
 He continued in this vein, avowing that 
the debasement that marks objects that are removed from their original meaning 
and, through allegorical depiction, used to signify something else, is analogous to 
the debasement that occurs when an object is cast as a commodity. Much like the 
effects of allegorical substitution, such forms are subject to ruination inasmuch 
as they are denied their intended purpose and reconfigured into items designed to 
perpetuate the valorisation of capital.112   
   Yet as Buck-Morss has reasoned, because allegory ruins things by abstracting 
them from their original meaning, Benjamin came to identify allegorical vision 
as a technique that would be employed by the artist only as a “cognitive 
imperative”.
113
 That imperative would be the artistic expression of realities 
imbued with a transience that mirrored the destruction enacted by allegorical 
depiction. Indeed, Benjamin avowed that the essence of allegorical illustration  – 
which “views its existence, as it does art, under the sign of fragmentation and 
ruin”
114
 – would be valid only in periods marked by a sense of decline.
115
 In 
other words, allegory was a technique that enabled the retransmission of discord 
and disunity.
116
 Therefore, we can reason that poets did not become allegorists 
by choice. On the contrary, they were compelled to do so by certain historical 
and social conditions.
117
  
   Yet if the cultures of specific eras possessed a fragmentary character that 
rendered them befitting of allegorical depiction, then why did Paris strike 
Baudelaire in this manner? The city facing him was that of the Second Empire, a 
place synonymous with financial prosperity and industrial growth. For the poet, 
however, this landscape was far from radiant. On the contrary, it engendered a 
general ennui.
 118
 This is voiced most strikingly in ‘The Swan’ (1861). Here, 
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Paris is presented as a source of melancholy, and the cities buildings – both old 
and new alike – are interpreted as structures imbued with an allegorical nature.119 
   The economic system that re-shaped the city provoked such lamentation. As 
Benjamin put it, in Baudelaire’s verse the commodity form becomes the social 
dimension of allegorical perception.
120
 Like allegory, the commodity was 
entwined with transience and decline. Its production was driven by the fickle 
tastes of fashion, meaning each new item was fated to become archaic.
121
 ‘The 
Seven Old Men’ (1861) illustrates this idea. Ostensibly, the poem details a state 
of anxiety arising from repetitious encounters with a social “type” of modernity: 
the sudden, “seven fold” appearance of a horrific old man who appears as always 
identical in his “multiplicity”.
122
 However, this motif also evokes the cycle of 
commodity production in the age of high capitalism, which centres on the 
unending repetition of the new.
123
 
   Baudelaire’s poem evokes a journey through a forlorn district of the city, the 
details of which he describes to the reader. A foul stream about which nothing is 
salubrious flows through the space, and the houses that flank the street seem to 
grow taller amid the fog that blankets the decrepit locale. Suddenly, without 
warning, an aged man dressed in ragged clothes looms into view. A sinister glint 
animates his eyes, giving his gaze a cold, forbidding edge. His chilling 
appearance is completed by his twisted, deformed body, which he supports with 
the aid of a stick. Almost instantaneously this man is joined by his double, a 
figure of equally frightening dress, appearance and demeanour. Another twin 
follows, similarly bitter and foreboding. Then another. Eventually, seven exact 
clones stagger across the landscape, prompting the poet to question what hellish 
forces might be responsible for such a menacing sight.124  
   The sensation conveyed is one of transformed temporality, an experience that 
anticipates everyday life in Hausmann’s city. As discussed above, to preserve its 
promise of progress the Second Empire paraded a continuous stream of 
innovations, each more enticing than the last. Yet like images cast by a magic 
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lantern, they were condemned to a fleeting existence, tied to a vicious circle of 
novelty and replacement. It is the flâneur’s encounter with this endless, 
fragmented procession that the ‘Seven Old Men’ evokes. To be sure, the 
abruptness with which the protagonists loom into sight is suggestive of Marx’s 
reading of mass industry, of the dreamscape in which goods appear and fade as if 
from nowhere.  
   Moreover, the stark resemblance between each monstrous figure is redolent of 
the world that regurgitates the new without any relief. This relentless updating 
would yield a malaise under which everything seemed the same. As Benjamin 
reflected: the “dreaming collective” is isolated from history, events pass before it 
as forever identical and “always new”.
125
 Undoubtedly, Baudelaire’s depiction of 
the disquiet fostered by an experience of ceaseless repetition anticipates this 
exact situation. As such, his use of allegory can be ascribed a socio-economic 
base, as the disintegration suggested by such techniques reflects the 
impermanence fostered by commodity capitalism.
126
 The progression from the 
Arcades, to the International Exhibitions and on to the department stores may 
have been redolent of modernisation, but it also rendered the once modern 
obsolete. The opening stanza of the ‘Seven Old Men’ – which speaks of ghosts 
that haunt the stroller by light of day – might thus be interpreted as a reference to 
the past innovations that have been cast aside by the city’s endless refashioning, 
and exist for the consumer only as phantoms from some distant time. However, 
this environment would impact not only upon the lyric; it would also influence 
the painter’s craft. It is by exploring such practice that the crises facing the 
auratic may be engaged. 
  
VIII: Monsieur G. 
 
   Crucially, the booming economy evoked by ‘The Seven Old Men’ produced 
not only a swift flow of fashions, it also fostered hordes of frenzied consumers 
who flocked to the capital and crowded its streets, each pursuing goods 
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emblematic of the prosperity pledged by the Empire.
127
 As stores grew in size 
and splendour so too would these masses swell, forming throngs amid which 
everyday encounters were divested of continuity. Accordingly, empirical reality 
became a chaotic mess of impressions upon which the beholder could grant only 
passing attention.
128
  
   Against this background, we can identify how the character of the commodity, 
that is to say its transient, allegorical nature, came to shape the conditions of the 
city. Just as commodities lacked permanence, so too would life in a consumer 
economy be comprised entirely of momentary encounters: the experience of ruin 
fostered the ruination of experience. Support for such claims comes from 
Benjamin’s assertion that if the experience of allegory is the “experience of 
eternal transience”,
129
 then allegories represent “that which the commodity 
makes of the experiences people have in this century”.
130
 Clearly, this climate 
posed challenges to the figure seeking the spirit of the age. The era of 
ephemerality fostered a glance attuned to its fragmentation. As Baudelaire 
reasoned, the modern world is marked by a speed of movement and change that 
necessitates a similar speed of execution from the artist. Crucially, an exemplar 
of this project would be found in the water-colourist Constantin Guys, a figure 
Baudelaire defined as the painter who captured the “passing moment” and all the 
“suggestions of eternity” it may contain.
131
  
   To introduce “Monsieur G.” Baudelaire invoked the prose of Edgar Allan Poe, 
and in particular ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (1840). Here Poe writes of a man 
sitting by the window of a coffee house, a “convalescent” whose gaze has 
become absorbed the spectacle of the passing crowd, who is lost within “the 
turmoil of thought that surrounds him”.
132
  
   Significantly, Baudelaire claimed that Guys shared this character’s 
unquenchable interest in the events daily life, a condition that bestows upon him 
a child-like quality. To be sure, Baudelaire claimed that both child and 
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convalescent possessed the ability to become intently engrossed in things 
regardless of how trivial they might seem. A child, he reasons, will be fascinated 
by the ordinary and mundane because for them everything is fantastic, they see 
everything as if for the first time. Genius, Baudelaire continues, might be thought 
of as the ability to recover this sense of wonder at will. In other words, a genius 
is a figure able to unite the infant’s joy and enthusiasm for the common place 
with an adult consiousness able to order, analyse and express the sheer mass of 
impressions that may be assimilated in any given day. These characteristics unite 
in Monsieur G. For Baudelaire, he is a “man child”, a figure for whom the 
empirical world is a constant source of delight and marvel.
133
   
   Undoubtedly, this man would be the ultimate flâneur, the “passionate 
spectator” who would “be at the centre of the world” and yet be hidden from it. 
Baudelaire compared him to “a mirror as vast as the crowd itself”, a 
“kaleidoscope gifted with a consciousness” who happily watches as the subtleties 
and events of life flow past him. His greatest skill would be the ability to capture 
this current in his art,
134
 a gift to which Baudelaire would famously attest. 
   He describes Guys working long into the night, endlessly striving to translate 
the brief, ephemeral impression he has recorded with a swift glance of his eyes 
onto the crisp, unmarked sheet of paper before him. His pen and brush are locked 
in a whirl of chaotic activity, a frenzy born of the fear that if he stops working 
even for a moment he might fail to capture an image or event. Yet when he does 
manage to record daily life, he does so in a composition that transcends any 
notion of naturalism or beauty. As Baudelaire’s account implies, the art of 
Monsieur G achieves something far greater than a mere record of the everyday. 
On the contrary, he evokes and distils the phantasmagoria of modernity for all to 
behold.135  
   As such we might conclude that the speed of Guys’ glance, the swiftness of his 
mark making, and the transience of modern life are perfectly attuned. Faced with 
a world that is perpetually new, his gift is to see “everything in a state of 
newness” and capture each and every novelty; a skill evident in the sense of rapid 
execution that pervades A Family Walking in the Park. A similar project can be 
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discerned in Manet’s wish to become a “spontaneist”, a figure able to transcribe 
the fleeting events of the everyday in his art.
136
 It is this declaration that will 
structure what follows. Specifically, I want to argue that it is the work Manet 
made in response to the social climate of high capitalism that allows us to view 
changes in creative practice as indicative of the aura’s decline. But to expound 
this claim first demands focus upon a particular reading of the artist’s oeuvre, 
specifically that advanced by Fried, which centres upon notions of temporality in 
painting.  
   For Fried, there are two contrasting approaches to representations of 
temporality, each based upon specific properties of painting. The first is that of 
“duration”, a conception tied to the notion that paintings are “material objects” 
that change little over time. The artist working in this context will select subjects 
possessed of a similar unchanging nature: the still life, the landscape, or images 
of people who appear to be captivated, asleep or unmoving. In Fried’s analysis, 
this thematic became a model for Western realist art, one allied to the “implied 
temporality of the representation and the actual (or ‘material’) temporality of 
painting itself”. Opposing this strategy, however, is the “temporal mode of 
instantaneousness”, which consigns itself to an alternative reading of paintings 
materiality. Namely, that easel painting is nothing but surface, that the entirety of 
that surface faces the beholder, and therefore that every detail and motif 
contained within a composition can be read in a single glance. It is within this 
latter paradigm that Manet’s work belongs.
137
 Yet to contextualise this claim 
against notions of the auratic, it is crucial to describe the mode of reception 
Manet eschews in greater detail. This can be achieved by focus upon the work of 
Caspar David Friedrich.  
 
IX: Aura. 
 
   Reflecting upon acts of beholding, Benjamin argued that “painting invites the 
spectator to contemplation”.
138
 The art of Friedrich operates in precisely such 
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terms. As Richard Wollhiem observed, Friedrich sought to engage the beholder 
in immersive perception, encouraging them to become an “internal spectator” in 
the painting itself. In this context, pictorial space would cease to be an external 
phenomenon, becoming instead a sequence of mental images accessed through 
the imagination.
139
 Corporeal projection was likewise important to Benjamin, 
who reasoned that: “A person who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed 
by it”.
140
 
   To explore such claims, Wollhiem distinguished two modes of imagination. 
The first, central imagination, referred to an event visualised from the 
perspective of a specific figure. The mental images formed through this act could 
be thought of as “occupied”, or “perspectival” as they originate from the 
viewpoint of a particular subject. The second, A-central imagination, represents 
the opposite of this conception. It describes a situation that is not visualised from 
the perspective of a particular subject or beholder, and which thus unfolds in a 
“frieze-like” manner.  
   For Wollhiem, central imagination was key to the beholder becoming an 
internal spectator in the picture space, but for this process to advance the viewer 
had to select a “protagonist”. That is, a character already present in the painting, 
a figure able to see the composition’s every detail, and who thus supplies the 
beholder’s imagination with an occupied viewpoint that can used to explore the 
image. The selected person can be anyone, but once chosen they must be 
imagined from the inside, meaning the observer must endow them with a 
“repertoire” of memories and feelings, perceptions and thoughts. This “inner 
life” is crucial as it represents the frame through which the subject must climb if 
they are to enter the work.
141
 
   But in order to project a repertoire onto the protagonist the viewer has to first 
access the “initial repertoire” created by the artist. Such information provides the 
basis of the “perceiving, thinking, feeling” character imagined by the beholder.
142
 
However, this does not mean that the protagonist must be a figure that is 
physically represented in the painting. On the contrary, a person who is invisible, 
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or whose presence is only implied could fulfil the role, as Friedrich’s art 
suggests.   
   Friedrich composed many paintings from a high viewpoint; a perspective 
occupied by what Wollhiem calls “the nature-artist of early-nineteenth century 
pietism”. This figure stands removed from the events of empirical life, a 
detachment that allows him to engage nature through a “profound and devout 
contemplation”. As such, we might identify him as one who follows Baudelaire 
and savours the harmonious moment before dusk when flowers impart their 
perfume like sensors, and then gazes in silent melancholy as the sun begins to 
drown in its “dark congealing blood”.
143
  
   Clearly this was an experience with which Friedrich identified, and he wanted 
to enact similar connections for the beholder. The 1832 painting The Large 
Enclosure near Dresden is typical of this project. Here the landscape is seen 
from an elevated position, to extent that the curve of the earth’s surface can be 
discerned. This angle of vision introduces the perceptual register of the nature-
artist into the imagination of the beholder,
144
 casting that figure as the work’s 
protagonist. With this link established, the subject channels the inner life of the 
nature artist and uses this information to become an inner spectator in the picture, 
an act that subsequently influences how the viewer receives the work. As 
Wollhiem comments, the nature artist attempts to understand the “secrets” of 
nature, secrets that can only be interpreted through “humility, patience, careful 
observation and long hours of dedicated, painstaking toil”. By engaging The 
Large enclosure from this figure’s perspective, the observer is thus compelled to 
similar acts of lingering contemplation.
145
  
    However, Wolhiem’s account also suggests that The Large Enclosure conveys 
a further category of experience to the viewer, namely that of aura. As shown 
above in the introduction, the auratic describes a mode of perceptual experience 
patterned upon the beholder’s response to the sacred, the magical, or the 
beautiful. An encounter with forms possessing such qualities draws the subject 
into a state of immersive meditation, through which the “atmosphere” or “plus of 
appearance” conveyed by the object of contemplation – the quality Adorno 
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identifies as that which transcends the experience of empirical life – can be 
engaged.
146
 The mode of reception fostered by this act, which can be understood 
as an act of looking that disavows any objective means, creates what could be 
thought of as a reverie in which all sense of time is lost, in which the subject 
becomes fully immersed in the spectacle before them.
147
 It is this exchange that 
forms the strange weave of space and time associated with the true experience of 
genuine aura.  
   Crucially, it was meditation upon the transcendent splendour of nature that 
provided Benjamin’s central metaphor of auratic experience. In Benjamin’s 
thesis, the beholder looks upon the mysteries of nature and is lost unto a 
lingering mediation upon the scene before them. This represents the precise 
context in which Friedrich’s nature artist attempts to unlock the divine secrets of 
the natural world, to engage the transcendent plus of appearance conveyed by the 
scene that confronts him. It follows, therefore, that if this figure provides the 
observer’s “window” into The Large Enclosure, then when the observer channels 
the inner life of the protagonist and becomes the inner spectator, the auratic 
contemplation of nature suggested by his “repertoire” becomes the frame through 
which the picture is viewed. In other words, if the nature artist experiences nature 
auratically, then the beholder will be compelled to receive Friedrich’s painting 
through the state of reverent contemplation crucial to the auratic. As such, the 
picture reflects Adorno’s claim that the auratic experience enacted by works of 
art parallels the tranquil melancholia arising from the perceptual immersion 
created when the beauty of nature is not viewed as a means for the observer’s 
practical ends. 
 
X: Manet. 
 
   It is precisely this immersive, meditative interaction that Manet’s art usurps. To 
illustrate this claim Fried refers to the painter’s 1863 masterpiece: Le Déjeuner 
sur l’herbe, and the derision it attracted. The canvas is set in the shaded setting of 
a wooded landscape. A series of trees guides the viewer’s eye into the image, and 
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their foliage almost seems to surround the figures who provide the picture’s point 
of focus. In the foreground are positioned two young men, and a semi-reclining 
female nude who gazes out towards the beholder. An upturned basked of food 
rests at her side, as if to illustrate the remnants of the meal that give the canvas 
its name. Behind this group we see a second female, who seems to have just 
emerged from a nearby lake or river, and appears to be drying herself at its edge.  
   For Emile Zola, this work represented an artistic achievement to which all 
painters should aspire,148 but public opinion was less favourable. As one 
commentator scathingly put it, Manet’s violent colour pierced the beholder’s eye 
like a blade, and his figures looked as if they had been roughly cut out by hand, 
then strewn across the composition in a haphazard fashion.
149
 Critics were 
particularly appalled by the artist’s handling of tone, notably his juxtaposition of 
the pale, featureless skin of the female protagonist against the dark clothes of her 
male companions. Equal outrage accompanied Manet’s decision to place both 
parties upon a vivid background of “acid green” grass. But what was absent from 
such scorn, Fried contends, is the realisation that such techniques enforce a state 
of rapid perception that influences not only how the beholder views the portrayed 
figures, but also their reception of the canvas as a whole.
150
  
   Thus for Fried, Manet’s choice to work upon a plain white or pale coloured 
canvas – a decision that would negate the “dark-ground painting” that permits 
artists to convey subtle details of light and shade – can be identified as a practice 
that would not only account for his “unorthodox rendering of form”, but would 
also foster the sense of “temporal immediacy” with which the observer reads his 
art.151 This last point can be expounded in relation to Courbet. As Marc de 
Montifaud observed in the Salon of 1867, the viewer of Courbet’s “dark-ground 
forest landscapes” is initially shocked by its denseness. But as one slowly looks 
into the canvas, these “masses of shadows detach themselves in an illumination 
that comes from the depths of the wood”. This sensation continues from the 
pictures depths to its outermost planes, until all its details are revealed.
152
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   Fried locates a similar sensation in The Burial, arguing that its compositional 
structure indicates the artist’s attempt to imaginatively enter the picture. Key to 
this claim is the personage of Max Bouchon, the second hatless figure positioned 
at the very end of the funeral procession. Courbet does more than “identify” with 
the image of his friend, he projects himself “as if corporeally” into the painted 
likeness of Bouchon. In justifying this claim, Fried points to the foreground 
figure of the choirboy who stands roughly parallel to Bouchon. The boy in 
question holds a “brass holy-water stoup” or bénitier, from which water will be 
sprinkled onto the open grave. Fried interprets this vessel as a metaphorical 
representation of the painter’s brush or palette knife, noting that its French name 
is a goupillon, which means brush. A particular variety of goupillon was even 
manufactured in brush-like form. This connection directs Courbet’s vision 
towards the crucifix bearer positioned immediately above the boy, a man who 
looks out of the canvas and focuses on a point where the artist would have sat as 
he painted. However, the artist does not return his gaze. He directs it to the figure 
stood behind him, who happens to be Bouchon, the target of Courbet’s 
projection. The result is the painter’s merger with the back of the cortège, 
suggesting that it is he who drives the line of mourners across the wide space of 
canvas.
153
 Hence Courbet’s work can be distinguished by its enactment of 
“protracted temporal effects”.
154
 
   Yet as Fried reiterates, such “gradual, almost magical unfolding” is the exact 
opposite of the “abruptness with which Manet’s paintings announced themselves 
to the viewer”. Indeed, the “spatial ambiguity” and placement of figures in Le 
Déjeuner actively discourages lingering meditation. For example, the crouching 
bather of the middle distance is the same size as the figures grouped in the 
foreground, even though she occupies a considerable distance from them. This 
perspectival distortion has the effect of pulling her towards the picture’s surface. 
Moreover, because she occupies a central position in the composition, the 
bather’s acceleration to the frontal picture plane gives the related impression that 
the background is propelled with her, thus dispelling any need for the beholder to 
explore the canvases depths.
155
 Hence, as Fried concludes, the “lightening fast” 
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moment of contemplation needed to read such works suggests that Manet’s 
project was not centred upon an intent to arrest moments or actions, but rather 
developed from an attempt to evoke what might be interpreted as the 
“instantaneousness” of sight or the rapidity of visual perception.
156
 
   What is significant about this thesis is the fact that while Fried does not engage 
or explore notions of the auratic on a direct level, he nevertheless creates a 
framework against which Manet’s work can be identified as resistant to the 
immersive, auratic experience enacted by Friedrich’s Large Enclosure. The 
viewer would not submit to a searching interrogation of Manet’s compositions 
precisely because all their details exist at surface level. The resulting visual 
assault – described by one commentator as like having a glass of iced water 
thrown in your face
157
 – interrupts the meditative state through which the 
spectator might assimilate himself or herself into the work and engage a 
transcendent atmosphere or plus of appearance. Thus, to paraphrase Benjamin, 
the temporal immediacy of Manet’s canvases would not invite the “spectator to 
contemplation”, and would grant the observer no time to “abandon himself to his 
associations”. As such, the viewer would not be held in the weave of space and 
time that characterised auratic sensation. The critics who described Manet’s 
paintings as visual equivalents of loud, deafening bangs
158
 confirm the threat his 
work posed to blissful, lingering reverie.  
   Importantly, the visual violence enacted by Manet’s art mirrored that 
operational in empirical life. Indeed, writing in ‘The Man in the Crowd’, Poe 
described his protagonist’s surroundings as being overrun with a chaotic mess of 
sights and sounds that caused his ear to ache and battered his eye.
159
 Such 
descriptions suggest that the transience of modernity would similarly debase the 
sensations of auratic experience. In Baudelaire’s vision of Paris, where ceaseless 
innovations flash into momentary existence and are then replaced, the rapid 
stream of fragmentary impressions would not permit the tranquillity of 
meditative contemplation. Amid this fleeting environment, the sensory 
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immersion of the auratic would oppose the subject’s reception of their ever-
changing surroundings.  
   Again, a clear indication that Haussmann’s engineering contributed to this 
phenomenon can be gleaned from the fact that the department store represented a 
major source of sensory disruption. As Kristin Ross reasons, Zola’s Au bonheur 
des dames bears witness to the swathes of disorientated female shoppers who 
purchase an ever increasing number of goods in a haze of greed and 
bewilderment, again confirming the interplay between the urban masses and the 
commodity form.  
   Echoing Zola once more, Ross notes how the encounters staged by this climate 
were analogous to the act of reading a newspaper. The figure who scans a 
paper’s fragmented layout performs a feat similar to the buyer who enters a store 
in which each commodity is conceived as something separate and detachable 
from the surrounding goods.
160
 In both cases, the eyes and mind of the subject 
would not be permitted to rest on a particular item. On the contrary, they would 
be compelled to operate in a state of perpetual motion; constantly shifting 
between the enticing influx of goods on display and the “swarming anthill”
161
 
that surrounds them.      
   The inhabitant of Paris would be thus denied the category of experience felt by 
Friedrich’s nature artist, and for Benjamin, Baudelaire’s poetry bore the sorrow 
of this insight. Indeed, if Mallarme relates the magical quality that compels 
sensory immersion to a flower’s intoxicating perfume, then lines such as “The 
spring, once wonderful, has lost its scent” suggest the realisation of a crisis in 
which the ability to encounter such contemplation has become archaic. The sense 
of mourning this realisation brings, the “spleen” it engenders, is the misery 
staged by the demise of the aura.
162
  
   Such loss is given voice in ‘The Artist’s Confiteor’ (1862), a prose piece that 
begins by extolling the lingering meditation of the auratic. In the work, 
Baudelaire claims that to pause and become immersed in an open sky or endless 
expanse of ocean is a true joy. But this harmony is soon disrupted. The poet 
encounters energies that create “mental malaise and positive pain” and cause his 
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worn out nerves to create “clamorous and painful vibrations”.
163
 Such sensations 
might be traced to the visual noise of Haussmann’s metropolis. Amid the sensory 
assault of the new city, the beholder can no longer isolate and become absorbed 
in a single spectacle; hence the delights offered by genuine aura are lost. Yet 
because the text does not directly attribute this shift to the chaos of the 
metropolis, we might also reason that modernity has degraded the writer’s senses 
to such an extent that a truncated, non-auratic pattern of experience had become 
commonplace. 
   A further evocation of this situation can be found in ‘The Double Bedroom’ 
(1862), in which Baudelaire portrays private interiors with opposing characters. 
The first is akin to a “reverie”. Its atmosphere is relaxed and languid, clouds of 
muslin fall from the windows and even the furniture seems to slumber. It is, 
Baudelaire concludes, a space where “your soul can bathe in idleness”. As such, 
we might reason that entering this residence would yield sensations equal to the 
auratic. Accordingly, I interpret the experience offered by this place as a 
metaphor for the flâneur’s idealised experience of Paris, as the intoxication it 
invites mirrors the absorption Benjamin associated with a meander through the 
city. Indeed, if the metropolis encloses around the flâneur as a room, then we 
might reason that the room in question would match that of Baudelaire’s text.  
    However, the chamber’s idealised atmosphere is momentary. A heavy knock 
is heard and through the door emerge a spectre, a bailiff, a concubine, and an 
errand boy sent to retrieve an overdue manuscript. At once the dwelling becomes 
a space of “eternal boredom”; a transformation confirmed by its sudden 
contamination with dust and grime. Crucially, the shock of this intrusion mirrors 
that which the flâneur would face on Haussmann’s boulevards. Just as the 
crowd’s intervention eroded the dreamlike atmosphere of the room, so too would 
the masses disrupt the stroller’s harmony. In reality they would feel no 
intoxication, only the jostling of innumerable consumers. Consequently, their 
home on the boulevards would be stripped of all comforts. Instead of supporting 
the contemplation and lingering immersion of auratic experience, it would foster 
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the lassitude expressed by ‘The Seven Old Men’ and become a space in which 
the subject is jaded by a climate of continually new sensations.
164
   
   It is possible to discern a link between this splintered environment and the 
proliferation of literary works in which Paris is explored through a montage of 
momentary looks. Often these devices were employed to emphasise notions of 
the unexpected and add a frisson to the story. Writers seeking to maximise this 
effect thus penned characters who peered behind objects and furnishings, 
exploited the brief anonymity offered by the glare of a spot light or flashgun, 
looked over the shoulder of a passer by, or even spied through the key-holes of 
locked doors.
165
 Such techniques would be central to Detective, a publication that 
invited the reader to share the sensations of the freelance investigator. As the 
private eye stalks the backstreets in search of clues, the audience moves with 
him, furtively peeping from behind his back in order to glimpse a forbidden 
underworld of dance halls, glamorous femmes fatales and all manner of villainy. 
But what is important in the context of the current discussion is not the journal’s 
faithfulness to certain forms of police work, but rather the idea that by re-staging 
such experiences Detective effectively paralleled the visual sensations of modern 
life. By constructing for its audience a mesh of single, isolated glances, the 
journal re-created the optic experience of the city street. Consequently, it 
suggests that sampling a state of unresting perceptual alertness plays a crucial 
role in developing the visual skills needed to endure and survive the modern 
world.
166
  
   Support for such claims comes from Benjamin, who famously associated the 
flâneur with the detective. For example, he comments that whatever path the 
flâneur may take, each route will lead him to a crime scene.
167
 Yet in the context 
of the above arguments, such ideas can be refocused. Instead of portraying the 
figure who prowls the city streets as someone who re-creates the law enforcer’s 
vocation, it can be argued that journeying through the crowd, the boulevard or 
the department store yields a visual sensation similar to the matrix of chance and 
random encounters crucial to the investigator’s craft.    
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   Manet’s art can be situated against this framework. Significantly, his work 
echoes Detective’s evocation of the snapshot aesthetic that dominates the 
exploration of urban life. The Balcony (1868-69) is key in this context. The scene 
details three figures, one man and two women, arranged on a green terrace-like 
structure that opens out from the interior of a dimly lit room. Like Le Déjeuner 
sur l’herbe, the protagonists are grouped face on to the picture plane, pressed 
against its outermost edge. The composition is equally marked by heavy contrast; 
evident in juxtaposition of the white dresses worn by the two female subjects, the 
white shirt of their male companion, and the dark background that surrounds 
them. As with Le Déjeuner, this blackness seems to accentuate the pale skin of 
the figures, pushing them towards the picture’s surface with great urgency. 
Consequently, the picture enacts an instantaneous reception.  
   Yet in this work, the rapidity with which the viewer reads the image 
corresponds to the fleeting glance cast by the flâneur who paces Haussmann’s 
streets. Edmund Duranty’s remarks are perceptive in this context. On viewing the 
canvas, he wrote that if one walked past a group of people situated on a balcony 
the scene would leave an impression analogous to that captured by Manet’s 
painting, but if one stood and stared, this impression would change.
168
 For Fried, 
such comments were suggestive of the methodology underpinning Manet’s work. 
Following Duranty, he reasoned that Manet’s haphazard compositions, their lack 
of dramatic unity and harsh, contrasting use of colour, could be understood as 
trademarks of a “new, artistically legitimate, rapidity of seeing” through which 
the painter sought to capture and relay a scene as he had glimpsed it through a 
passing glance, thereby relaying the sensations of that glance to the viewer.
169
  
   In other words, if the early impressionists sought to explore the experience of 
the “urban promenader”,
170
 then the techniques Manet employed to enforce a 
rapidity of perception upon the viewer can be associated with an attempt to re-
stage the rapid, shifting gaze with which such figures would have encountered 
Haussmann’s cityscape. Therefore, if Manet sought to create a sense of unity 
between his art and the world around him,
171
 it can be argued that the speed with 
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which his painting reveals itself to the beholder achieves this by replicating the 
brief sensations that existed at the heart of nineteenth century modernity. The 
swift visual attack of his art is perfectly attuned to the experience of a metropolis 
that, as Baudelaire observed, shifts with the speed of a human heartbeat.
172
 
   Armand Silvestre expressed comparable sentiments in his discussion of 
Manet’s Le Chemin de Fer (1873). In the painting, a woman wearing a dark navy 
dress rests against a row of iron railings. In her hands is an open book, though 
her outwards gaze – which she directs roughly towards the beholder – hints at a 
momentary pause from her reading. To her left stands a young girl in a white 
dress adorned with a large purple bow. She looks away from the spectator, and 
peers through the railings against which her face is pressed. The cloud of steam 
billowing through the composition suggests that both figures are positioned on a 
bridge overlooking a train station or railway.  
   As before, the canvas is marked by the sharp contrast – the woman’s dark 
clothes jar against the light outfit of her companion – and compositional effects – 
both figures are pressed close against the surface of the picture plane – that 
encourage an instantaneous reading. The impact of this immediacy permeated 
Silvestre’s response, which begins by asking whether the mundane, everyday 
sight of a woman resting against a row of iron railings while a child stands at her 
side would prompt sustained visual analysis? The answer implied is no, but as 
Silvestre reasons, the scene might linger in your vision for a few seconds before 
it was lost. For Silvestre, it was that “instantaneousness impression” that Manet 
sought to capture, and though he attacks the painter for not seeking to convey 
anything greater, he concedes that the brief sensation of this chance gaze is the 
experience aroused in the viewer.
173
  
   Against the background of these interpretations, we can argue that the 
“instantaneousness” Manet evoked to express the transient, glance-like 
encounters of modernity captures the fleeting climate in which the sensory 
immersion of auratic experience was eroded, and also re-creates the perceptual 
immediacy responsible for that corruption. As such, his work reflects Benjamin’s 
claim that transformations in economic production necessitate new artistic forms 
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to match the transformed conditions of daily life and, moreover, confirms the 
philosopher’s assertion that if the perceptual experiences fostered by such 
practice could be understood as a decline of the aura then it would be possible to 
identify its social causes.
174
  
   Courbet holds dual importance in this framework, for in addition to providing a 
model against which the beholder’s reception of Manet could be defined, 
paintings like The Burial highlight the political unrest that inspired Haussmann 
to re-order the conditions of urban existence. For example, the embellishments 
that turned Paris into an image of capital, that gathered the proletariat in factories 
and compelled them to manufacture ever-evolving streams of commodities 
around which they subsequently flocked as consumers – creating a reality in 
which experience became a stream of staccato-like bursts – did not happen 
arbitrarily. On the contrary, such transformations originated from an 
infrastructure intended to allay civil insurgence with the assurance of ceaseless 
progress. Consequently, if Courbet reveals the political formations that underpin 
the debasement of auratic experience, then Manet encounters and conveys the 
sensations fostered by its destruction.  
   Indeed, if Paris was remoulded by changes in modes of labour and production, 
then the fleeting ocular response demanded by the new metropolis could be 
ascribed similar origins. As Adrian Rifkin observed, state institutions shape the 
visual and auditory assimilation of urban space.
175
 That Manet’s work was 
governed by perceptual sensations akin to the sharp turn of the head or brief 
scanning of everyday events that an individual might attempt inside a busy store, 
or outside in the street as they fought through crowds surging towards the latest 
spectacle, confirms the impact Haussmann’s social engineering had upon his 
practice. Just as the city could not be experienced auratically, Manet’s tableaux 
parisiens denied the beholder such encounters. Therefore, if the economic forces 
of the Second Empire shape the experiential crisis evoked by Baudelaire, then 
the mode of vision manifest in Manet’s art is similarly created by the age of 
commerce. 
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   However, such arguments are, as yet, incomplete. The link between the loss of 
auratic experience suggested by Manet’s work, and a parallel decline of auratic 
sensation in empirical life, needs elaboration. Specifically, what needs to be 
addressed is the psychological nature of an artist’s experience of the modern 
world, and the precise impact this has upon their work’s creation and reception. 
The interplay between an artist’s experience of modernity and the spectator’s 
experience of the work needs greater consideration. This dialectic will represent 
a further theme of this thesis, which will focus upon a painter contemporary to 
both Manet and the events discussed above: the German artist Adolph Menzel. 
But Manet’s work also points to further issues, notably the fact that it 
“anticipates” photography, a practice key to the study of aura. For Fried, Manet 
“imagined photographs”, and works such as Olympia (1863) – with their harsh 
lighting and areas of strong contrasting colour – were remarkably 
photographic.
176
 Crucially, such interaction with the camera has been charged 
with decimating the artwork’s aura.
177
 The precise nature of photography’s 
impact upon both painting and the auratic thus needs exploration. This 
undertaking will structure chapter two.  
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“Documents for Artists”. 
 
I: Sun Worship. 
 
   The influence Haussmann’s Paris exerted over creative practice would be 
evident not only in expressions of its transformed perceptual landscape, but also 
in the potential such new spaces held for photographic exploration. As Linda 
Nochlin put it, the ephemerality of nineteenth century urban experience was 
particularly suited to the camera’s “random, significance destroying cut-offs, 
blurring of moving figures and oblique compositions”.
1
  
   Further equivalence between photographic framing and the optical sensations 
of empirical life existed in the perspectives offered by the city’s architecture. The 
lens staged a mode of seeing analogous to that created by modern structures, 
with the Eiffel Tower in particular representing a viewing apparatus comparable 
to the camera. Viewing the French capital through this intersecting metal web 
would create a “montage-principle” that allowed the spectator to “crop, cut, 
reframe and abstract” their surroundings.
2
 In this way, we can follow Benjamin 
and claim that such forms served to destroy the banality of the urban sphere and 
replace it with views of the “magnificent potentiality” latent within the modern 
landscape.
3
 
   Yet photography’s potential to capture such sights and become a vital art of the 
modern age was impeded by one crucial obstacle: the fact that many 
commentators were openly hostile to the very idea of photography gaining 
acceptance as a creative medium. Steve Edwards illustrates this conflict with 
reference to the “taxonomy” of the International Exhibitions, albeit through a 
focus upon English events rather than their French counterparts. Key here is the 
task of classification that faced the organisers of such spectacles, an activity 
linked to an ongoing attempt by bourgeois intellectuals to develop detailed 
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insight into the structures and relations of Capitalist society. Underpinning this 
project was the categorization of industrial forms created by a rapidly developing 
society, of which the photograph was understood to be but one example.
4
 It 
would be precisely this inclination to associate photography with the products of 
industrial labour that sparked a controversy still debated today. 
   Referring to the British Exhibition of 1862, Edwards notes that the showcase 
arranged its attractions according to four basic categories: “raw materials, 
machinery, manufacturers, and fine art”. Crucially, photography was associated 
not with the latter, but was instead assigned its own place in the subsection 
“machinery”. The Royal Commissioners responsible for such judgements did not 
see anything problematic about this decision. The promotion of photography to a 
class of machinery in its own right was deemed appropriate recognition for the 
technological developments that had gathered pace following the medium’s 
inclusion in the previous event of 1851. Yet such verdicts prompted mass outcry 
and caused an estimated two hundred articles to en-liven the photographic press 
with vitriolic condemnations of the Commissioners’ ruling.
5
    
   One such report avowed that the debasement caused by photography’s 
inclusion within the humble class of “mechanical contrivances” would be 
overcome only if photographers vindicated “the dignity of their art by deeds, not 
by words”. In other words, if photographers produced work that was made with a 
level of skill and insight that allowed it to rank alongside the greatest 
achievements in artistic production then there would be no possibility that any 
adjudicator could dismiss or de-value their practice.
6
 Daumier satirised the 
ensuing struggle that faced photographers who sought such recognition in his 
1862 lithograph, Nadar raising photography to the level of art. In this work, the 
protagonist floats above Paris in a hot air balloon, his camera balanced 
precariously on the craft’s rigging as he captures a view of the spectacle below. 
But when read in tandem with the cartoonist’s witticism, this act becomes an 
attempt to scale the heights of art’s ivory tower, and earn the photographer a 
level of praise equal to that bestowed upon the leading painters of the time. 
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   However, the fact of photography’s interrelation with mechanical and chemical 
processes would remain an unavoidable source of suspicion and controversy. 
Indeed, if Marx charged mass manufacture with a debasement of the worker’s 
skill and dexterity, then the camera’s detractors claimed the apparatus posed a 
similar threat to the artist. The rivalry that polarised painters and photographers 
was thus comparable to the resentment discernable between craftsmen and the 
modern machines they associated with the destruction of their working methods.
7
 
Just as commodities were seen to emerge as if by magic from manufacturing 
processes that expunged all traces of human labour, photographs were interpreted 
as a conjuring trick of automated technology and received as images that bore no 
evidence of individual skill. That Lady Elizabeth Eastlake posed the question of 
photography’s creative merit: “How far can the sun be considered an artist?” – a 
phrasing possibly addressed to Fox Talbot’s claim that his early photographic 
experiments were conducted with a “solar microscope”
8
 – is testament to the 
limited focus placed upon the photographer in such debates.
9
 As Edwards 
reasons, photography was placed alongside “steam power, the railway and gas 
lighting” as part of the wide scale transformation of artisanal labour that 
characterised the industrial revolution.
10
  
   In late nineteenth-century France, the implications arising from such 
conclusions were decisive. Crucially, French law did not view the photograph as 
the private property of the photographer. On the contrary, it was defined as the 
sole possession of the person who owned the subject depicted by the image. In 
March 1861, the Tribunal de Commerce decreed that at no point in his labour 
does a photographer create an image that can be considered his own creation. 
Rather, it was argued that the photographer produces negatives, prints and 
images of objects in a fashion that is wholly servile and automated. The crisis 
facing would-be art-photographers was spelt out by a further Tribunal held some 
months later, which – following earlier judgements – concluded that mechanical 
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systems of image making such as photography will never yield objects that can 
be identified as equal to items wrought by human spirit and intelligence.
11
 As 
such, the camera’s artistic ambitions would be realised only when such 
propositions were overturned.  
   In Art and Photography, Aaron Scharf detailed a case study that attempted this 
exact feat. In 1862, the photographers Mayer and Pierson accused another 
partnership, Betbeder and Scwabbe, of producing pirate copies of their images of 
Lord Palmerston and Count Cavour. This act would be in breach of French 
copyright laws passed in 1793 and 1810 only if the images in question were 
considered to be works of art. Following an initial failure, Mayer and Pierson 
secured such status for their work on appeal. An impassioned plea from their 
lawyer, M. Marie, has been identified as key to this ruling.
12
 Addressing the 
court, Marie argued that if art is synonymous with beauty, and if beauty is, in its 
purest form, truth in empirical reality, then a photograph that offers a truthful 
depiction of things – a depiction that, moreover, we find aesthetically appealing 
– must be considered an example of beauty. And once that classification is 
granted, it follows that the same photograph will be identified as art.13  
   But if such claims equate photography’s creative value with its ability to 
faithfully depict the beauty of nature, then the rhetoric in question only 
anticipates a further barrier to the medium’s acceptance by the canon of fine arts, 
an issue about which Charles Baudelaire was vociferous.  
   For Baudelaire, naturalism had exerted a monstrous influence over creative 
practice. It suppressed beauty, he reasoned, replacing feeling with judgement and 
analysis. Yet regardless of these concerns, naturalism had become entrenched in 
popular tastes, a trend which the poet viewed with open scorn. As he exclaimed, 
those who celebrated its eminence displayed a misguided wish to “be made to 
wonder by means which are alien to art”. The impact of such desires was 
manifest in paintings faithful to such wants, with Ernest Seigneurgens’ Amour et 
Gibelotte (1859) typifying what Baudelaire decried as the “ridiculous titles and 
preposterous subjects which are intended to attract our eyes”. In particular, 
Seigneurgens’ decision to name his work Love and Rabbit Stew was something 
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the poet found startling.
14
 His ironic response to the title expresses this distaste 
by comparing the animal’s corpse to the figure of cupid. For Baudelaire, any 
attempt to compare the idea of love and the image of a rabbit carcass, skinned 
and ready for the stew pot, were doomed to failure. The only possible reason for 
bringing two such unrelated motifs together in a work of art would be if the 
painter had intended to construct an allegory between the rabbit and the figure of 
cupid. But as the poet contends, the connection would be too obscure to be 
attempted.15  
   Though Baudelaire conceded that he had not actually seen the work, he 
nevertheless found the sentimentality of the title to be suggestive of a generation 
that possessed “so little faith in painting” that it has to receive it in a disguised, 
sugar coated form in order to make it palatable. The poet was adamant about the 
origins of this crisis, exclaiming that the development of photography had 
fostered the abject ruination of artistic genius. For Baudelaire, the photograph 
polluted the “French mind”, and paid out only stupidity in exchange for the blind 
faith it attracted.
16
 The camera’s legacy was a manifesto that none dare 
challenge, and in this environment a specific credo became akin to law. Indeed, 
Baudelaire states that individuals were compelled to place their support in the 
idea that art can be nothing other than the exact, indexical replication of reality. 
With this misapprehension in place, a medium that allowed the beholder to make 
and view an image of nature that would be faithful to the details of empirical life 
in every possible way would be wrongly situated at the pinnacle of artistic 
achievement.17 
   Thus, in a famous declaration of contempt, Baudelaire presented photography 
as the offering of an angry God, an infernal tool created by Daguerre, the 
inventor falsely praised as a Messiah. Under his influence the acolytes would 
intone: because photography offers every assurance of factual exactitude the 
medium is synonymous with art. But for Baudelaire, lunacy and fanaticism were 
the forces that possessed these “sun-worshippers”, instigating a confusion that 
cast photography as the most fearful enemy that art could ever face. The support 
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it gained from the ignorance of the masses threatened to corrupt creative practice 
altogether. The only way to stop this devastation would be to return the camera 
to its true vocation and cement its position as the “clerk” of anyone who requires 
“absolute factual exactitude” in his or her vocation.
18
 As the poet concluded, if 
photography were used to create a lasting archive of buildings, books, pictures, 
or any other object that might be subject to the ravages of time and fall into a 
state of irreversible ruin, then the medium would be “thanked and applauded”. 
But if the camera attempted to enter into realms of creativity and imagination 
then, Baudelaire warns the reader, it would be to our detriment.
19
 
   However, it was within precisely such areas that the aspirations of many 
photographers remained.  
 
II: Beauty. 
 
   To be dubbed producers of “practical” images was simply unacceptable to the 
ambitious pioneers of photography. They did not want to be thanked by artists, 
scientists, or anyone else in need of precise visual records to complete their 
vocation. But due to the unstable position of their medium, could the followers of 
Daguerre and Fox-Talbot really hope for anything beyond the pretence of 
gratitude a master might bestow on his servant?
20
 The weight of the 
philosophical problems facing early practitioners of photography can be 
contextualised against ideas Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel advanced in the 
Lectures on Aesthetics.  
   Key to Hegel’s thesis was the idea that the beauty of art stood higher than that 
found in the natural world. Underpinning this assertion was the fact that art was 
born of the mind. For Hegel, any concept that developed in the human mind was 
greater than any product of nature This, Hegel reasoned, was because 
“spirituality and freedom” are present in any form of thought. Consequently, 
because art was created by the mind it would be suffused with this higher beauty, 
and would thus exist as a category superior to the “imperfect” beauty of nature.
21
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   Moreover, the fact that art originated through the mind allowed it to rank 
alongside religion and philosophy as a discourse in which humanity could 
express the deepest reaches of its soul.
22
 But for Hegel, such notions became 
problematic as awareness that art did not represent the “highest and most 
absolute mode of bringing to our minds the true interests of spirit” developed. 
Such judgements were influenced by the world contemporary to the writer. 
Indeed, Hegel reasoned that art no longer satisfied the beholder’s spiritual needs, 
and attributed such failings to the “development of reflection in our life”, an 
impulse that sought that sought to regulate matters according to “laws, duties, 
rights” and “maxims”. As a creation of imagination and feeling, art would suffer 
in a world that defined the “universal” according to predetermined criteria. 
Consequently, Hegel lamented that art had become “a thing of the past”. 
Nevertheless, to accommodate this new intellectual climate a scientific 
formulation of creative practice was essential.
23
 To that end Hegel postulated 
three definitions of how art might be understood. Firstly, he reasoned that a work 
of art would be a product of human activity and not a phenomenon created by the 
forces of nature. Secondly, he argued that an art object could be identified as an 
item made in order to be beheld and apprehended by the human sensory 
apparatus. Finally, the philosopher avowed that each work of art must have both 
“an end and aim in itself”.
24
 
   From the perspective of such statements Hegel would advance the following 
ideas about art. Initially, he suggested that if art is defined as a product of human 
labour it is conceivable that the skills and production methods employed through 
the act of creative labour can by studied and learnt by anybody who wishes to 
craft an art object. But this would result in mechanical systems of production 
able to yield but a flow of objects formed by dexterity alone. Indeed, Hegel 
avowed that although the artwork is a product of human activity, implicit in that 
activity is a process of mental, rather than mechanical, production. Thereby 
implying that the creation of art cannot be regulated by any abstract “formulae”. 
Hence if the assertion that art can be produced by anyone able to replicate the 
techniques specific to a given mode of creative practice can be contested on the 
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grounds of the artist’s potential for individual thought, then such notions will be 
replaced with a description of art as a production system that depends upon 
creative inspiration, just as much as it requires the application of technical skill.
25
  
   In this context, the image captured by photography’s mechanical replication of 
nature would be classified as a subordinate practice from which all evidence of 
individual thought has been expunged. As Bernard Edelman summarised, 
opponents of photography would always return to the belief that machines cannot 
create art because they “cannot convey the thought of the artist”.
26
  
   It follows, therefore, that if the photographic plate was to negate its status as a 
cold product of industrial progress and emerge instead as an outcome of creative 
labour, it would have to reveal itself to be not simply a technical procedure, but a 
system guided by the operations of human cognition, emotion and sensitivity. As 
such, the camera would secure artistic validation by following practices that 
realised this goal, by aspiring to the example of mediums that made pictures born 
of inspiration rather than documents wrought by dexterity. In other words, 
photographers would disavow their position as mere copyists of empirical life by 
engaging methodologies specific to the art of painting. As Peter Henry Emerson 
reasoned, photography would play the student to painting’s master.
27
 
   Perhaps the most vocal response to this idea came from Alfred Stieglitz, who in 
the 1980s asserted that those who readily associated photography with the 
actions of automated technology were naïve to the human judgement, skill and 
subjectivity needed to create a photographic image. In his thesis, the camera lens 
became analogous to the painter’s brush, and was identified as a tool through 
which the subtle beauty of nature might be interpreted by figures of creative 
genius. The level of creative control and intellectual intervention needed to form 
such pictures could be emphasised by the understanding of tone and composition 
that the photographer, like the artist, had to display. Accordingly, Stieglitz 
claimed that both photographer and painter alike relied upon their “observation 
of and feeling for nature in the production of a picture”.
28
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   Such claims possess a distinctly Hegelian tone. To be sure, if Stieglitz 
encouraged photographers to transcend the mechanical boundaries of their 
medium by exploring their innate capacity for artistic feeling and vision, then the 
methodology espoused becomes strikingly close to claims that the creation of art 
hinged upon the interaction between craft, technique and the cerebral. Arguments 
of this type became typical of how photographers defended their craft. Indeed, 
the recurrent claim that photography and painting – and hence photography and 
art – were not unrelated but indivisible might be summarised as follows: The 
photographer is always as creative as the painter. Like the easel artist he begins 
with an image in his mind – an image created by the operations of his 
imagination – then through his skill and technical mastery he ventures to realise 
that image in material form.29 
   However, the manifestos Stieglitz and Emerson advanced at the turn of the 
century did not represent a wholly new territory. The search for a critical 
exchange between photographic and painterly labour had existed since the mid-
1850s, finding an early prototype in the constructed or “composite photographs” 
made by figures such as Oscar Gustave Rejlander and his contemporary, Henry 
Peach Robinson. Both developed a practice based upon “combination printing”, 
a skill in which numerous, individual negatives were used to create a single, final 
image. In Rejlander’s case, the use of intricate, multi-figure compositions 
betrayed an obvious attempt to re-create the grandeur of history painting. The 
1857 piece The Two Ways of Life is typical in this respect. Moralistic in tone, the 
work forms a narrative in which the viewer is presented with polarised ways of 
living: firstly, a virtuous, saintly existence grounded in religious sobriety; and 
secondly, a life of decadence and indulgence fated to condemn the debauched 
individual to damnation. Clearly concerned for the spiritual wellbeing of his 
public, the artist urges the beholder to follow the latter, saintly path to spiritual 
fulfilment.
30
  
   Less pious is Peach Robinson’s Fading Away (1858). Simpler than Rejlander’s 
extravagant work, the picture can be considered an attempt to confirm the 
following plea, which attempts to align the photographer’s craft with the labour 
of painters like Ingres: If a photographer were to master the subtle effects of 
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lighting, if they used a studio equipped with all manner of blinds and reflectors, 
if they acquired a wide variety of backgrounds, props and costumes and worked 
only with professional modes, would it not be possible for that individual to 
create images capable of rivalling the greatest paintings of art history?31 
   All the above elements are present in Fading Away. The composition portrays 
a sick child wrapped in a swathe of blankets. She sits in the company of her 
family as they gaze with sadness upon her frailty. A male relative, possibly the 
girl’s father, has his back to this scene. Overcome with emotion, he appears to 
look out of the window at which he stands; yet closer inspection of his body 
language suggests that he has raised a hand to eyes, as if to dry his tears. This 
heavily melancholic tone imbues the image with a stiffness and formality of pose 
that belies the photographer’s attempt to recreate an everyday incident of 
Victorian family life. For contemporary observers, however, the naturalism of 
the work was startling. In fact, a minor scandal ensued when it was first made 
available to the public, as people believed that Robinson had made a truthful 
record of an actual event. The photographic nature of the image was enough to 
persuade viewers that the ailing girl really was facing death. The possibility that 
she was simply an actor playing a part was not entertained.
32
  
   Evident in such accounts are the problems that arose when painting was 
advanced as a model for photographic practice. Though both Rejlander and 
Robinson’s work offered clear evidence that cognitive development and creative 
intent played a crucial role in photographic production, their work was fated to 
suffer when compared with the very practice to which it aspired. Rejlander’s 
quasi-religious symbolism may have been faithful to a specific strand of 
Victorian moralism, but it did not win universal approval or secure his work the 
artistic credibility he sought. One can only speculate upon how Baudelaire might 
have responded to such images, but following his dismissal of Seigneurgens as a 
saccharine imitator of genuine painting there is little probability that Rejlander’s 
heavy-handed ethical message would have elicited a favourable response. 
   Likewise, Robinson’s attempt to develop a form of photographic genre 
painting was destined to struggle against public perceptions of photography’s 
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indexical proximity to reality. The artist’s adoption of the compositional 
techniques a painter might employ to control and construct the specific details of 
their canvas was not enough to silence popular opinions that the camera was but 
a pre-eminent recording device, and possessed little use value beyond such tasks.  
   Perhaps, therefore, the contention surrounding photography’s integration 
within the canon of fine arts can be associated with the fact that such debates 
were posed solely from within established notions of what creative practice was 
and how it might be achieved. The emphasis placed upon identifying how the 
camera might secure a foothold in existing artistic hierarchies seemingly 
obscured the wider issue of photography’s potential to disrupt and re-order such 
structures. Photography had emerged as a medium without a past, and thus 
offered artists an opportunity to break with tradition precisely because such 
constraints had not yet ensnared the practice.
33
 But this was a fact with which 
few seemed cognisant. As Benjamin asserted, the nineteenth century saw 
numerous pointless arguments devoted to solving the puzzle of whether or not 
photography was an artistic practice, while the more vital question of whether 
photography’s invention had served to revolutionise the very nature of art was 
seemingly overlooked.
34
 Yet critical discourses begun in the early decades of the 
twentieth century brought such discussions to the fore.   
 
III: Atget. 
 
   In the cultural landscape of the European avant-garde in the 1920s, the 
attitudes that had previously derided photography as a mere tool or device 
underwent a radical change. Where the expression of artistic creativity had once 
stood firm as an irresistible yet unachievable dream for photographers, a new 
intellectual climate had emerged. In this culture, the communication of emotion 
and feeling – factors initially perceived to be beyond the camera’s reach – were 
replaced with a renewed interest in the speed and veracity of the lens.35  
                                                
33
 Albert Velatin: “Eugène Atget” in Photography in the Modern Era, 1989, p18. 
34
 Walter Benjamin: “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility (Third 
Version)” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938 – 1940, London, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, p258. 
35
 Tristan Tzara: “Photography Upside Down”, in Photography in the Modern Era, 1989, p5. 
 88 
   For Tristan Tzara, and his contemporaries such as Man Ray and Robert 
Desnos, the acceleration of modern life that gathered pace with Haussmann and 
continued unabated across the following years was key to the erosion of earlier 
prejudices surrounding photography. Man Ray in particular believed the camera 
to be a wondrous explorer of those elements of reality that the human eye often 
overlooks. In his opinion it possessed the ability to capture the fleeting 
impressions of daily life, such as the brief, magical moment in which twilight 
descends into darkness. It would be this ability to record the ephemeral, 
evanescent details that the “slowness” of human sight could not perceive that 
cast photography as the medium most attuned to “the moral needs of the modern 
world”. Painting was therefore in danger of becoming obsolete at the hands of its 
former pupil, of being rendered archaic by the speed and accuracy of the 
Kodak.
36
 This situation strengthened as equipment progressed, achieving its 
zenith in the 1920’s with the development of 35mm cameras and fast films 
characterised by increased sensitivity to light. The convergence of such 
technologies gave rise to street photography, allowing the experiences 
documented by Baudelaire’s flânnerie to be fixed. Thus fulfilling the connection 
Victor Fournel foresaw in Things to be Seen on the Streets of Paris, in which the 
flâneur was called the “peripatetic daguerreotype upon whom every trace 
registers”.
37
 This new willingness to re-consider the photograph’s critical 
potential can be traced to the influence of a specific figure, the Parisian 
photographer Eugène Atget. 
   In 1926, a year before his death, Atget had a meeting with the Surrealist group. 
Seeking a picture to use as cover art for their journal, La Révolution Surréaliste, 
the young collective approached the photographer with the hope of buying an 
image. The details of their conversation are now obscure, and the sale of 
L’Eclipse – Avril 1912 remains one of the few facts about which commentators 
agree. But one incident, recorded by Man Ray, has left its indelible historical 
mark. As the two parties began to separate, Atget turned to his companion and 
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spoke about his print: “Don’t put my name on it…these are simply documents I 
make”.
38
  
   This plea is initially misleading, for although Atget did not aspire to the realm 
of high art he was nevertheless a master of his medium. Moreover, Peter Wollen 
observes that while Atget did not share the drive for the “perfection of 
composition or print” that might be identified in the work of Edward Weston, he 
was nonetheless able to see “aesthetic value” in subjects considered to be beyond 
such classifications.
39
 Hence we might conclude that the presence of a creative 
imagination was constant in Atget’s work.  
   A sign hung in the window of his shop on the rue de la pitié confirms the role 
he granted his craft. It read “Documents for Artists”, and attests to the market he 
would supply throughout his life. Yet the photographer’s legacy would exceed 
that of an archivist who presented salon painters with a supporting file of visual 
material. On the contrary, he became one of the precursors of the Parisian avant-
garde. As Pierre Mac-Orlan put it, he was Le Père Atget, a figure who “seduced 
and mystified” radicals, intellectuals and poets alike.
40
    
   These eulogies conceal the fact that Atget’s association with the Surrealists 
was the outcome of pure chance. He happened to live on the same street as Man 
Ray, the rue Campagne premère, and was known throughout the district as an 
“old neighbourhood photographer” who sold work in his nearby studio. Such 
notoriety compelled figures such as Desnos to explore his shop, and when they 
entered this space they were entranced. The Parisian intelligentsia did not view 
his plates, prints and albums as a collection destined for the obscurity of a library 
shelf. Rather, they found in his work a vision that would inspire future 
generations,
41
 a “cerebral landscape” in which the boundaries separating fact 
from dream became indistinct.
42
   
   The city frozen by Atget’s camera was the “popular Paris”, a world divested of 
the trappings of bourgeois culture and the “reveries of the ancien regime”. His 
documents reclaimed the character of the old city and uncovered the sights and 
sensations that Haussmann had hidden beneath the veil of economic revolution. 
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As such, his pictures were both “alien” and “familiar”; they celebrated an 
everyday life usually absent from depictions of the capital.
43
 In this context, a 
sense of parity emerges between Atget’s photography and Benjamin’s notion of 
“The Collector”.  
   For Benjamin, collecting was a “primal phenomenon of study”, a labour 
exemplified by the student who “collects knowledge”.
44
 Atget can be considered 
in precisely such terms. He was literally a student of the city, a man who 
gathered detailed visual knowledge of the landscape around him. His diligently 
constructed albums – each focused upon a specific subject or theme – evoked the 
collector’s need to bring together “what belongs together”. Consequently, he 
mirrored the figure who, by “keeping in mind their affinities and their succession 
in time”, finds he is able to “furnish information about his objects”.
45
 By 
scouring Paris for images of shop windows, carriages and architectural 
embellishments, Atget followed the collector into the spaces that harboured 
archaic trades, detective agencies and beauty salons in which women with long 
hair had their flowing locks set into “permanent waves”.
46
 As Benjamin put it, 
Atget regularly ignored the landmarks of the city, but what he did not overlook 
was “a long row of boot lasts; or the Paris courtyards”.
47
  
   This visualisation of the objects that modernity had discarded was a source of 
joy for the Surrealists.
48
 But Atget was not simply an agent of delight or humour. 
On the contrary, his work harmonised perfectly with the intentions of La 
Révolution Surréaliste. The journal was conceived as a parody of La Nature, a 
scientific review of long established credibility, and like that publication it had 
clearly defined research goals. Whereas La Nature debated how the sciences 
might be applied to industry and the arts, La Révolution Surréaliste aimed to 
collect and examine the “everyday pathological phenomena of ordinary 
people”.
49
 Hence a photographer like Atget would be prized as figure who could 
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isolate fragments of empirical life and supply a source of images to which the 
surrealist’s could subject their analytical gaze.  
   However, the psychical interrogation of the everyday does not represent the 
sole context in which the viewer could engage Atget’s work. His images also 
offered the onlooker the unique opportunity to project their imagination into the 
streets of Paris. Key to this process was the photographer’s ability to encourage 
the beholder to adopt a specific “look” as they engaged his compositions. The 
album Métiers, boutiques et étalages de Paris (1912) achieved this effect by 
replicating the glance of the subject who moves through a landscape of shop 
fronts, flower stalls and market halls. As Molly Nesbit observes, we are 
encouraged to view these pictures from the particular role of the shopper. Indeed, 
the sequence opens with the façade of a general store, then progresses to a 
newspaper stand, the window of a shop selling china dolls, and onwards to a key 
cutting booth. By following this flow, the spectator’s eye mimics the shifting 
gaze needed to explore the random sights offered by a walk through the city. 
Hence the beholder comes to imagine that they are the pedestrian Atget evokes.
50
  
   But Atget was not content with the recreation of a general category of 
experience. He wanted the observer to sample the city from a particular 
perspective, namely that of the working class. This becomes evident as Métiers, 
boutiques et étalages de Paris develops. After the early scenes, Atget guides the 
viewer through spaces that are marked by an increasing lack of finery. He directs 
the viewer to shops selling second hand goods and focuses their attention on a 
modest choice of foods. The implied conclusion is that only a member of the 
poor would search out such things and view them with such intent. Old clothes, 
worn shoes, used furniture, and the produce of back-street greengrocers were the 
commodities of the proletariat, the goods on which they depended. Thus, when 
the beholder viewed these items in Atget’s album – and lingered over them in the 
manner of one trying to decide whether or not to make a purchase – they would 
be doing so through the eyes of the worker. In effect, they are prompted to 
identify or empathise with a specific social group. Consequently, for the 
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bourgeois observer Ategt’s work would initiate a reversal in economic status. To 
view his images would be to taste the reality of the masses.
51
  
 
IV: The Ragman. 
         
   Further insight into Atget’s work emerges when one considers his ability to 
evoke the characters and landscapes captured by Les Fleurs du Mal; a fact 
rendered deeply ironic by Baudelaire’s infamous antipathy towards photography. 
Nevertheless, there is an affinity between the two bodies of work that transcends 
the notion of Atget answering the poet’s plea and using photography to record 
the aspects of daily life that might otherwise be forgotten. For instance, 
Baudelaire’s eerie suggestion of houses growing taller in the mist
52
 parallels the 
ominous presence that architecture assumes in Atget’s prints. In his 1898 view of 
St Etienne du Mont, for instance, the capital’s buildings flank the street like 
sentries and stretch to the sky with such force that they threaten to come crashing 
down upon the beholder.  
   In the case of the Rag Picker, the link between photographer and poet was 
stronger still. The ragman or Chiffonier was a figure upon which history has 
bestowed conflicting identities. For Marx, the man forced to eek out an existence 
by sifting through the scraps discarded by modernity represented the extent of 
the worker’s debasement under capitalism.
53
 Baudelaire, however, viewed the 
rag picker as maverick, a figure blessed with the freedom to philosophise, 
wander and drink.
54
 He immortalised this figure in Le Vin des Chiffonniers 
(1857), which follows the ragman on his night time mission to scavenge the 
city’s waste. 
   In the poem we encounter the ragman in a windswept street illuminated by the 
red glow of gaslight. He pays no credence to the presence of policemen or their 
informants, and instead moves through the night air crying aloud the laws and 
rules he has designed to govern his own life.55 Such details confirm that, for 
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Baudelaire, the rag picker was a sublime, poetic figure. He was a romantic free 
spirit who lived in open defiance of the industrial capitalism that had come to 
dominate Parisian life. By harvesting the garbage of the city, the chiffonnier 
found an endless source of food, clothes, fuel and myriad materials from which 
shelters could be built. Plundering this bounty allowed freedom from the 
restrictions of an exchange economy and liberation from the tyranny of bosses 
and drudgery of factory labour. Poverty was undoubtedly the cost of this 
emancipation, and it was generally accepted that selling wares reclaimed from 
the poubelles or dustbins would yield no more than twenty-five francs a day, yet 
what cannot be ignored is the fact that the ragman’s lifestyle offered clear 
extrication from the contingencies of class struggle. Moreover, their world 
granted asylum not only to the unemployed, but also to the soldier who had 
deserted his regiment, the businessman facing insolvency, the inventor seeking 
inspiration, and the scholar whose genius had been numbed by absinthe.
56
 Much 
like the flâneur – whose idling was interpreted as a protest against the “division 
of labour”
57
 – the heroism of the rag picker was thus entwined with their refusal 
to participate in bourgeoisie culture. Their existence was born of a conscious 
decision to remain on the peripheries of civilised society, and garbage was the 
commodity that allowed such choices to become reality.
58
                   
    Unlike Baudelaire’s verse, Atget did not offer a vision of the rag pickers at 
work, but in scenes such as Intérieur d’un Chiffonnier (1912) he portrayed their 
homes and detailed the items gleaned from their nightly rounds. Strewn 
throughout their dwellings were abandoned pieces of furniture, coils of rope, 
scraps of paper and hottes, the large baskets with which such objects were 
gathered. Again, the sense of squalor conveyed by such landscapes is palpable. 
But as before, to dismiss the chiffoniers as mere paupers would be naïve. Rifkin 
confirms this in his discussion of the Zone non aedificandi, the forgotten spaces 
that stood beyond the fortifications that Their designed in the 1840s, which 
provided the ragman with a place of shelter. While “health statistics” officially 
defined this region as objectionable, in Rifkin’s view it was infinitely preferable 
to the featureless districts populated by the modern working classes: the “smoke-
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filled” region stripped of all vegetation and cursed with “any and every industrial 
pathology”.
59
  
   The autonomy of those who resisted such hegemony was emphasised by 
Atget’s pictures. When he photographed the rag pickers of Porte d’asnières, each 
figure met the camera with a steady, “knowing” gaze, a look evocative of the 
self-control they possessed.
60
 These people were not weak but victorious. They 
were the figures who prowled the city’s gas lit streets, reserving only scorn for its 
authorities; who wrote their own laws and toasted their success. In this context, 
the “dregs” and “vomit” of the metropolis were not burdened by their “heaps of 
rubbish”. On the contrary, they were empowered. As Baudelaire put it: “Arches 
of triumph rise before their steps”.
61
 In other words, rags enabled liberty.
62
  
   The intellectual framework formed by such comments reflects Benjamin’s 
claim that Atget’s work possessed “a hidden political significance”.
63
 The 
significance in question becomes clearer when one considers Atget’s own 
political views, which were made public by his decision to donate over one 
hundred issues of the revolutionary journal La Guerre Sociale to the permanent 
collection of the Bibliothèque Historique.
64
 It follows that a man committed to 
such socialistic ideology would be drawn to groups that opposed the structures of 
capitalism. By photographing those who snubbed the conventions of capitalist 
society, he indirectly contributed to the critique of capital itself. This challenge 
would stand even if the rag picker’s resistance of social conformism was one 
suffused with romantic melancholy, a quality born of the sacrifices needed to 
sustain a way of life that was in constant threat of decline. Notably from the city 
council who, in 1914, proposed legislation that would suspend their rights to 
salvage the rubbish on the city streets.
65
 In this sense, Atget’s portraits of the 
chiffoniers refute any relation to aesthetic pleasure. They are not pastoral 
depictions of a simpler way of life, but pictures imbued with the potential to 
become active agents in wider cultural debates.  
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   Key to this potential would be the very fact that Atget worked with the camera, 
not with paint or stone. To be sure, Benjamin maintained that when the 
photograph engaged the beholder it would be through language altogether 
different than that uttered by the canvas, a language focused upon the exploration 
of social motifs rather than the veneration of beauty. As he put it “free-floating 
contemplation” was inappropriate to Atget’s indexical replication of reality. On 
the contrary, his prints challenged and stirred the viewer in new ways.
66
 Rather 
than compelling the spectator to a state of passive meditation upon aesthetic 
forms, they allowed the “politically educated eye” to roam freely across the 
image.
67
 It would be this discourse that confirmed both the medium’s critical 
potential and the transformation of creative practice it promised to enact. 
 
V: Halo. 
 
   For Benjamin, such changes were enabled by a single factor: the photograph’s 
ability to arrest the auratic experience, the perceptual immersion in time and 
space, previously staged by works of art. As illustrated via Manet’s practice, the 
artwork’s ability to enact such a response could be influenced by the phenomenal 
conditions of reality.
68
 However, Benjamin also argued that the auratic 
sensations fostered by the art object derived from its status as a unique item 
entwined with systems of magic, myth and religion.   
   The philosopher elucidates this idea in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility’, noting that painting and sculpture had existed 
throughout history as entities able to generate feelings of awe and wonder. 
Underpinning this claim is the suggestion that the first works of art originated as 
a way of depicting gods or deities, a fact that bestowed upon them a ceremonial 
character. The viewer who beheld such works would be suspended in reverent 
meditation, a state inspired by the transcendent, spiritual qualities embodied and 
evoked by the object before them. The resulting encounters would be akin to the 
sensory captivation inspired by the beauty of nature, a spectacle equally imbued 
with notions of transcendent divinity. The nature artist’s attempt to interpret the 
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enigma of The Large Enclosure through contemplative immersion thus emerges 
as a sensation analogous to the ritualistic response enacted by works of art.
69
  
   Consequently, when Benjamin contends that the ancient Greeks would 
approach a statue of Venus as an object of worship, and then subsequently notes 
that later medieval clerics would view the same item as an “ominous idol”, his 
point is that the differences of their respective responses are trivial. Both parties 
are united by the impulse to receive the item as if it were a magical item, a 
predilection that subsequently shapes their cultic reception of it. Indeed, by 
approaching the statue in this context, the observer would be held in a spatial-
temporal matrix. They would breathe the strange weave of space and time, the 
contemplative, perceptual immersion that constitutes the feeling of genuine aura. 
Moreover, this example not only illustrates how an association with the sacred 
enabled artworks to enact auratic experience, it also confirms a fundamental 
characteristic of the object that holds the viewer in the reverie of auratic 
sensation, namely its phenomenal distance from the spectator. Regardless of its 
physical proximity, the beholder would be psychologically separated from the 
work by the lingering acts of perceptual absorption it inspired. No matter how 
close it appeared to be, it would remain forever unreachable.
70
  
   If we follow such arguments it becomes tempting to reason that the gradual 
secularization of society begun in the Renaissance stood poised to initiate the 
aura’s evanescence. But this is not the case. Writing in ‘The Artwork Essay’ 
Benjamin argued that as magic and myth became less dominant in empirical life, 
the character of “fundamental uniqueness” attached to works of art underwent a 
significant transformation. As the philosopher explained: in the mind of the 
viewer the “uniqueness of the phenomena” which dominates in the cult image is 
increasingly replaced by the “empirical uniqueness of the artist” or of their 
artistic achievements.
71
 Accordingly, the authenticity of the genuine work of art 
becomes attributed to the unique creative intellect that created it. However, such 
objects would retain the capacity to invoke a meditative state similar to that 
inspired by the sacred. The viewer would still be held in an auratic weave of time 
and space, and the work would remain at a distance. 
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   It is possible to expound this claim and identify a process of transference 
operative between the aura of the artwork and the aura conveyed by the artist. 
Key to this idea is Baudelaire’s prose piece: ‘Perte d’auréole’ (1869). In English, 
the title of this work is “Loss of a Halo”. But as a footnote to the Harvard 
University Press edition of The Arcades Project states, ‘Perte d’auréole’ can also 
be translated as “Loss of Aura”.
72
 The editor’s notes to the edition of ‘Central 
Park’ included in volume four of Benjamin’s Selected Writings confirms this 
point, stating that ‘Perte d’auréole’ can mean both “loss of halo” or “loss of 
aura”.
73
  
   The connection between aura and halo, here implied, might be unremarkable 
were it not for a passage composed in 1930, a text where Benjamin argues that 
genuine aura is like an “ornamental halo” in which the item or individual is 
enclosed as if inside a case.
74
 This suggests that notions of the auratic can be 
applied to people as well as things. To explore this claim demands closer study 
of the prose piece in question. ‘Perte de Auréole’ describes a chance encounter 
between a poet and a citizen played out in a “den of iniquity”. The shocked 
observer is unable to contain his surprise at meeting the poet, the “eater of 
ambrosia”, in this setting. But when asked to explain himself, the poet offers an 
unexpected response. 
   He claims that only moments earlier he was outside, amid the chaos of the 
boulevard, trying to cross the street whilst avoiding the dangers of passing 
carriages. Yet as he jumped the fifthly puddles that festooned the pavement, and 
evaded the galloping horses that assaulted him from all sides, his halo fell from 
his head and landed on the ground. He lacked the will to retrieve it, and instead 
chose to leave it where it lay. Then, a remarkable thought crossed his mind, a 
thought that transformed a potential misfortune into an enticing opportunity. 
Without his halo, without the symbol that marked him as a poet, he was granted 
anonymity. He could walk unnoticed through the city and freely indulge himself 
in the pleasures of the masses.75 
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   His new companion appears unconvinced by this idea, and urges the poet to 
report the loss of his halo – or at the very least find out if it has been retrieved – 
but these suggestions are met with a negative response. Far from feeling despair, 
the poet is happy in his new surroundings. He is bored with notions of dignity 
and the hallowed status he used to possess, and is excited about the possibility of 
standing and living alongside ordinary people.76 
   What this summary illustrates is the fact that the halo represents the qualities 
that separate the poet from everyday life. It is only when the halo is lost that the 
poet is free to merge with the masses and move unnoticed through the haunts of 
ordinary men. Here I want to argue that such distancing can be ascribed to the 
poet’s creative genius. The opening lines of ‘Perte d’auréole’, in which the poet 
is described as a figure who drinks quintessence, suggests this precise possibility. 
Today, quintessence denotes the exemplar of any given category. However, its 
etymology derives from the Latin quinta essentia, which literally means the fifth 
essence and describes a magical element beyond terrestrial classifications of 
earth, air, fire and water. This mysterious property was thought to reside in 
celestial bodies, and would be defined as that which gave the heavens their 
majesty. The man who drank of this substance – as Baudelaire imagines the poet 
doing – would be therefore enchanted. They would transcend the empirical world 
and exist on a higher spiritual plane. This would not only grant them a level of 
insight and sensitivity beyond that of the public, but would also cast them as 
living embodiments of the magical phenomena that fostered auratic experience.  
   In other words, if Benjamin presents the aura as an “ornamental halo” in which 
an item or individual is held as if in a case, then the halo worn by the poet 
becomes emblematic of the psychological unapproachability generated by the 
figure who possessed a genius of such profundity that it was thought to derive 
from some otherworldly source. Indeed, the individual imbued with such gifts 
would be revered. Therefore, all encounters with them would be marked by a 
sense of hushed awe akin to the auratic contemplation staged by the beauty of 
nature. This reaction would render the poet distant regardless of physical 
proximity, consequently giving them the appearance of being metaphorically 
encased, as if in a halo, and thus separated from the everyday world. The shock 
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felt by the subject who finds himself able to converse with the writer once their 
mythic status has been forsaken attests to the distance traditionally manifest 
between the parties. Furthermore, once established such perceptions would 
influence not only human relations, they would also govern the reception of the 
poet’s craft. 
   Bernard Edelman’s assessments of the legal debates surrounding the ownership 
of creative practice place this point in context. Because the visual components of 
fine art frequently evoke subjects located in empirical life, for instance a 
landscape, portrait or still life, the artist has to invest their work with a quality 
that allows it to be perceived as their property and not, as noted above, as that of 
the owner of the depicted subject.
77
 Crucially, the quality in question is the 
immaterial evidence of the artist’s intelligence, for as Edelman argued: the 
notion that an artwork is first and foremost the “production of genius” is a 
judgment that is likely to attract the fewest detractors in a court of law.
78
  
   In a development of this position, Nesbit notes that laws passed in Eighteenth 
Century France also avowed that an artist’s genius ingrained its imprint on the 
products of their labour. Such judgements cast the artist’s work as the mirror 
image of their personality and hence suggested that “material and reflected 
personality” were not only connected but invisible from each other.
79
 This logic 
suggests the following conclusion: if an author’s genius granted them a 
supernatural status that influenced their interactions with others, thereby 
distancing them from everyday life, then such qualities would conceivably seep 
into the products of their craft. Once phrased in such terms, this hypothesis can 
be applied to the practice of all artists who were taken to be above the masses in 
the exercise of their creative prowess. If the artist – like Baudelaire’s poet – 
personified the magical, transcendent qualities that inspired auratic experience, 
then their work would share such traits and emerge as a cultic object able to hold 
the viewer in an immersive web of time and space.  
   That Benjamin located the true resonance of this phenomenon in the work of 
Vincent van Gogh validates such claims. As the philosopher observed, it is 
within van Gogh’s “late paintings” that we encounter what is arguably the 
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clearest example of the auratic, as in those images it is feasible to argue that the 
aura has been painted alongside various objects and motifs.
80
 Such claims 
undoubtedly rest upon the fact that both art history and popular culture alike have 
fêted van Gogh as the embodiment of tortured, misunderstood genius. For 
example, an account written in 1890 argued that his art could be distinguished by 
an “excess of energy, of sensitivity, of expressive violence”. Such qualities were 
born of the painter’s ability to see the world with a supernatural intensity, a gift 
that allowed him to perceive imperceptible subtleties of line, shape and form and 
engage details of reality that remained unseen by the common eye.
81
 Indeed, 
speaking of a canvas completed in 1888 – a work finished in order to settle a 
debt with his landlord – van Gogh himself asserted that: “with red and green I 
have tried to render the terrible passions of humanity”.
82
  
   Such comments grant the artist parity with the haloed, quintessence-drinking 
poet of ‘Perte d’aure’ole’. Like that figure, van Gogh would be able to see 
beyond the limits of empirical life and explore instead a higher spiritual 
consciousness. Baudelaire provides a further metaphor with which to explicate 
this claim. In ‘The Albatross’ (1861), he evokes images of a bird whose great 
wings allow it to soar higher than any other living thing. But in a cruel twist of 
fate, those same wings render it near immobile on land and provide a source of 
amusement for the sailors who trap this great flier in order to mock its comical 
gait. Crucially, the verse concludes by drawing an analogy between this creature 
and the figure of the poet, a comparison that rests on notions of the sublime 
genius associated with such characters. For Baudelaire, the poet and the albatross 
are kindred spirits. The poet’s intellect grants them the capacity to travel far 
above the chaos of empirical life and witness things that remain unseen to those 
below.
83
 Without doubt, this description can be applied to van Gogh, an 
association that allows us to discern how his art would prompt a cultic, auratic 
reception. If an author venerated for their transcendent insight creates items able 
to evoke similar reverence, then a painting by van Gogh would likewise attain a 
mythic character able to lull the spectator into a ritualistic pattern of beholding 
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analogous to that initiated by the statue of Venus. Accordingly, when Benjamin 
claims that van Gogh painted “aura” alongside his subjects, we can state with 
conviction that it is the transferral of the auratic response generated by his status 
as a unique creative visionary to which the philosopher refers. 
 
VI: Trace. 
 
   But by substituting the single for the plural, such encounters would be 
disrupted. Following the advent of photographic technology, artworks would be 
purged of their mythical character and transfigured into pictures that the 
spectator could integrate into their daily reality and receive on their own terms. 
The unique work of art would thus escape its former confines of the temple, the 
cathedral, or the secular space of the gallery and flow forth into empirical life. A 
passage from The Arcades Project, which considers aura against its diametrically 
opposed category of trace, places this relationship in context.  
   For Benjamin, trace is the “appearance of a nearness”, regardless of how 
distant the “thing that left it may be”, a definition which opposes the now 
familiar claim that the aura is an experience of phenomenal distance regardless 
of any proximity between subject and object of contemplation. But this is not the 
only difference between the two classifications. Crucially, Benjamin also noted 
that in the trace the beholder takes possession of the object, whereas in the aura it 
is the artefact that takes possession of the individual.
84
 From the perspective of 
such claims we can reason that if the experience fostered by the painting can be 
associated with that of aura, then the sensation staged by the photograph can be 
likened to the trace. 
   As evidenced by van Gogh, the empirical uniqueness of the object and the 
profound genius of its creator would combine in painting to re-create the auratic 
immersion in time and space historically staged by sacred artefacts. It is this 
lingering contemplation – a sensation that could be attributed to the artwork 
taking possession of the observer – that enforces the beholder’s sense of distance 
from the work. But photography allows a replica or “trace” of the painting to be 
literally brought closer, both spatially and psychologically, to the spectator. In 
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this context, it will be the subject who takes possession of the object, not the 
other way round. Therefore, regardless of any latent magical associations 
attributed to either artwork or artist, the item presented in photographic form 
would be marked not by an irreducible distance born of reverent meditation, but 
an indefinite nearness created by the disruption of such experiences. As 
Benjamin argued, technological reproducibility achieves the historic feat of 
liberating the artwork from its lowly obedience to ritual.
85
  
   The use of photography as a creative medium in its own right would only 
accentuate this state of affairs. A medium that was popularly associated with 
automated production would conceal traces of the creator’s hand and yield work 
that bore little relation to objects wrought by sensitivity, passion and emotion. As 
such, it would offer no grounds for auratic engagement. Moreover, the inherent 
capacity of photographic negatives to bear endless copies, faithful to the original 
print in every conceivable detail, would mean that to favour the authentic image 
over its copies became nonsensical. Such technology allowed countless people to 
possess the results of creative labour, eroding the artwork’s mythic status further 
still.
86
  
   Benjamin believed that this transformed mode of production would engender 
new relationships between beholder and object, under which “all intimacies” 
were “sacrificed to the illumination of detail”.
87
 As the philosopher elucidated: 
regardless of the photographer’s creative intent – or the aesthetic manner in 
which he or she may compose their subject – the beholder is always compelled to 
scour the photograph for the trace of contingency, of the “here and now”, with 
which reality will brand the image.
88
 In other words, by denying factors that 
previously compelled the observer to venerate the artwork as if it were an icon, 
the photograph would permit greater focus upon the social content it was able to 
convey. Jürgen Habermas would later draw similar conclusions, noting that once 
an artwork became purged of the capacity to stage auratic reverie it would 
simultaneously be able to release its “historical testimony”.
89
 The unrivalled 
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political potential Benjamin located in the non-auratic image
90
 can be traced to 
this exact point. Photography is able to radicalise creative practice in a way 
painting cannot because by denying the ritualistic functions that had hitherto 
surrounded works of art it permits the viewer a previously unattainable focus 
upon social motifs.  
   This exchange represents the interplay between viewer and work manifest in 
Atget. Key to such claims is his embrace of photography’s documentary status. 
By declining to embellish his practice with a signature Atget eschewed 
traditional notions of artistic authorship and hence refused to “inflate the value” 
of his images. Therefore, although history has cast him as an auteur, the impact 
of Atget’s creative spirit would be reduced.
91
 Unlike van Gogh’s oeuvre, his 
albums would be identified not as the sole product of mythic, creative 
consciousness, but would be interpreted instead as the bounty of technical 
progress, of the modern union between man and machine. Consequently, like the 
“Newhaven fishwife” captured by David Octavius Hill, Atget’s prints would 
always resist assimilation into the category of “art”.
92
 As such, his images would 
be divested of the authority gleaned from such status and stripped of the 
authenticity that inspired acts of cultic veneration. 
   To be sure, his practice initiated the artwork’s liberation from the snare of the 
auratic;
93
 it would be the revised mode of reception arising from this context that 
allowed the beholder to take possession of portraits such as the Rag Picker series 
and engage the latent political content with which they were suffused. An extract 
from Benjamin’s ‘Thirteen Theses Against Snobs’, which seeks to delineate 
between artworks and documents, provides an apt conclusion to these ideas. The 
taxonomy exclaims that subject matter is ballast removed from the artwork by 
the act of contemplation, suggesting that the lingering immersion in time and 
space inspired by a work of art numbs the beholder to the social content it may 
contain. However, Benjamin proceeds to state that in the utilitarian document 
subject matter will represent the image’s dominant content. Hence when the 
beholder views a documentary work it will be subject matter that directs their 
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senses.
94
 Therefore, because the viewer is no longer gazing upon a unique, 
authentic item or an object imbued with the artist’s “transcendent, spiritual 
insight”, the spell of auratic reverie is broken and the critical potential of the 
work gains prominence. As a maker of documents, Atget would have enacted 
this effect.        
   The photographer thus assumes a key position in Benjamin’s writing. 
Following Baudelaire, he emerges as the second figure around which notions of 
the aura’s decline can be formulated, albeit through a subtlety different context. 
If aura names a mode of experience characterised by contemplative, perceptual 
immersion, and if Les Fleurs du Mal alluded to the debasement of such 
experiences following social transformations in empirical life, then Atget reveals 
an analogous revolution in creative labour that impacted upon the artwork’s 
ability to enact auratic sensations.  
 
VII: Tret’iakov. 
 
   What becomes apparent through such accounts is the fact that Benjamin not 
only viewed photography as a medium capable of re-ordering the conventions 
and traditions of artistic production, but also as an invaluable weapon for artists 
seeking to enact social change through their work. In effect, the photograph 
presented the philosopher with a solution to a longstanding problem, a dilemma 
that can be phrased thus: how can revolutionary art be made so that it does not 
become lost in “the basic conditions of artistic production”? That is, how can the 
artist instil critique in their work without restricting the work’s public to the 
privileged few who might see it hanging resplendently on the wall of a gallery, or 
displayed proudly in the private sitting room of a collector? Such debates hinged 
upon issues of how the artist might reach the masses while simultaneously 
bypassing the art market and its exhibition culture?
95
  
   These problems held myriad implications for the artists who came to 
prominence during the Second Republic, and for Gustave Courbet in particular. 
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Indeed, while it is certainly no exaggeration to define Courbet as a political artist 
and to identify his politics as revolutionary, the forms he used to express his 
beliefs can be identified as barriers to their social integration. Such claims can be 
expounded by further reference to The Burial at Ornans. 
   That this painting was charged with radical intent is an observation that cannot 
be easily disputed. As argued above, it issued the proletariat with a symbolic call 
to arms, thereby generating anxiety in the Parisian bourgeoisie.
96
 Consequently, 
the work’s rhetoric would have to be suppressed. Yet such concealment would be 
complicated by the fact that, as a medal winner, Courbet held an incontestable 
right to exhibit in the salon. Therefore, the conservative members of the jury 
would be bound by their own rules. They would be unable to refuse his entries 
on the grounds of morality or ethics; on the contrary, they would be obliged to 
accept them.
97
  
   But gaining acceptance to such events did not provide Courbet with a platform 
from which the mechanisms of cultural change could be instigated. As Clark 
argues, the moment political works enter into an environment associated with 
tradition and convention – such as the gallery – they will be paradoxically 
integrated into the very systems they seek to subvert. Therefore, the 
inflammatory content of Courbet’s painting would be tempered. Rather than 
engaging the viewer on a political level, it would enter the trove of precious 
objects that the beholder looked upon with awe. Consequently, it would emerge 
as testament to the artist’s skill and genius rather than his social commitment. 
The picture would thus trap the observer in the lingering temporality of auratic 
experience, and become imbued with a sense of phenomenal distance from the 
spectator. In this context, adding a radical canvas like The Burial to the Salon 
ironically becomes perhaps the best way of ensuring that it remained aloof from 
the public.  
   To avoid this regression and preserve their original intentions, the artist would 
have to convey their ideology in a format that could not be re-appropriated by the 
ruling institutions. As such, their work would not only have to become 
“uncompromisingly clear”, it would also need to be “uncompromisingly 
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experimental”. The message portrayed would have to be inseparable from the 
techniques employed in its expression. Revolutionary art would function only if 
the methods used in its creation were improvised, unexpected and alternative, if 
they were able to destroy a discipline or tradition from within.
98
 For Benjamin, 
the critical practices that followed the Russian revolution of October 1917 – 
notably the conception of the “operative” writer, a figure “defined and 
embodied” by the Soviet critic Sergei Tret’iakov – would provide the model for 
such projects. Speaking of Treti’akov, a constructivist theorist and key member 
of the radical Lef group (taken from Levyi Front Iskusstv, meaning “Left Front of 
the Arts”), Benjamin avowed that the labour of the operative writer represented 
the most vibrant example of the interdependence manifest between a “correct 
political tendency” and a progressive “literary technique”.
99
  
   Operative writing was a project in which “civic” and “literary” activity become 
indivisible, a practice that required the writer to participate in the “life” of their 
subject.
100
 To explain this process, Benjamin referred to Treti’akov’s 
involvement with the 1928 collective farms or Kolkhoz project, an activity he 
pursued not only through traditional forms of reportage, but also through direct 
action. As Benjamin notes, during his two visits to the “Communist Lighthouse” 
Kolkhoz, Tret’iakov convened mass meetings, raised funds for equipment, 
encouraged private farmers to join the collective, inspected reading rooms, 
developed “wall-newspapers”, directed the farm newspaper, and organised radio 
and travelling film shows.
101
 In this context, the writer’s activities far exceeded 
the conventional boundaries of his medium.  
   For Tret’iakov this approach was essential, as the image of Russia recorded by 
classic works was antithetical to the rapid developments of post-revolutionary 
culture. Tolstoy, he reasoned, would be simply unable to comprehend the details 
of revolutionary life, a failing that stemmed from traditional literary structures. 
The attention such discourses placed on the “emotional life of the hero” would 
cause the writer to overlook the “social and intellectual” content of their work. 
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Classical novelists would have no interest in the protagonist as a “participant in 
an economic process”; their only concern would be how they live, love, suffer 
and die.
102
  
   Negating this “writerly arrogance” demanded active immersion in the 
empirical sphere. As Treti’akov reasoned, a relational approach in which the 
details of revolutionary life were gleaned from contact with the people was thus 
essential to preventing the agitational promise of facts becoming sullied by the 
indulgence of fiction. Furthermore, only factual portraits could educate the 
public and inspire them to continue “the reorganisation of reality in accordance 
with socialism”.
103
 Therefore, because such instructive potential would be 
preserved only where expression and imagination were sacrificed, Tret’iakov 
urged his fellow writers to “create out of reality, out of concrete struggle and 
labour”.
104
  
   Moreover, the ideals that underpinned Tret’iakov’s anti-art methodologies 
would also entail a conscious refusal of the transcendent genius that generated 
the artist’s auratic halo. Such denial would be crucial, for, if made manifest such 
qualities would regress the writer’s craft into the problematic sphere of creative 
authorship and its inherent ambivalence towards social themes. On this basis, 
Tret’iakov did not aspire to the cultic status bestowed upon figures venerated for 
their sensitivity and imagination. He refused to embrace what he called the 
“brand names of edification, perfection, and transcendent spiritual insight”, the 
fantastic qualities that cast the artist as a “prophet” whose talents were thought to 
derive from some divine, celestial source.
105
 On the contrary, he derided the title 
of “creator” as an insult, a comment that introduces an unlikely kinship between 
Soviet avant-gardist and Baudelaire.  
   Like the poet of ‘Perte de Aureole’, Tret’iakov gloried in his ability to meet the 
people and become part of their community. He did not drink quintessence; he 
spat it out. Indeed, Tret’iakov sought to become one with “the work of 
construction” staged by the Kolkhoz, as through this role he would learn not only 
how to capture the everyday in his art, but also how to change the mechanisms 
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and habitual patterns of life itself.
106
 Revolution in reality and revolution in 
literature would be intertwined, and for Tret’iakov photography possessed the 
potential to stage analogous transformations.  
   Crucially, the factuality of the photographic image provided the writer with a 
visual language capable of supplementing his literary project. As Tret’iakov 
reasoned, the camera offered the starting point for an “active dialectical-
materialist relation to the world” in a manner that would be far superior to 
anything that painting could ever hope to achieve.
107
 The ideas of Osip Brik are 
relevant in this context. In a statement redolent of Edelman’s thesis he argued 
that a painter would always distort reality because the expressive interpretation 
of nature represented the only way that such individuals could assert that they 
were artists rather than mere copyists.
108
 Therefore, if classical literature masked 
the details of everyday life with emotional elaboration, then painting would 
likewise hide the vitality of Soviet modernity beneath the veil of creativity.  
   Tret’iakov’s account of the painter who visited the “Communist Lighthouse” in 
search of an “activist” who possessed an expressive appearance evokes such 
concerns. The artist in question chose to portray a wine maker who possessed a 
“beautiful beard”, a feature he subsequently rendered with heavy impasto. The 
finished image thus embodied the artist’s personal conception of how a 
revolutionary should look. But shortly after the canvas was completed the farm 
celebrated its tenth anniversary, and the vintner honoured the occasion by 
shaving his face clean. He no longer wanted to look like a “hairy monster”, yet 
the painting relayed that precise stereotype. Hence by sacrificing veracity for 
emotion, it would confirm only preconceived ideas about the commune and offer 
no insight into its daily reality.
109
  
   But a practice underpinned by the documentary realism of Atget’s oeuvre 
would avoid this crisis and mirror the operative writer’s engagement with 
empirical life. Again, Brik would conquer with such claims and instruct all 
photographers to take their pictures when they were in direct contact with the 
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everyday.
110
 Accordingly, we can argue that Tret’iakov advocated photography 
not only because its mechanical nature harmonised with his critique of creative 
genius, but also because the camera enabled him to depict Soviet modernity 
without romanticising it.  
   Furthermore, he identified the photograph as a form that possessed educational 
potential. As the writer observed, photography does not just record, it also 
explains. In his analysis it could fix for prosperity the details and mechanisms of 
social change and grant the viewer uninhibited access to such motifs.
111
 
Consequently, it is feasible to suggest that Treti’akov shared Benjamin’s insight 
into the political value of the non-auratic image. That is, of the ability of the 
utilitarian, anti-art document to allow the beholder to appropriate, and thus learn 
from, its social content, rather than gazing spellbound at its magical, cultic 
character.   
 
VIII: Heartfield. 
 
   The lure of producing works able to match the painter’s verve and skill would, 
however, remain a constant presence in the minds of many aspiring 
photographers. As such, the enduring drive to unite photography with established 
patterns of creative labour threatened to usurp the critical potential located in the 
medium’s indexical proximity to empirical reality. This danger could be 
illustrated by the rise of New Objectivity and its subsequent impact upon the 
photographic form. For Benjamin, the photography of figures such as Albert 
Renger-Patsch marked a regression into the problematic field of aesthetics that 
had blighted the medium’s early history. Against this framework it is interesting 
to note that support for his work often came from quarters previously opposed to 
notions of a photographic art. For example, Ernö Kallai had been a staunch 
defender of painting’s superiority, but on viewing Renger-Patsch’s famous book, 
The World is Beautiful, he was moved to acknowledge the photographer’s gift 
for “psychological and formal observation”, his intelligent handling of 
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composition, lighting, and exposure, and the high quality of his aesthetic 
vision.
112
  
   However, Benjamin maintained that to leaf through this publication was to 
encounter a dubious achievement. As he reasoned, the images sacrificed politics 
for subtlety, and by beautifying their subject matter in this way mutated images 
of impoverishment into sources of aesthetic pleasure. Works of this type were 
able to praise only visual harmony and formalist values, and were naïve in 
relation to what Benjamin identified as the political function of photography, 
namely its ability to transform the conditions of empirical life. Renger-Patsch 
thus polarised Tret’iakov’s project of transforming the conventions of artistic 
authorship. Rather than developing a practice in which critical content was 
underscored by the experimental use of a creative labour, he provided an 
infamous example of what it means to use a method of production without 
transforming it.
113
 In other words, he followed the path defined by previous 
generations who overlooked photography’s inherent radicalism by seeking to 
integrate the medium into the confines of artistic tradition.  
   Benjamin’s response was to follow arguments rehearsed in Plato’s Republic 
and appeal for artists to sacrifice their autonomy for social commitment. Indeed, 
he believed that the “advanced” writer was compelled to place their talents in the 
unequivocal service of class struggle, establishing a paradigm that could spread 
to all forms of creative practice.
114
 Key to this manifesto would be the 
destruction of barriers that separated disparate forms of intellectual production, 
specifically the barriers between image and text. As Benjamin argued, what was 
required from photography was the ability to give an image a caption that could 
liberate the photograph from the concerns of fashion and allow it to function as a 
revolutionary cultural form.
115
 Therefore, John Heartfield’s use of photomontage 
to transfigure “the book jacket into a political instrument” – a process 
exemplified by his design for Kurt Tucholsky’s 1929 Deutschland Deutschland 
über alles, which Tret’iakov praised as a “stunning documentary indictment” of 
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the failings and mistakes of capitalism
116
 – was presented as a template for future 
projects.
117
  
   Emblematic of Heartfield’s approach is the work he submitted to Arbeiter-
Illustrierte Zeitung (Workers’ Illustrated Paper) a publication that, throughout 
the early 1930s, sustained a scathing critique of the Nazi party. Interestingly, AIZ 
was initially suspicious of montage, associating it with a whimsical project 
suitable only for hobbyists. However, a dearth of images addressing the journal’s 
core themes of working class life and socialism prompted a reversal, as the 
techniques of combination printing allowed straight photographs to express 
messages the magazine sought to convey. Consequently, Heartfield’s desire to 
“use photography as a weapon”
118
 made him an ideal contributor.  
   Representative of such material is Through Light to Night (1933), which 
attacks the Nazi book burnings that began in Berlin and spread to numerous 
German Universities throughout 1933. In the composition, a bonfire of texts by 
writers such as Marx, Freud and Tucholsky is juxtaposed against the figure of 
Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda. His left arm is raised in an 
impassioned gesture, giving the impression that he is captured in mid rhetoric. 
The caption that featured in the original image, in which Goebbels demands the 
starting of new fires to ensure that those who have been blinded shall not regain 
their sight, indicates that the words are a quotation from a public address. 
Positioned behind Goebbels and the burning books is a view of the Reichstag, 
the seat of German government. Like the pyre of literature that smoulders before 
it, the parliamentary building is aflame, forming an interplay central to 
Heartfield’s polemic.
119
  
   The Reichstag was set ablaze in February 1933, an act Hermann Göring 
infamously attributed to communists such as Marinus van der Lubbe and Georgi 
Dimitrov.
120
 The conspirators were charged and a trial ensued, forming a 
spectacle that provided the subject of a further montage. In Göring: The 
Executioner of the Third Reich (1933), Heartfield shows the prominent Nazi 
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wielding a large axe similar the type used in archaic medieval punishments. His 
uniform is splattered with blood, and his face is gripped by manic rage. The 
implied impression of a man about to administer some diabolical form of justice 
refers to the fact that Göring acted as chief prosecutor throughout the court 
proceedings. Undoubtedly, he had a vested interest in the outcome of the case. 
The accused maintained that he had no desire to solve the crime fairly and was 
manipulating events in order to justify action against the Left. Heartfield 
visualised such protests in his work, expounding them with the assertion that 
Göring himself had masterminded the fire. The caption to The Executioner of the 
Third Reich advances this point, exclaiming that in Leipzig on 21 September four 
innocent men will stand trial for crimes they did not commit, while Göring, the 
true culprit, evades prosecution. Similarly, close inspection of Through Light to 
Night reveals an oilcan bearing Göring’s name – and also that of Henry 
Deterding, a Dutch oil millionaire and Nazi sympathiser – again suggesting that 
the Riech staged the whole affair in an attempt to discredit their political 
enemies.
121
  
   The words Goebbels speaks in the Reichstag image – which sound a clarion 
call to arsonists everywhere – reiterate this intent by requesting a burning of all 
non-Nazi ideology into silence. Consequently, by juxtaposing smouldering books 
against blazing buildings, Heartfield suggests that the Nazis sought to eradicate 
not only the literature that threatened their rise to power, but also the social 
factors that posed similar dangers. Accordingly, his work imagines a climate in 
which, once blinded by Goebbel’s propaganda, the masses would remain 
inhibited because the factions and discourses that might challenge his views – be 
they the work of scholars or statesmen – have been eradicated by smoke and 
flame. In this context, fire would stand not as a harbinger of warmth or safety, 
but would signal an age of darkness, a reversal expressed by the title Through 
Light to Night.    
   Like Courbet, Heartfield thus emerges as a figure who sought to engage the 
political consciousness of his audience. But crucially, he also developed a 
practice that resisted being swallowed and neutralised by artistic convention. 
Indeed, Heartfield not only exploited photographic reproduction to relay his 
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work throughout society, ensuring that it addressed a far wider audience than the 
museum would allow, he also emphasised such strategies in the exhibition 
process itself. When he came to show his images, Heartfield ensured that each 
“original” was partnered with a copy of the journal through which it had been 
distributed to the masses. As such, the beholder could be in no doubt that the 
images before them were not “private, unique, unrepeatable works of art”, but 
documents designed to operate beyond the gallery walls.
122
 In this context, 
Heartfield realises Benjamin’s project of making socially revolutionary work by 
employing revolutionary methods of production.  
   Such claims hold crucial implications for the concept of aura. Firstly, that 
Heartfield’s practice existed as a plethora of facsimiles divests it of the authority 
possessed by the unique object. Furthermore, by integrating concrete reminders 
of this process into the exhibition space he ensured that even when his images 
entered the museum they would not be transformed into mythic, precious 
artefacts. Therefore, regardless of how they encountered his work, the beholder 
would not be drawn into the sensory immersion of auratic experience. Rather, the 
spectator’s reception would be akin to the Benjaminian notion of “trace”. The 
observer would not linger before Heartfield’s compositions, but would take 
possession of them and hence engage their political content.  
   Heartfield’s divestment of the aura would be perpetuated by his use of found 
imagery. Indeed, although his hand is clearly evident in the painstaking 
construction of his compositions, the material assembled is taken from everyday 
sources, news photographs or press archives. Art objects rarely featured, and on 
the scarce occasions when Heartfield did work with original images – when he 
had to create or design a specific motif to complete a particular project – he did 
not craft the picture himself. On the contrary, he employed photographers to 
meet his demands. An account by one such figure, Wolf Reiss, confirms this 
system. 
   Reiss tells how the photographs he made for Heartfield had to conform to a 
specific set of regulations, and were often based upon a sketch that the artist had 
made in order to illustrate his precise needs. His exacting standards also applied 
to the processing, development and enlargement of the image. As Reiss explains, 
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Heartfield would often stand by him in the darkroom, always insisting upon 
subtle variations and amendments to the print in question. Once completed, 
Heartfield would take his photographs, dry them out, dissect and remove the 
sections he needed for his intended composition, and then assemble the finished 
piece. But this was not the end of the process. As soon as the montage was 
arranged in its pre-planned form, Heartfield would work tirelessly to retouch and 
remove any imperfections or blots on the original. Always fearful that this last 
act could ruin all his pervious efforts.123  
   Such descriptions present Heartfield’s practice as a polarised version of 
Rejlander’s composite technique. In other words, although Heartfield followed 
Rejlander’s use of multiple images and negatives, he did not employ this process 
to assert his creative domination over a mechanical process. Although the origins 
of photomontage have been located within Camille Silvy’s drive to bestow a 
“painterly character” upon his landscape images,
124
 the acts of cognition and 
craftsmanship Heartfield brings to the photographic medium are not advanced in 
order to valorise his pictures as fine art, but to complete and convey an 
intellectual discourse. In this respect, he follows Tret’iakov and negates 
conceptions of expressive genius, becoming not a unique creative author but a 
socially motivated producer. Consequently, unlike van Gogh’s painting, 
Heartfield’s work would not possess a cultic value derived from the artist’s status 
as a figure blessed with transcendent intellect and sensitivity. Again, it would 
have no aura. It would not suspend the viewer in lingering, immersive 
contemplation and hence would not occupy a phenomenal distance from the 
beholder.  
   Thus, whereas Courbet’s use of traditional media could be interpreted as a 
potential obstruction to the message he hoped to convey, Heartfield’s 
photographic practice allowed him to mobilise the social focus of his art. In this 
context, the dialogue between the figures in question can be located against 
Benjamin’s claim that one of art’s principle tasks has traditionally been the 
creation of a demand that can only be satisfied at a later point in history.
125
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Courbet raised the need for a project that would communicate radical ideology to 
the masses, and by embracing advancements in photographic technology 
Heartfield made this goal a reality.      
 
IX: Slogans. 
 
   However, given the compelling evidence for reading Heartfield in relation to 
Benjaminian and Tret’iakovian theory, it is perplexing that critics contemporary 
to the artist sought to return his work to the canon of art history. Louis Aragon 
was a key voice in this context. Initially, he echoed commentators who praised 
Heartfield’s ability to evoke the social and political realities of modernity, 
defining him as a figure who “knows how to create those images which are the 
very beauty of our age”. For instance, speaking of the 1932 montage: Adolf the 
Superman Swallows Gold and Spouts Junk, he claimed that Heartfield visualised 
“cry” of the masses, and evoked their war against the “brown hangman” whose 
throat is loaded with gold.
126
 Yet in subsequent discussions, Aragon avowed that 
photography had to be perceived as painting’s auxiliary. To counter the rise of 
right wing politics in Western Europe, he claimed that painting had to be 
mediated by the eye of the camera. Only this would allow the painter to avoid the 
regressive implications of naturalism and initiate projects of social critique.
127
 
Heartfield was thus identified as an instigator of this new practice, as an artist 
who re-staged painting’s liberation from the icon and enabled it to engage 
cultural rather than mythic themes.  
   In making such claims, Aragon was betraying the influence of an ongoing 
crisis in Soviet Russia. Indeed, although the revolution had raised the need for an 
art of the proletariat there was no unanimous agreement about how it would be 
achieved. As Maria Gough writes, the country required cultural forms able to 
express the dynamic nature of communism.
128
 But as Brik’s critique implies, this 
was a role that painting simply could not fulfil. The academic traditions of 
painting were perceived by the avant-garde as unnecessary remnants of the 
                                                
126
 Louis Aragon: “John Heartfield and Revolutionary Beauty” in Photography in the Modern 
Era, 1989, p65.  
127
 Louis Aragon: “Untitled Contribution to The Quarrel over Realism”, ibid, pp 76 – 77. 
128
 Maria Gough: The Artist as Producer: Russian Constructivism in Revolution, London, 
University of California Press, 2005, p70. 
 116 
Tsarist Imperial Academy, and thus antithetical to the society formed by the 
October revolution. The Lef’s rejection of easel painting as an irredeemably 
bourgeois model of the “art object as a commodity” proceeded from this exact 
position.
129
 Yet conversely, other voices would argue that historical forms should 
not be discarded as they represented a cultural source the working class could 
exploit.
130
  
   Such ideas can be traced to Lenin. His dislike of experimental art hinged on the 
belief that sophisticated debates played out by the avant-garde intelligentsia 
would foster a practice unintelligible to the wider population.
131
 A resolution 
submitted to the Proletkult conference of October 1920 justified this distaste on 
theoretical grounds. Because Marxism had attained its position as the “ideology 
of the revolutionary proletariat” by assimilating and re-fashioning every useful 
thing that could be gleaned from two thousand years of human thought, Lenin 
claimed that creative labour had to continue this process if an art of the people 
was to be achieved.
132
 
   Such ideals would underpin the “Association of Artists of Revolutionary 
Russia” (AKhRR), who called for all artists to echo Courbet and become both 
skilled draughtsmen and passionate revolutionaries.
133
 Many avant-gardists 
criticised this commitment to realist painting. Tret’iakov, for one, called the 
AKhRR’s “Red icon painting” a redundant methodology.
134
 Yet what cannot be 
ignored is the group’s swift rise to prominence, an ascension driven by support 
gleaned from powerful sections of the Soviet state. The military in particular 
looked favourably upon their iconic depiction of the Red Army.
135
 Furthermore, 
the “New Economic Policy” (NEP) of 1921 served to increase the audience for 
“Socialist Realism”. 
   Initially, the NEP seems to contradict the communist ideals that underpinned 
the Bolshevik revolution. It represented a radical shift from total nationalisation 
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to a re-opening of private trade, an act prompted by the near total collapse of 
agricultural and industrial production in 1920. In turn, this move towards 
privatization created a “gold rush” environment in which entrepreneurs and 
manufacturers could make rapid and vast fortunes. Though disliked by the left, 
these “Nepmen” became a major force in Russian society. Moreover, they also 
offered a rich source of artistic patronage. Crucially, their tastes were 
conservative. The NEP bourgeoisie enjoyed figurative works completed in 
conventional media. Hence their emergence not only steadied the economy, it 
also secured the fortunes of the AKhRR by providing them with a new and 
authoritative clientele.
136
 
   Finally, we must note that in the visitor’s book that accompanied the Tenth 
Moscow Exhibition (1928) Stalin himself offered a positive account of AKhRR 
practice and even consented to be photographed alongside Pavel Radimov, 
Fyodor Bogorodsky and other leading members of the group.
137
 To imagine a 
statement of official backing greater than that suggested by this act is almost 
impossible. 
   Aragon’s attempt to re-invent Heartfield as a revolutionary painter can be thus 
considered an attempt to make his work palatable to the French Communist 
Party, of which he was a member, and by extension communist officials of the 
Soviet Union. But re-casting Heartfield in this role is awkward, as it denies his 
work the very qualities that allowed its revolutionary impulse to be preserved. In 
effect, such classifications regress the artist into conventional practice and risk 
the subsumption of his critical potential by tradition. Indeed, if the radicalism of 
the message and the radicalism of its execution are intertwined, then to refute the 
status of the former is ultimately to undermine the latter. Accordingly, if 
Heartfield was presented as a painter, as a figure who makes pictures rather than 
documents, then his craft could be re-positioned as a unique labour of 
transcendent genius.     
   As such, images like Through Light to Night would be marked by an internal 
conflict. The artist’s drive to communicate with the masses would jar against his 
status as an author of cultic objects imbued with a mythic authority derived from 
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their uniquely gifted creator. Hence, rather than engaging the political 
consciousness of the beholder, Heartfield’s work would threaten to re-enact the 
sensory immersion of auratic reception, thereby compromising its radical 
content. Undoubtedly, his commitment to mass reproduction and dissemination 
would allay some of these fears, but reconciling Heartfield with art history – as 
Aragon strives to do – ultimately serves to tame his methodologies. 
   However, although they offered photography a methodology that could not 
lapse into aestheticism, a case exists for defining attempts to preserve the original 
focus of Heartfield’s strategies as equally reductive. Adorno’s voice is key in this 
context. Writing in Aesthetic Theory he sought to reaffirm the artwork as a non-
objective object. As the philosopher observed, it is in the very nature of artworks 
to be purposeless, inasmuch as they are separated from “reality” and from thus 
from “useful personal strategies of survival”. Such claims highlight why it is so 
important to speak of artworks in terms of their “meaning” rather than their 
function.
138
 Yet such principles are, Adorno contends, usurped by montage and 
construction, as these disciplines actively assign art a purpose, something that is 
patently evident in Heartfield’s work. Moreover, while Adorno reasoned that 
montage should not be classed as a “cheap trick” that strives to transcend 
photography’s indexical proximity to the empirical sphere by uniting lens based 
media with fine art, he nevertheless avowed that even though such techniques 
exceeded the photographic form in an “immanent way”, the revolutionary impact 
of such achievements had but a limited life span.
139
 The conclusions arising from 
this realisation are unremittingly bleak; for once montage becomes shorn of its 
shock value the technique will be rendered obsolete. As Adorno put it, montage 
will no longer foster communication between art and the everyday; the process 
will be rendered neutral, and will thus become an historical curiosity.140 
   Perhaps the most contentious issue to emerge through this revision is an 
awareness of the proximity between purpose and misinformation; an 
understanding of the apparent ease with which the techniques of montage could 
be transplanted from their origins in radical politics and re-appropriated by 
oppressive regimes. Historical precedent exists for such concerns. In Soviet 
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Russia, critical projects seeking to celebrate the ideals of revolution would be 
transformed into a state mandate. As Benjamin Buchloh observed, the Stalinist 
political system effectively subsumed avant-garde methodologies into a tightly 
controlled process of governmental spin. Key to such arguments would be USSR 
in Construction, a publication intended to portray a grand vision of Russia’s 
industrial achievements.
141
  
   Many of the country’s leading artists worked for the journal, but the legacy of 
their involvement has become increasingly problematic. Focusing on Alexsandr 
Rodchenko’s contribution, Victor Margolin reasoned that the artist’s multi-image 
compositions detailing the construction of the infamous White Sea Canal 
presented a positive account that contrasted sharply with suffering endured by 
those assigned to the project. The most problematic aspect of Rodchenko’s work 
is revealed when one considers the text that partnered his photographs. To 
accommodate its limited budget, the White Sea Canal was built using labour 
harvested from prisons run by the secret police. Accordingly, the documentation 
that accompanied the project was keen to present work on the scheme as a form 
of self-redemption. Slogans preaching atonement for sins committed against the 
state thus became the context within which Rodchenko’s pictures were placed. 
Hence the masses received a heroic, valiant vision from which all evidence of the 
thousands who perished while toiling to advance the Soviet cause was purged.
142
 
   Consequently, at the very moment in which “modernist montage aesthetics” 
stood poised to become a vehicle for the education and enlightenment of the 
masses they were recast as a conduit for nationalist Stalinist ideology.
143
 Indeed, 
from the mid 1930’s onwards, creative practice was assigned a project of “myth 
making” that would hide Stalin’s “perpetration of cruel and shameful deeds” 
beneath a celebratory veneer.
144
 
   The use of technology to saturate the country with works of this type thus 
suggests that photography and photomontage had replaced Socialist Realist 
painting as the practice most able to hide the realities of communist life behind a 
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false vision of a wondrous Socialist heaven.
145
 Benjamin himself spoke of this 
situation, remarking with forlorn acceptance that, the “constructivists, 
suprematists and abstractivists” who previously made work designed to serve the 
October Revolution have all been discharged from their occupations. The radical 
interplay between critical content, experimental production and political change 
had been replaced by projects seeking only to announce the glory of Stalin’s rule 
with “banal clarity”.
146
       
   Therefore, if employing traditional media to convey revolutionary ideology 
raises the possibility that such works might be swallowed by tradition and re-cast 
as precious, sacred objects, then using radical techniques to express radical 
content highlights the analogous threat that such practices may be adopted by 
institutions seeking not to liberate but control. Although photography enabled 
methodologies focused upon the exploration and mass dissemination of social-
political motifs, there is a parallel danger that such techniques might be used not 
to awaken and engage the beholder’s consciousness, but to suppress and restrain.  
   Against this framework, we might consider whether a practice dependant upon 
factors key to the artwork’s aura – notably the autonomy of the creator, the 
influence of creative genius and the generation of authentic, unrepeatable objects 
– could offer a methodology able to preserve the artist’s critical stance by 
establishing a discourse that could not be so easily circulated throughout society 
and hence become appropriated by dominant social forces. Adorno raised this 
exact debate in his response to Benjamin, claiming that art will survive only if it 
continues to resist society.
147
 Crucially, the aura was presented as key to such 
resistance. For the philosopher, the distance between aesthetics and the practical 
world was reflected in the distance between aesthetic object and viewer. As 
Adorno reasoned, if the lingering suspension of auratic contemplation distances 
subject from artwork – thereby preventing them from intervening with it – then 
the art object can be accordingly identified as a form that does not intervene in 
empirical life.
148
 This separation would engender an inbuilt eschewal of ‘social 
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norms”. Artworks would thus possess no need to prove themselves “socially 
useful”, as they would oppose society by virtue of their very existence.
149
 It 
therefore follows that attempts to eliminate phenomenal distance, politicize 
creative practice and achieve its “total integration” into the everyday may 
effectively negate the radicalism inherent to art.
150
  
   Such propositions place the camera in a delicate position. They imply that 
photography’s critical potential would not lie in the re-ordering of creative 
authorship and production that initiated the destruction of the artwork’s aura. On 
the contrary, if we follow Adorno’s thesis then the problem of how photography 
might negate its mechanical status and be accepted as a process of intellectual 
intent becomes prudent once more. In other words, the issue facing 
photographers would be how to realise a practice in which the influence of 
individual creative insight allowed the photographic print to escape its utilitarian 
classifications, and inbuilt potential for mass replication, and emerge instead as a 
unique, auratic artefact irreducibly distanced from empirical society. The 
quandary of how this might be achieved suggests that the dialectical exchange 
between the lens, the artwork and the auratic remains open. Yet before 
considering how this dialogue might be resolved, it is necessary to follow a path 
outlined in the closing paragraphs of chapter one and focus upon the art of 
Adolph Menzel. Undertaking this project will introduce an intellectual 
framework against which further dimensions of the European avant-garde can be 
explored, thereby raising the suggestion that such work contributed to the aura 
debate in ways that exceeded the motifs discussed above.  
                                                
149
 Ibid, p321. 
150
 Ibid, p429. 
 122 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Memory Traces: Empathy and Experience in Walter 
Benjamin and Adolph Menzel” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
“Memory Traces”. 
 
I: Freud. 
 
   For Sigmund Freud, the development of  “mental events” was governed by the 
“Pleasure Principle”, a “metapsychological” concept that defines “an avoidance 
of unpleasure or a production of pleasure” as the impulse that shapes psychical 
activity. In both instances, the subject’s response to levels of excitation is crucial, 
for “unpleasure” is the state that corresponds to an increase in levels of 
excitation, and pleasure to a reduction in the intensity of stimuli. However, in 
posing this thesis Freud’s intent was not to explore the simple interplay “between 
the strength of the feelings of pleasure and unpleasure and the corresponding 
modifications in the quantity of excitation”. On the contrary, he claimed that the 
“pleasure principle” presented opportunities for critical psychoanalytic study, 
most notably in areas anticipated by the work of Gustave Fencher.
1
  
   As Freud recounts, Fencher argued that if “conscious impulses” are open to the 
influence of pleasure and unpleasure, then these same impulses could be located 
within a “psycho-physical” relationship to the states of stability and instability. 
Such ideas proved central to Freud’s thesis, as they suggested the possibility of a 
process designed to preserve mental stability by regulating the level of 
excitation.
2
 The success of the proposed system would thus hinge upon its ability 
to neutralize “perceptions of excitations” cast by the outer world. Key to this 
argument would be the notion of a psychical shield defending the organism 
against the excitatory effects triggered by such energies. To illustrate how this 
mechanism might be formed, Freud asked the reader to imagine a simple living 
organism, one sensitive to stimulation from the outside world. The creature’s 
external surface would receive these energies; an idea informed by the science of 
embryology, which asserts that the central nervous system and sense organs 
develop out of the ectoderm, the outer most section of the three cell layers of the 
embryo. As Freud reasoned, because the “grey matter” of the cortex derives from 
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the primitive surface layer of the organism it may inherit some of its 
characteristics.
3
  
   Noting this creature’s biological traits prompted Freud to suggest that continual 
exposure to stimulation might permanently modify its surface, a proposition that 
can be elucidated through Henri Bergson. Crucially, Bergson claimed that if we 
study the development of the perceptual apparatus in any living thing we will 
find that all living matter – even a simple “mass of protoplasm” – is “irritable 
and contractile”. As such, it will be subject to the influence of simulation from 
the outer world, and will respond to it through “mechanical and chemical 
reactions”.4  
   In Freud’s hypothesis, the fact that the creature’s outer shell retained a cellular 
similarity to the “grey matter” of its nerve tissue rendered it vulnerable to 
precisely such reactions. Moreover, if left unchecked this vulnerability 
threatened to transform its external layer into a hardened skin that would be able 
to resist and deflect stimuli. Yet this mutation would not be considered 
detrimental. On the contrary, it represented a change key to the organism’s 
survival.
5
 As Freud argued, the tiny creature occupies a world charged with 
powerful energies and would be killed by the simulations such forces emit if it 
did not possess a method of protecting itself from them.6 
   Following this assertion, Freud concluded that defence against stimuli was 
more important to living organisms than reception of stimuli. As such, he 
formulated an intellectual framework against which it is feasible to argue that a 
system of defence analogous to that found in the creature described above might 
exist in all living things.
7
 In this chapter, I aim to engage such ideas and apply 
them to the philosophical study of the aura. Accordingly, we must return to the 
work of Walter Benjamin, who used Freud’s thesis to advance his critical reading 
of Baudelaire.  
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II: Proust. 
 
   As illustrated in chapter one, Benjamin believed that Baudelaire’s verse gave 
poetical expression to a fundamental shift in the nature of experience. Yet in later 
discussions, Benjamin reasoned that locating an exact explanation of this change 
demanded further research. Consequently, Freud’s ideas were employed by the 
philosopher to clarify and expand the methodology of his work, albeit in 
situations somewhat different to those that Freud had anticipated.
8
 Interestingly, 
this project began not with a direct return to Les Fleurs du Mal, but with a 
reading of Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu. Underpinning the 
philosopher’s interest in this work were the twin notions of mémoire volontaire 
and mémoire involontaire presented therein. As Benjamin elucidates, Proust 
named voluntary memory a servant of the intellect, defining it as a recollection 
that gives information about the past but “retains no trace of that past”. 
Involuntary memory, however, represented an accidental restoration of past 
impressions, an instant recall achieved without conscious intention.
9
 An example 
taken from the first volume of Remembrance of Things Past illustrates the 
phenomenon. 
   In Swan’s Way, Proust describes his inability to remember his childhood home 
of Combrary. This lapse endured until one cold winter’s day, when his mother 
greeted his return home with some tea. Alongside the warming drink was served 
a Petites Madeleine, a pastry that looked as though it had “been moulded in the 
fluted scallop of a pilgrim’s shell”. A mechanical reaction to the bitter climate 
compelled Proust to take a morsel of this cake and dowse it with tea. Yet when 
he raised this mixture to his lips he was struck by an unexpected sensation.
10
 As 
the writer recounts, an “exquisite pleasure” overcame his senses as he ate and 
drank, but this sensation offered no clue as to its origins.
11
  
   From where, Proust asks, did this joyous emotion originate? His only guide 
was that its providence was in some way connected with the taste of a pastry 
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saturated with tea, but as it “infinitely transcended those savours” he reasoned 
that it must derive from some other source. Presently, Proust reasoned that the 
answer lay not in the cup but in him. In other words, the taste of tea and cake had 
awoken in the writer some force or agent from which happiness flowed forth. 
Keen to identify this sensation’s origin, Proust concentrated on the flavour of the 
pastry, and in so doing noted that he could feel something that had remained 
dormant within his psyche, like an anchor buried into the sea bed, suddenly break 
free from its hiding place and take shape in his mind.
12
 Following further 
reflection, the source of this feeling was revealed. It stemmed from a memory 
formed when Proust was a young boy. As the writer elucidates, the taste he had 
just experienced was the equal of one he regularly encountered as a child. In 
Combray he used to visit his aunt Léonie every Sunday morning before going out 
to church. And when he arrived his aunt would always offer him a piece of 
Madeleine cake, which she would first dip in her own cup of standard or lime 
flower tea. The tea and cake Proust received at his mother’s house thus evoked a 
flavour he had enjoyed long ago.
13
        
   With this connection made, Proust’s memory immediately conjured a vibrant 
image of his former home, replenishing the details he had struggled to re-capture. 
He described his astonishment at the sharp relief with which his mind rendered 
first his Aunt’s home and then the surrounding landscape. Her “old grey house” 
suddenly sprang into view, Proust tells us, like the background scenery used in a 
theatre production. And in its wake followed the small pavilion and attached 
garden which had been constructed behind the house for the author’s parents. 
This restoration continued at pace, until the writer finds that he is able to see the 
town square where he used to go before luncheon, the streets along which he 
used to run when completing errands, and the country roads along which he used 
to walk when the weather was fine.
14
 Therefore, a simple sensation of taste was 
responsible for reclaiming impressions that were previously beyond reach.  
   Through this account, we encounter Proust’s conviction that the past exists 
somewhere beyond the grasp of human intelligence, hidden in some material 
form. As Proust explained, this idea stemmed from a belief rooted in Celtic 
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mythology, which avows that souls of the departed often become trapped in 
animals, plants, or objects and remain lost until the day one happens across the 
item in question and frees the soul from its prison. For Proust, recollections of 
personal history followed this exact pattern. It would, he reasoned, be a matter of 
pure chance whether or not the individual discovered the item that triggers the 
release of their forgotten memories.
15
  
   However, this proposition illuminates only the process and not the cause; the 
factors that might explain the transfer of mental impressions to material objects 
still need clarification. To that end, Benjamin postulated that social forces could 
impede the formation of memory traces by subverting the subject’s ability to 
gain possession of their experiences. Journalism and newspapers were presented 
as contributors to such restrictions, as both were charged with numbing the 
readers ability to “assimilate the data” of empirical life. To be sure, Benjamin 
argued that the press sought to insulate the reader from the information they 
receive, rather than display it in a digestible form. This estrangement would be 
compounded by the constant newness of the news itself. If information were 
frequently updated, then communication would no longer depend upon systems 
of narration. Therefore, whereas storytelling fostered a system in which tales 
bore the trace of the narrator in the same way as piece of ceramics would bear 
the evidence of its maker’s hands, journalism instigated a process in which 
events did not need to become entrenched in “the life” of the narrator before they 
could be relayed.
16
  
   Proust’s wish to reclaim his childhood memories, the events and impressions 
entwined with his own existence, can be thus read an attempt to reverse this trend 
and restore the storyteller to prominence. But like efforts at willed recollection, 
the successful completion of this task would rest upon matters of chance. In this 
context mémoire involontaire becomes both the solution to, and dilemma of, the 
writer’s project. It was the preserve of the individual who had become estranged 
and isolated from their experiences. Yet it also offered an unplanned route to the 
past through which “pure memory” – the faculty Bergson described as that which 
captures and orders the range of impressions that an individual may acquire and 
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accumulate over the course of their lifetime
17
 – could be recovered. Therefore, 
we are left with the paradoxical conclusion that the continuation of storytelling 
would hinge upon the intervention of involuntary memory. Yet Benjamin also 
avowed that such systems would develop only where memory had first become 
separated from consciousness. Crucially, it would be Freud who provided the 
framework against which this idea could be subjected to critical exploration.
18 
   Key to Benjamin’s position was the idea that the central purpose of memory 
was the preservation of our impressions, whereas “reminiscence” was focused 
upon their destruction. As such, he followed Theodore Riek’s assertion that 
“memory is conservative, reminiscence, destructive”.
19
 Freud’s suggestion that 
consciousness “takes the place of a memory trace” was presented as a 
development of this claim. An exchange fulfilled by his ensuing argument that it 
is impossible for an event or occurrence to both form an impression in the 
subject’s consciousness and leave behind a lasting memory trace.
20
  
   For Freud, consciousness does not receive memory traces. He exclaimed that 
fragments of experiences often expire in the process of “becoming conscious”. 
Accordingly, memory traces would often leave their most indelible and enduring 
imprint when the event that created an impression was one that had not entered 
into the subject’s consciousness. Under this system, “permanent” memories 
would be formed only when impressions were processed and stored in systems 
that are detached or separate from consciousness. As Freud notes: the after-
image of the event does not enter into consciousness but is transmitted to the 
systems lying in close proximity, and it is in such locations that memory traces 
will be retained.
21
 The significant and elusive position taste occupied in Proust’s 
childhood memory of Combray confirms this hypothesis. The writer’s past 
resisted all attempts at conscious recollection because it had been absorbed into a 
sensory matrix other than consciousness, and only when that system was 
triggered – as it was by the Madeleine pastry – could it be released and 
reclaimed.  
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   Yet accepting this proposition leaves a key question unanswered: why should 
consciousness act in a manner so destructive? Responding to this debate, Freud 
referred to the human being as an organism receptive to stimuli, but in order to 
survive as an organism, needing to protect itself against excessive stimulation. In 
Benjamin’s analysis, the need for such protection in the human subject could be 
attributed to the sensory landscapes of modernity and automated industry, which 
conveyed a barrage of optic sensations to the viewer.
22
 As before, the outer layer 
of the being was offered as that most able to nullify this rush. But this time it 
would be consciousness, rather than an external membrane or skin, which 
emerged as the shield. Baudelaire’s declaration that the figure who paces the 
metropolis is plugged into a sea of electrical energy, a force that transforms him 
into a “kaleidoscope equipped with a consciousness”,
23
 illustrates the rationale 
behind this idea. For Freud, that same consciousness represented the part of the 
cortex so hardened by exposure that, as Benjamin observed, it offered the 
optimum location for the “reception of stimuli”.
24
 Indeed, although Freud’s 
notion of consciousness acting as a buffer against psychical trauma was 
formulated in response to the experience of war, Benjamin avowed that the 
neurological sensations of modernity were analogous to that of “shell-shock”, 
thus making a defence originally ascribed to the soldier applicable to the 
civilian.
25
  
  Against this framework, we can identify precisely why consciousness had to be 
purged of memory traces. If stimuli were allowed to form lasting imprints within 
consciousness – if the images derived from them remained “constantly 
conscious” – then the protection it offered would expire, as the effects of 
accumulation would restrict the system’s capacity to absorb further excitations.
26
 
Baudelaire’s description of the “sullen skull” burdened with more memories than 
could be gathered over a thousand lifetimes is redolent of the misery born of just 
such a failure.
27
 Therefore, the details of everyday experience had to be diverted 
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to areas such as taste, smell or touch – or to external objects like the Madeline – 
because once the “synesthetic system” is given the task of discharging stimuli, its 
role is effectively reversed. Rather than preserving information, it will strive to 
numb the senses and stifle the memory, effectively becoming anaesthetic in 
nature.
28
 Approached through a Benjaminian context, such claims illustrate the 
crisis that blocks assimilation of the outside world, and highlight the significance 
of la mémoire involontaire as the sole refuge of impressions lost amid the ocular 
battering of the modern.  
 
III: Storytelling. 
 
   The conditions that engendered Freud’s “shock defence” were key to 
Baudelaire’s work. Indeed, the poet’s drive to parry traumas with “his spiritual 
and psychical self”
29
 was evident in his erratic movements, which drew 
comparison to the startled scurrying of a spider.
30
 In Benjamin’s analysis, the 
“fantastic combat” implied by such evasive acts could be understood as a war 
waged between the opposing categories of “Erfahrung” and “Erlebnis”.
31
 
Crucially, both terms denote forms of experience, but there is no English 
equivalent beyond this simplistic definition. Therefore, although a workable 
classification exists in Benjamin’s distinction between “long” and “immediate” 
experience – likewise in his assertion that what separates the categories is the 
fact that the former cannot be separated from the representation of a “continuity 
or sequence”
32
 – I will use the German of his original text.  
   Erlebnis means a fragmented or restricted pattern of experience, in which the 
reception of events is limited to the moment of their occurrence. As such, an 
incident experienced as Erlebnis will not leave a lasting trace in the subject’s 
memory. In contrast, Erfahrung denotes a more substantial conception of 
experience, a process of accumulation whereby the details of everyday life are 
retained and amassed, forming the bank of impressions needed to create a 
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personal history.
33
 Consequently, we can reason that Erlebnis describes an 
experience that has not become “the object of conscious recognition”, allowing 
Erfahrung to be thought of as its conscious other.
34
  
   Such interpretations are indebted to the Freudian “shock defence”. Indeed, 
Benjamin argued that by defending against trauma, consciousness restricts our 
memory of incidents to the second in which they transpire. As he put it, 
whenever consciousness is required to screen against onrushing stimuli – and is 
compelled to accomplish this task with high levels of efficiently – impressions 
will not enter into “long experience” (Erfahrung) and will thus be reduced to the 
lesser category of “isolated experience” (Erlebnis).
35
 
   The sense in which Erlebnis describes an “immediate” experience shorn of 
continuity is made clear in this context. However, the notion of such sensations 
exceeding Erfahrung as the dominant mode of experience in empirical life 
cannot be thought of as harmless. On the contrary, Costello notes that the 
transformation yields a detrimental legacy, the impact of which is twofold. 
Firstly, the present will be separated from the past because it will no longer be 
absorbed into an individual’s memory of their previous experiences. Secondly, 
because impressions are no longer retained both the “collective store of 
experience” and a subject’s memory of present encounters will not be relayed to 
future generations.
36
  
   The impact of this dilemma is immediately relevant to the art of storytelling. 
The idea that the practice formed a “collective store” of experience was central to 
Benjamin’s study of Nikolai Leskov, a figure presented as the exemplar of the 
craft. In the text, the Storyteller is described as a figure who can “exchange 
experiences” with a group by introducing the details of his or her past into their 
memory. That same audience is then able to absorb and retell the tale, 
establishing an interplay central to its existence. But this does not engender a 
simple duplication of narrative content. Rather, it forms a “repetition” of 
“narrative form”. Each time the tale is retold the act becomes a unique event 
within a wider process of replication, allowing the story to be perpetuated 
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through systems of retention and dissemination. Therefore, a temporally 
determined form of tradition – where motifs are bequeathed and renewed through 
a process of collective experience and memory – is created.
37
 
   Yet because storytelling hinges upon the accumulation of encounters that have 
become embedded in the “life” of the narrator, once the ability to experience as 
Erfarhung fails, so too will the interplay between listener and collective break 
down. That Proust’s inability to reclaim his memories disrupted his attempt to 
revivify the art confirms such claims. Moreover, once the teller becomes 
estranged from their own experiences, the spoken link that binds past, present 
and future will be undone, thereby shattering the collective store of impressions 
such dialogues nurture and support.  
   Examined in a purely literary context, this loss can be attributed to modern 
modes of printing and production, a claim indebted to Benjamin’s assertion that 
journalism attacks the reader’s ability to preserve their impressions. Because it is 
encountered instantaneously then succeeded by the next headline, the constantly 
updated stream of information offered by the press seals the reader in a space 
where experience of the outside world is limited to a brief recognition of passing 
events. The newspaper thus renders the subject unable to retain information 
beyond the instance in which it has been imparted. As such, it mirrors the 
operations of Erlebnis.  
   Equally detrimental to the craft of storytelling is the fact that printed narration 
exists as a “self-enclosing” form, a conception that can be explained in relation 
to the novel. For example, whereas the story depends upon a “community of 
listeners”, the novel does not need to be re-created through public speech and 
hence requires no shared relay for its existence. In this context, the repetition 
once instrumental to the continuity of tradition is rendered obsolete, a process 
that yields the threat of fragmentation. By denying the need for human 
interaction, the novel replaces the listening community with isolation, effectively 
undoing the need for collective exchange.
38
  
   Similar concerns emerge when contrasting the “oral” traditions of the folktale, 
the saga, the proverb and the comic tale – all examples of the epic form at its 
purest – against the novel. The epic, Benjamin argued, found its equivalent in the 
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ocean. Initially, this analogy may be viewed against ideas of scale, for the 
vastness of the ocean is the very essence of the epic. Yet what truly links the 
categories is a notion of interaction. For Benjamin, the coast offers a range of 
pastimes: you can relax on the sand, listen to the sound of breaking waves, and 
collect the shells that the surf discards on the beach. Such comments conjure 
images of a figure who actively engages their environment, a context that is 
instantly applicable to the epic writer, as through his practice he connects with 
the lives of the people and throws his work open to the experiential memory of 
the collective. But the ocean also offers the possibility of journeys. Its vast 
surface allows you to chase the horizon until you see “nothing but sea and sky”.
39
 
This voyage represents the labour of the novelist, which is “solitary and silent”. 
As Benjamin concludes, the individual who lives in isolation creates the novel. It 
is the product of the figure who has no opportunity to share their thoughts and 
concerns, who receives no counsel and can impart no guidance to others.40  
   However, there is more at stake in these distinctions than explorations of 
paradigm shifts in literary practice. The disruption of the collective exchange that 
underpins both story and epic can also be ascribed an economic base. Key to 
such claims is the notion of an interplay between the debasement of collective 
memory and the divisions of labour that characterised the industrial manufacture 
of the nineteenth-century, a phenomenon Benjamin charged with sealing the 
worker “off from experience”.
41
 
   As Marx observed, de-skilled labour alienates the worker by reducing human 
expertise to a process of rhythmic motions. He famously avowed that it 
“exhausts the nervous system” and choreographed human reflexes until they 
become a perfect performance of repetition.
42
 Following this critique, Benjamin 
commented that such relentless, faultless execution should allow the experience 
of labour to form definite traces within consciousness, and hence foster a 
collective store of impressions propagated by acts of narrative exchange. But in 
reality, he contends that this absorption was rarely achieved. Specifically, he 
identified it as antithetical to the processes of mass manufacture that emerged in 
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the nineteenth-century, processes that disbanded practices derived from skill and 
handicrafts and replaced them with automated systems to which the worker had 
to subject their will.
43
  
   This transformation implies that, unlike the artisan, the figure employed in 
such spaces would not learn through traditions that have been formed and 
disseminated by past generations. Neither would they have the opportunity to 
stage their own interaction with that ongoing dialectic. As Andrew Benjamin 
argued, where the “rhythm of work” becomes drill rather than practice, the 
ensuing climate will destruct the continuity through which the labourer might 
experience their actions as Erfahrung.
44
  
   Applying such notions to Marx’s critique of mass manufacture implies that the 
debasement of experience Benjamin associated with the emergence of automated 
production can be attributed to the Pleasure Principle’s intervention in a climate 
of intense visual and auditory stimulation. In order to negate the threat of shock 
posed by the cacophonous landscape of heavy industry, impressions would have 
to be deflected and limited to a single point in time, thus restricting the 
individual’s capacity to take hold of their experiences and relay them to others. 
Such claims might be elucidated through Bergson’s notion of impressions that 
remain “fixed” within the subject. Because the machine uses the individual, 
because it no longer submits to the dexterity and commands of human skill, the 
machinist will follow Bergson’s conception and develop a set of “intelligently 
constructed memories” that guarantee the necessary response to particular 
events. The operations of this memory will allow individuals to adapt themselves 
to given situations as through it the “actions” which they encounter will trigger a 
series of “reactions” that are sometimes “accomplished”, sometimes “nascent”, 
but always of a general appropriateness to the task or conditions at hand. In other 
words, it is not memory but a habit formed in response to specific stimuli.
45
  
   This faculty could represent the way in which the reversed hierarchy between 
the craftsman and his or her tools might compel factory labourers to recall and 
apply the techniques of their vocation. But because external forces alone dictate 
the memories that allow such actions to be performed, the process would limit 
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the impressions of those activities to the precise instance in which they were 
triggered by events on the production line. As such, the worker’s experience of 
their toil would be limited to the fragmentary mode of Erlebnis, as the duties 
they perform will be accessible only in a specific moment of their life.
46
 Hence, 
unlike the dialogue between storyteller and listener, they become participants in 
a process of repetition that does not grant them conscious possession of the 
information they receive.  
   Therefore, if the art of storytelling will expire only when the ability to conserve 
and exchange knowledge fails,
47
 it can be argued that mass-manufacture 
contributes to its demise by decimating experience as Erfahrung. As Benjamin 
concluded, just as the processes of industrial labour are distinct from those of 
handicraft, so to does the method of informational communication that 
corresponds to industrial labour oppose the storytelling or collective exchange 
that corresponds to artisanal production.
48
 Moreover, because storytelling 
requires the preservation of impressions in the mind of both narrator and 
receiver, its dissolution in the age of high capitalism reflects Benjamin’s claim 
that the process that triggers the atrophy of experience emerges from an economy 
focused upon the production of commodities.
49
  
 
IV: The Passer-by. 
 
   For Benjamin, the worker’s plight spilled out onto the Parisian boulevards. 
Indeed, following Poe’s Man of the Crowd Benjamin remarked that the 
pedestrian wears a smile to greet passers by, the automatic formation of which 
echoed the mechanical agitation of the machine operator’s limbs.
50
 As Poe writes 
of the city dweller, whenever they find their progress blocked by the masses that 
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congregate on the urban walkways they will stand, allow an unconscious smile to 
form across their lips, and wait for a path to clear before them.51  
   Clearly, this habitual act can be likened to Bergson’s notion of memories that 
trigger “appropriate” reactions to external forces. However, to fully explore the 
synchronicity between city dweller and labourer we must refer to Baudelaire’s 
‘A Une Passante’ (1861). For as Andrew Benjamin observes, in this piece the 
poet evokes the ephemeral encounters staged by a metropolis in which 
experiences do not become objects of “conscious recognition”.
52
 
   The setting for the poem is a cacophonous city street, on which is played out a 
chance encounter between the poet and a female passer-by. Baudelaire is struck 
by her beauty, and gazes as she elegantly raises and swings the hem of her dress, 
as if to avoid contact with the dirty ground underfoot. Yet the wonderment born 
of this ephemeral meeting is short lived. Amid the chaos of the metropolis the 
passing figure is soon gone, and the poet is left with the realisation that he may 
never again see the woman with whom he has become intoxicated. All he can do 
is mourn the loss of a love, and a happiness, that might have been.
53
  
   For Benjamin, ‘A Une Passante’ is a work that has been composed through the 
“veil” of the city. As he notes, at no point in the poem are the masses mentioned 
directly, yet their presence is always inscribed on the series of events that unfold. 
As such, we might claim that the poem in question offers clear evidence to 
support Benjamin’s claim that Baudelaire had no need to overtly describe the 
swarming throng of consumers that populated Hausmann’s city because their 
significance to his work was implicit.
54
 The city’s presence is even inscribed 
onto the figure who gives the work its name. Benjamin reasoned that an identikit 
image of the passer-by could be gleaned from Proust’s description of a “pallid, 
ardent Parisian”, who appears etiolated by a lack of clean air and the dense 
atmosphere created by the crowds.
55
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   Crucially, Baudelaire’s meeting with this figure is a portrayal of love at last 
rather than first sight. By expressing the crisis of “sexual shock” that could only 
afflict an individual who is isolated and cut off from human contact, ‘A Une 
Passante’ betrays the impact that life in the metropolis has upon love. As 
Benjamin put it: the poet’s body contracts as if in the grip of some profound 
tremor, a sensation fostered by the tension between the emotional pain of 
“farewell” and the promise of “enchantment” implied by the verse.
56
 
Furthermore, because both emotions are limited to the intense duration of the 
encounter – and then lost as the passer-by leaves his sight – we can only 
conclude that endless cycles of enrapture and sadness await the writer as he 
paces the capital. Each and every time the poet isolates a figure from the 
confusion around him, he will be compelled to engage these feelings anew.   
   Such temporality casts Baudelaire’s subject as the ephemeral sensation of 
Erlebnis, the fragmentary moment that holds no relation to what has gone before. 
This idea can be clarified against Bergson’s avowal that the present exists only as 
“duration”. As the philosopher reasoned, the defining feature of time is that it 
passes; time that has gone by is the past, and the present is the moment of its 
lapsing.
57
 The intense climate of the Second Empire subjected Baudelaire to a 
similar conception of the here and now. His reality was a web of transitory 
incidents that became past events in the instance of their unfolding. A situation 
compounded by the pleasure principle’s limitation of the subject’s capacity to 
retain mental images of events beyond the precise moment in which they took 
shape. As such, the poet bore witness to encounters that could not be assimilated 
into Erfahrung. The link between Factory floor and city-street is thus confirmed. 
Like the former, the latter was an environment in which long held experience 
was supplanted by immediacy.   
   For Benjamin, the “loss” engendered by this decline was so ingrained in 
Baudelaire that he identified it as a major theme of his work.
58
 Undoubtedly, it 
formed the basis of his war against the crowd, a conflict waged between a 
struggle to absorb and evoke impressions of Paris while simultaneously 
defending himself against the capital’s visual assault. In this context, we might 
                                                
56
 Walter Benjamin: “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” 2003, p324.     
57
 Henri Bergson: Matter and Memory, 1988, p137. 
58
 Walter Benjamin: “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, 2003, p333. 
 138 
advance the methodology of stumbling over words evoked by ‘Le Soleil’ and 
suggest that the poet worked in a manner that could be considered a form of 
combat in which he duelled with the excitations strewn forth by Parisian streets 
in order to wrest a verse from the chaos around him. The fight to capture the 
particular sensation of love unique to the city dweller can be associated with this 
exact project.
59
 In defiance of the conditions of modernity, ‘A Une Passante’ 
represents an attempt to retain the fragments of everyday life for the performance 
of poetry, to recapture and contemplate that which is lost in an instant.
60
  
   Moreover, we can use this framework to elucidate the unresolved issues posed 
in relation to Manet. For example, we have seen how Manet’s impressions of 
Paris were recorded through fleeting, non-contemplative, acts of vision, and have 
attributed such encounters to the swarming spectacle of Haussman’s metropolis. 
Likewise, the instantaneous reception enacted by his art was identified as an 
attempt to evoke sensations arising from this environment. Yet it was also noted 
that a more precise description of the artist’s psychological response to his 
surroundings was needed to account for this interplay between location, image 
and beholder. We can now attribute such phenomena to the fact that Manet was 
compelled to encounter his environment through the splintered experience of 
Erlebnis.  
   The rapid, shifting glance through which he engaged his surroundings was 
necessitated by a landscape that fostered a ceaseless influx of stimuli. Like the 
intense sensorial assault of the factory, Haussman’s Paris staged an onrush of 
energies that had to be neutralised in order to numb the danger of psychic 
trauma. Accordingly, the pleasure principle would intervene and compel 
indivudals to live through the events of everyday life in a restricted, momentary 
manner. As an inhabitant of the capital, Manet would gain first hand exposure to 
this transformation in perceptual experience. Consequently, because the 
fragments of empirical life would no longer form lasting traces within his 
memory, he was left with little choice but to see and render instantaneously. 
There was simply no other way in which modernity could be engaged.   
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V: Menzel. 
 
   Crucially, the ideas and perspectives Benjamin developed to discuss the crisis 
of experience faced by Baudelaire can be applied to the work of another artist: 
the German painter Adolph Menzel. Indeed, it is my contention that not only can 
Menzel’s practice be contextualised in relation to Benjamin’s critical framework, 
but also that changes in his art parallel the fluctuations in experience the 
philosopher described.  
   Like Benjamin, Menzel was a native of Berlin. Yet from birth his slight stature 
had cast him as an outsider. He was only four feet six inches tall, and the stark 
reactions that greeted his appearance embittered him against social interactions 
beyond his circle of friends. In addition to this, there is a further physical trait 
that distinguishes the artist. Menzel was ambidextrous, and commentators have 
famously described him “alternating hands” as he worked. For Michael Fried, 
this skill underpinned his prodigious draughtsmanship, a talent he employed to 
create an “art of embodiment” in which the viewer is frequently compelled to 
attempt acts of imaginative projection analogous to those undertaken by the artist 
in the course of his work.
61
 Exploring this motif against the social and cultural 
formations of the nineteenth century will show how closely Menzel’s painting 
echoes the themes addressed by Benjamin’s work. But in order to appreciate the 
interplay between the discourses, it is necessary to first identify the principles 
that underpin the “art of embodiment”.  
   Menzel’s pencil sketch, The Scarfgraben Flooded (1842 – 43), proves helpful 
to this task. The composition depicts the scene of a flooded river, with the 
drawing itself divided into four distinct zones: the background of a far shoreline; 
the two middle zones – where poplar trees and ramshackle wooden fencing 
border the reeds that break the waters surface – and finally the half submerged 
tree stumps of the near distance. Taken together, these areas combine to form 
what Fried calls the “lived perspective” of the image. Key to this claim is the fact 
that each zone is constructed around an “angle of vision” that becomes steeper as 
the viewer’s eye reaches the foreground. Crucially, this effect allows the picture 
to re-create the shifting, “downward looking” glance with which an individual 
                                                
61
 Michael Fried: Menzel’s Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth Century Berlin, London, 
Yale University Press, 2002, pp 9 – 13. 
 140 
would have explored the location in empirical life. Accordingly, because the 
beholder’s sight moves in harmony with this gaze, they are compelled to imagine 
that they are the “embodied viewer” suggested by the composition, forming a 
link that underpins the act of corporeal projection. In their mind the observer 
ceases to be an external onlooker. Instead they become a bodily presence within 
the image itself, a figure able to explore first hand the landscape that the artist 
has captured.
62
 
   Menzel did not limit this technique to his drawing, as the Garden of Prince 
Albert’s Palace (1846/1876) testifies. Here the beholder’s viewpoint 
approximates the raised balcony from which Menzel made the work: a vantage 
that forces their eyes to plunge downwards into the painting. The palace grounds 
and sleeping workers of the foreground confirm this assumption, as they are all 
seen from above. However, the tall trees that flank the garden intervene and 
redirect the observer’s sight towards the topmost branches that scrape the clouds 
overhead. The leaf-shrouded railings of the garden’s perimeter, and the light 
coloured buildings beyond, convey a further perspective. These background 
zones are seen from a more lateral angle, suggesting that the spectator’s aspect 
becomes flatter as they look towards the distance. Again, by combining disparate 
acts of looking in a single composition, the image gives the impression of an 
embodied subject who cranes their neck and shifts their gaze as they explore the 
scene before them. To view the canvas is thus to imagine that you stand beside 
Menzel as he works and see into the space he depicts.
63
  
   In this context, it is possible to interpret Menzel’s practice as a system in which 
the spectator is always an implied presence in the composition, regardless of its 
subject matter.
64
 This conception is particularly applicable to the artist’s still 
lives, which evoke latent corporeality by depicting objects that bear traces of 
bodily contact. The Unmade Bed (1845) confirms this claim; its crumpled 
pillows and creased duvet retain impressions of the form that previously lay upon 
them, appearing almost moulded to the contours of the body. Likewise Menzel’s 
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studies of suits of armour, in which the cumbersome metal outfits appear to 
move under their own will, as if haunted by the ghost of human presence.
65
  
   This notion of material things being brought to life by traces of human touch 
yields an uncanny effect. As with the artist’s landscapes, Menzel’s suggestion of 
a bodily presence permeates the mind of the beholder and encourages them to 
envisage their own interaction with the image. A notable example exists in 
Molke’s Binoculars (1871), the compositional structure of which implies the 
existence of an unseen operator who studiously uses the item in question. Indeed, 
Menzel’s careful rendering of the thumbscrews used to focus the apparatus 
compels the observer to enter the scene, pick up the object and raise it to their 
eyes. Such interplay is continued through his studies of bicycles – the 
composition of which evokes the absent rider and the rhythmic actions of their 
limbs as they drive the pedals forwards – and his pictures of violas, which appear 
to be supported by the hands of an invisible musician who cradles the 
instrument’s neck, plays its strings and carefully tunes them to the correct pitch. 
Again, the animating presence encourages the audience to visualise themselves 
within the composition, using the items as an embodied spectator.
66
  
   Moreover, this combination of lived perspective and bodily projection yields a 
further, temporally determined, mode of experience. The 1844 drawing Dr 
Phulmann’s Bookcase is key to expounding such claims. In this work, the artist 
portrays the Doctor’s books, journals and pamphlets as objects that are 
frequently opened and read. This active use is particularly evident in the random, 
haphazard arrangement of the texts themselves. The impression given is that 
each manuscript is regularly picked up and returned, suggesting that, like 
Benjamin’s own library, Phulmannn’s books are not “touched by the mild 
boredom of order”.
67
  
   As before, these traces of human contact invite the observer to become an 
embodied spectator. In their imagination, the viewer approaches the bookcase, 
selects a volume and surveys its contents. But unlike other works, this activity 
discloses a passing of time. As Fried comments, the composition reveals the 
“lived” time that has elapsed between the Doctor and his books, the periods of 
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study and research that have characterised his relationship to them. In other 
words, the temporality of the image suggests that the books possess the traces of 
an “inner history”, which began when Dr Phulmann first purchased the items, 
and grew with each and every act of use.
68
 
   The concept of “inner history” here employed is taken from the second volume 
of Søren Kierkegaard’s Either/Or (1843), a text that features a critical discussion 
of aesthetics. For Kierkegaard, our insight into notions of aesthetic beauty has 
been clouded by the predominance of several misunderstandings. Specifically, 
the philosopher reasoned that such confusions could be attributed to the fact that 
although the idea of aesthetic gratification is traditionally contextualised against 
the sensations encountered when beholding works of fine art, there have been 
very few attempts to expand our reading of the phenomenon beyond this narrow 
interpretation. To solve this dilemma Kierkegaard thus suggested that we might 
begin to consider everyday life or commonplace activities as an extended form of 
the aesthetic.69  
   The idea that the everyday might represent an aesthetic category prompted 
Kierkegaard to suggest that the truly beautiful is a phenomenon formed over time 
and not something that takes shape instantaneously. Such claims presuppose a 
link between aesthetics and history, or more specifically a link between aesthetic 
beauty and an “internal history” in which every single moment is imbued with 
great importance.
70
 Based on these arguments, Kierkegaard called for a creative 
practice that would focus entirely upon temporal categories. As he argued, when 
one studies the notion of aesthetic beauty – be it from a dialectical or historical 
standpoint – the resulting conclusion will state that throughout its evolution our 
critical understanding of the aesthetic has negated spatial concerns and has come 
to focus upon the issue of time. This means that in order to perfect the practice of 
fine art one must likewise forsake notions of space and instead engage temporal 
motifs.71  
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   To accommodate this model, painting would have to depict motifs such as 
“patience” which, as Kierkegaard put it, cannot be expressed in an instant.
72
 
Therefore, artists would have to portray not a series of isolated fragments, but a 
subject commensurate with sequential continuity. Crucially, the process of 
continual scholastic endeavour expressed by Doctor Phulmann’s Bookcase 
achieved this exact feat. It represented something that happened everyday, over 
numerous years, thereby expressing temporal progression. Furthermore, the 
experiential structure of Menzel’s drawing allows this timeline to advance. In the 
viewer’s mind, the Doctor takes a book down from his shelf and perpetuates the 
inner history of study and research further still.
73
  
  
 VI: Empathy. 
 
   Fried argues that, taken together, such works foster an “aesthetic of empathy”, 
a claim informed by the critic’s reading of Robert Vischer. To some extent, the 
category under discussion bears similarities to the perceptual sensations Nesbit 
located in Atget’s work. However, as will be outlined below, the implications 
suggested by Menzel’s empathy are far greater in their significance.  
   Specifically, Vischer sought to theorise the empathic against the body’s 
response to dreams; his central proposition being that “certain stimuli in dreams” 
prompt the body to objectify itself in material things. In essence, he believed that 
human imagination granted individuals the magical ability to project and unite 
their own physicality with external forms.
74
 But for such unity to be formed, a 
defence against stimuli must not obscure the sensations cast by the object of 
perception. Rather, as with Erfahrung, they must permeate the consciousness of 
the beholder.  
   ‘The Aesthetic Act and Pure Form’ (1874) advanced this reading by equating 
empathy with notions of an emotional interplay between subject and object of 
contemplation. As Vischer avowed, bringing “psychological life” into contact 
with every external phenomena that the viewer can experience “aesthetically” 
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creates a mode of vision able to direct and change an individual’s moods and 
feelings.
75
  
   Such encounters begin with the beholder placing himself in a “simple and 
essentially unilateral relation” to an external form. This can be achieved in two 
ways, either he approaches the item and fixes his gaze upon it, or, as Vischer 
comments, the object attracts the attention of the subject and is subsequently 
absorbed into their inner being. This idea becomes key to the writer’s thesis, for 
through such meditation he claims to receive “the external impression of the 
object” into his eye, and thus into his imagination or mind. However, the next act 
he describes has a distinctly Freudian tone. Anticipating the response to stimuli 
described in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Vischer argued that once the object 
is absorbed, its energies act upon the subject, and may cause them feelings of 
pleasure or repulsion.
76
 As noted above, Freud maintained that such excitations 
fostered a psychical need to balance positive and negative impulses, but for 
Vischer engaging these sensations allowed the spectator to see their double – the 
“photographic image” of their mood – materialise in the spectacle before them.
77
 
As he explains, the light waves and excitations that flow out from any given 
object, for example the moon, will seep through the onlooker’s eye, into their 
“central nervous system”. Thus if an individual gazes intently at the moon they 
will find that their imagination and emotions are driven into a state of arousal 
influenced by the sight of the lunar globe and the “bluish-white” glow that it 
casts upon the earth’s surface.
78
 
   In other words, the beholder’s reverie triggers an entwining of “aesthetic 
perception” and “mental association”. As the subject views natural or man-made 
forms, images, thoughts and feelings that are not present in the object of 
contemplation – but are inspired by the stimulative effects it prompts – will be 
aroused in their mind. Vischer himself confirms this. Speaking of the moon once 
more, he describes how gazing upon its silvery circumference might inspire a 
sentimental response because it evokes memories of a loved one who would sing 
or vent their emotions in its presence, or because it is the heavenly body that 
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symbolises a contemplative and restful dimension of human existence. The 
precise nature of the impressions suggested by a particular spectacle will differ 
from person to person, but the effect of seeing their “conscious second self” 
coalesce with the thing on which they look represents a universal outcome for 
each and every participant in this process. Because the object influences the 
observer’s imagination and governs their emotions, Vischer argues that the 
subject will see a projection of their mind, and thus an image of their bodily 
form, materialise on the object’s surface. In the critic’s analysis, it is where this 
connection is manifest that the experience of empathy will be felt at its fullest.
79
  
   Consequently, as the viewer explores the compositional structure of Menzel’s 
practice, we can reason that their patient reflection will yield sensations 
analogous to those discussed above. Like the protagonist of Vischer’s thesis, the 
observer will see their second, imagined self combine with the object of their 
perception, forming an empathic link between artwork and beholder.
80
 
 
VII: Alexandrite. 
 
   However, Vischer also reasoned that works of art would stage such a response 
only if the artist first experienced their subject through the sensory matrix of 
empathic vision. That is, the artist had to view the everyday through the same 
meditative contemplation that allowed the beholder to perceive their likeness in 
the world around them. In this context, the execution of creative practice 
becomes something that cannot be achieved by perception alone. On the 
contrary, the artist has to open his emotions, moods and feelings to the influence 
of the object before him.
81
  
   A vivid illustration of this process exists in ‘The Storyteller’. In the final 
section of the essay Benjamin describes a tale called ‘The Alexandrite’, a work 
that reveals Leskov’s “mystical” response to things. The fable is narrated through 
the voice of “Wendell”, a gem engraver who worked in the time of Czar 
Alexander II. As the story unfolds, we learn that Wendell meets the Czar, whom 
we are told wears a ring set with the eponymous, semi-precious stone. Wendell 
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takes Alexander’s hand in a gesture of greeting, yet as he does so the ring catches 
the light, causing the green chrysoberyl mineral within to flash red. This 
phenomenon was well documented, but seen through Wendell’s eyes it becomes 
a work of magic. It was once as green as hope, he utters, but now, in the onset of 
evening, it has become the colour of blood. Indeed, when told the stone was 
found by a scholar called Nordenskjöld, Wendell cries in defiance that only 
sorcery could explain its origins, for it seems to foretell the future that awaits its 
bearer. As he pleads to those around him, within the stone a “green morning” has 
become a “bloody evening”, a shift in fortunes that anticipates the dire fate that 
awaits the Czar.
82
  
   For Benjamin, a “remote” passage from Paul Valéry came closest to 
contextualising the meaning of these words. Integrating the writer’s claims into 
his own argument, he contends that they reveal how artistic vision attains a 
“mystical depth” when objects of perception are beheld through a union of the 
“soul, eye, and hand” of the individual who, on viewing external things, finds 
that he or she is able to evoke them in their own inner self. By contemplating the 
alexandrite and allowing its energies to colour his feelings and influence his 
cognitive response, Leskov engaged this exact exchange. He established an 
emotional connection that, as Benjamin suggests, allowed him to see the rock as 
a “natural prophecy of petrified, lifeless nature” applicable to the historical and 
economic climate in which he lived.
83
 Thus the portentous nature of the green 
stone turning deep red might have evoked unto Leskov the revolutionary tensions 
of late nineteenth century Russia precisely because the mineral was named 
“Alexandrite” in the Czar’s honour, forming a link that suggests his life was 
compelled to follow the bloody path implied by the stone, a prediction fulfilled 
by his assassination in 1881.  
   Crucially, such comments offer a context against which the parallel between 
empathic vision and that of the storyteller can be confirmed. For example, by 
describing how his double formed in objects of contemplation, and noting that 
things appear truly real to the beholder only when they become reflections of 
what he called their “inner life”, Vischer echoed Leskov’s ability to perceive in 
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material forms a mirror of his reality, and by extension an echo of his identity.
84
 
Accordingly, if the aesthetics of empathy required the artist to allow stimuli cast 
by external phenomena to penetrate their mind, it becomes feasible to reason that 
Menzel encountered his subjects in the same context as Vischer and Leskov. As 
such, we might argue that his practice was underpinned by something analogous 
to Baudelaire’s “Holy Prostitution of the Soul”.  
   For Baudelaire, the poet possessed the ability to empathise with anything and 
anyone they wished. As he put it, the poet is almost like a ghost; a wandering, 
disembodied soul who seeks out corporeal form and thus strives to coalesce with 
the “character” of any living man or woman.
85
 Similar powers might be ascribed 
to Menzel. For instance, Doctor Phulmann’s Bookcase suggests that by engaging 
the notions of study and solitude evoked by his subject, and allowing those 
sensations to seep into his mind, Menzel was compelled to imagine himself in 
the role of the scholar. Thus we might argue that he allowed his “soul” to enter 
the personality of the individual, and then used information arising from that 
possession to express the experience of research to the viewer. Likewise, we 
could reason that when the spectator views Menzel’s studies of musical 
instruments they are able to imagine themselves as musicians precisely because 
the artist did the same. As he contemplated the contours of the viola, Menzel 
would have pictured himself holding the object, performing a piece of music, and 
savouring the rich emotions such acts would trigger within him. The ghostly 
hands that, in the finished composition, appear to be playing the instrument bear 
the marks of this fantasy, and hence convey similar sensations to the spectator. 
Consequently, we can say with conviction that in forging his art of embodiment, 
Menzel saw reality with the “mystical” intensity of Leskov.  
   But this is not the only link between the parties. Referring to Valéry once more, 
Benjamin claimed that it was precisely the union of the soul, the eye and hand 
that enabled the storyteller to take the raw details of experience and turn them 
into something the audience could assimilate into their consciousness.
86
 That 
‘The Alexandrite’ was composed through this faculty explains how it was able to 
transport the listener into an archaic time in which stones dug from the earth or 
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the movements of the planets were readily interpreted as things able to reveal the 
future.
87
 Clearly, such descriptions can be applied to Menzel’s work, for once he 
had viewed the world with an insight that transcends empirical vision, absorbed 
the energies cast by its external phenomena and moulded them into paintings that 
invite empathic seeing, the sensations he encountered were relayed in a way that 
allowed them to become the experience of the beholder. Therefore, if Leskov 
takes the content of his tales from experience and then turns those impressions 
into the experience of his audience,
88
 then Menzel achieves a similar exchange 
by using paint and pencil to introduce impressions into the mind of the beholder. 
Consequently, the artist can be considered a storyteller in the Benjaminian sense 
of the term.  
   An observation gleaned from the final stages of Fried’s study validates this 
suggestion. The argument in question concerns Menzel’s bricklayer image, a 
motif that connects to many aspects of his work. For example, the physical task 
of laying one brick after suggests further links to notions of temporal progression 
and “lived time”. Of greater significance, however, were the ideas of the French 
critic Edmond Duranty, who reviewed Menzel’s contribution to the 1879 Munich 
International Exhibition for the Arts. 
   For Duranty, the most striking aspects of works such as Bricklayers on 
Building Site (1875) was the picture’s ability to convey the movements and 
actions of the tradesmen in a manner that allowed the viewer to empathize with 
them, to the extent that it could serve to instruct and educate apprentices in the 
skills of the job. As the writer exclaimed, if Menzel’s image represented the only 
source from which future generations might relearn the skill of bricklaying it 
would be enough to revivify the vocation in question.
89
 Again, this argument is 
underpinned by assertions that Menzel’s audience does not simply view the 
images before them, but cognitively engages the sensations they describe. Yet it 
is the sense of instruction implied by Duranty’s claims that cements Menzel’s 
status as a storyteller. Indeed, Benjamin identified an interest in practical 
concerns as a character trait particular to most storytellers. Equally pertinent was 
the open or covert desire to instruct and educate the listener in such skills, an 
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assertion possibly addressed to the interplay between collective exchange, 
tradition and the growth of artisanal skill. In this context, the storyteller becomes 
a figure who can educate and impart useful knowledge.
90
 For Duranty, Menzel 
achieved this exact feat in his bricklayer series. As such, his art assumes a close 
affinity with Benjamin’s thesis, a relationship only enhanced by the painter’s late 
works.  
 
VIII: Verona. 
 
   In 1884 Menzel painted what Fried has called his last “ambitious” oil painting, 
the Piazza D’erbe in Verona. The work, which details the teeming landscape of a 
busy market square, marks the conclusion of Menzel’s attempt to evoke 
embodiment through his art. When compared to earlier pieces, The Piazza 
emerges as atypical in its portrayal of crowds that resist all attempts at embodied 
seeing or empathic projection and thus grant the beholder a limited, detached 
role. For Fried, this claim can be illustrated by comparing the canvas with an 
earlier piece, the Supper at the Ball (1878), which depicts a grand banquet staged 
in a resplendent setting. Like the later image, Menzel’s main motif is the crowd, 
but here it is suffused with satire. An official looking man attempting to eat while 
holding his hat between his legs is but one of many examples of comic incident 
in the picture. Yet by capturing the official juggling his plates, Menzel 
encourages the viewer to empathise with the clear difficulty of his task. Such 
effects are absent in The Piazza, prompting us to ask why the artist abandoned 
his former approach.
91
  
   Fried offers a solution by suggesting that Piazza D’erbe in Verona be 
interpreted as part of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century response to 
the metropolitan crowd, and the change in social relations it fostered. This claim 
is strikingly close to Benjamin’s description of the shift in experience 
encountered by Baudelaire, and Fried’s use of Georg Simmel’s ‘Metropolis and 
Mental Life’ (1902 – 03) to defend his claims pulls Menzel ever deeper into 
Benjamin’s orbit. 
                                                
90
 Walter Benjamin: “The Storyteller”, 2002, p145. 
91
 Michael Fried: Menzel’s Realism, 2002, pp 207 – 209.  
 150 
   Like Freud, Simmel argued that the intense sensory conditions of modernity 
pressed individuals to develop a psychical defence against stimulation. His 
assertion that the transitory experiences staged by modernity exhaust a greater 
share of consciousness than “regular” impressions parallels Freud’s avowal that 
the battering it receives from onrushing sensations accounts for the central 
position consciousness occupies within the “shock” defence. Indeed, Simmel’s 
claim that the rapid and unending stimulation of the senses manifest in daily life 
would result in the emergence of a protective shield against sensory agitation – 
the “blasé attitude”, as the writer would call it – confirms the connection between 
his thesis and that of the Pleasure Principle.
92
  
   However, unlike the threat of excitatory energies described by Freud, Simmel’s 
shield was directed against an excess of social contact. For Simmel, the social 
interactions of a rural setting – in which an individual will know potentially each 
and every person they meet over the course of a day, and would have a 
seemingly “positive” reaction to each encounter – would reduce the metropolitan 
subject to a state of nervous exhaustion if transferred to the city. The 
“indifference” of the blasé attitude was thus required in order to preserve a state 
of distance or estrangement in response to the “close contact” fostered by the 
crowd. Yet because of this, the blasé subject would experience everything in the 
metropolis as “insubstantial”, and hence see it as bland and unexceptional. A 
perpetual state of separation and “aversion” would result from this situation, 
rendering the individual isolated and aloof from the masses.
93
 
   In Fried’s analysis, the conception of modern experience advanced by Simmel 
echoes that which Menzel would have faced in the growing metropolis of  
nineteenth-century Berlin, a city of nearly two million people. Hence the panic-
stricken tourists who appear overwhelmed by the frantic market square – the 
incident that provides the dramatic focus of The Piazza – can be read as a motif 
intended to express the stifling and disorientating chaos of the artist’s home 
town. In these terms, the work’s inability to stage acts of empathic projection can 
be viewed as part of this evocation, or even interpreted as a response to Simmel’s 
claim that to stand in an urban crowd is to experience the most intense form of 
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loneliness imaginable.
94
 Indeed, any artist seeking to evoke the anonymity 
fostered by the blasé response would have to imbue their work with a sense of 
detachment. In other words, they would have to encourage the beholder to 
renounce all attempts at empathy and the sense of intimacy it implies. However, 
there is a flaw in such arguments. Put simply, Simmel’s thesis was written long 
after Menzel’s death, which means the artist would have been unable to read his 
work. As Fried confesses, it would be a leap of faith to suggest that Menzel 
intentionally arrested his project of empathic projection in response to the 
unnerving chaos of the modern city. But he does ask the reader if it is feasible to 
imagine the artist staging “an involuntary withdrawal of empathy” – that is to 
say, a failing of his capacity to imbue such figures with a sense of “inner life”, 
such as that achieved in the Supper At The Ball – as a reaction to the hectic 
swarming of the market square?
95
 Approaching Menzel through Benjamin’s 
thesis suggests that this proposition is accurate. 
   To be sure, the decline of empathy in Menzel can be attributed to the numbing 
of experience as Erfahrung that Benjamin located in the visual saturation of 
modernity. Key to this proposition is Vischer’s claim that, in empathic vision, the 
individual has to absorb the energy from the shape or figure before them. 
Likewise, his assertion that such excitations have to engage the beholder’s 
imagination and emotions if they are to experience an empathic merger with the 
object of their contemplation. Crucially, if we follow Benjamin’s reading of 
Freud, we can only conclude that such interplay would be arrested in the urban 
metropolis. Amid this environment stimuli no longer pass through consciousness. 
On the contrary, they ricochet off its surface. The degraded pattern of experience 
engendered by such protection, which leaves the individual able to claim only 
momentary recognition of ephemeral impressions, thus suggests that the 
excitations and energies cast by objects of aesthetic contemplation will no longer 
pass beyond the subject’s eyes. Hence an impression of external phenomena will 
no longer seep into the viewer’s mind, meaning the emotional engagement 
enacted by such absorption would go unrealised.  
   Accordingly, when Menzel stood in the swarming space of The Piazza, the 
forced neutrality of the blasé attitude would not only dull the faces of the crowd, 
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it would also suspend the artist’s capacity to share and assimilate the range of 
feelings and emotions conveyed by the appearance, mannerisms or attitudes of 
the people around him. Although the empathic response described by 
Baudelaire’s “Holy Prostitution of the Soul” was patterned upon the poet’s 
interaction with the masses, the frantic swarm of Verona would overload the 
faculty. There would be simply too many people with which to engage. As such, 
Menzel’s response to the sights and spaces around him would be restricted. 
Unlike the process that underpinned his earlier works, he would see the market 
square through vision alone. These limitations would debase the resulting image 
because, as noted above, artworks will stage empathic sensations only if the artist 
enacts an emotional exchange with the object of their contemplation, and then 
expresses the sensations such dialogues arouse within them. Menzel’s inability to 
initiate this process in The Piazza thus becomes a decisive influence upon the 
viewer’s peripheral response to the canvas.  
   Furthermore, there is no possibility of inner history within this temporally 
fragmented environment, a barrier that would limit Menzel’s ability to portray 
his subject as one that unfolds over hours or days. Again, this can be attributed to 
the Freudian “shock defence”. As Benjamin reiterates, the defining achievement 
of this faculty exists in its ability to limit the conscious memory of an event to a 
“precise point in time”, albeit at the expense of the impressions that might 
otherwise be formed by the incident in question.
96
 Hence the phenomenal 
exchange between past, present and future evoked by Dr Phulmann’s Bookcase 
would be inapplicable to a cityscape that reduces sensations of lived time to an 
instant. Therefore, when the viewer perceives The Piazza, they will fail to 
empathise with the lived experience of events that follow patterns of sequential 
continuity precisely because there will be none to speak of in an environment 
composed entirely of single, isolated moments. 
   Consequently, the loss of empathy in Piazza D’erbe in Verona can be 
understood as symptomatic of Menzel’s choice of subject. The only form of 
embodiment at play in this image would be a psychically determined 
embodiment of distance and disinterestedness, rather than the corporal 
unification of previous works. Thus if the succession of Erlebnis over Erfahrung 
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was the transformation Benjamin charged with the decline of storytelling and the 
individual’s ability to absorb and exchange experiences, then Menzel’s work 
reveals how similar experiential and spatial conditions combined to prevent 
objects of perception directing their energies into the mind, imagination and 
subjectivity of the artist. Benjamin’s avowal that the sensation of empathy is the 
preserve of the solitary,
97
 and cannot be achieved where limited, truncated modes 
of experience are dominant,
98
 confirms the destructive impact that urban life had 
upon this faculty. But there are further implications to be drawn from such 
conclusions. To engage them requires a return to the concept of aura. 
 
IX: Mimesis. 
 
   The link between aura and empathy represents a comparatively unexplored 
discourse, but the interplay between the two categories is most acute. An initial 
consideration of the two concepts yields some important connections. Firstly, the 
contemplative sensations that underpin acts of empathic projection – for example 
the meditative state Vischer adopts as he lingers before objects of perception – 
forms a direct parallel to the sensory immersion of auratic experience. The 
individual who loses himself in the panoramic majesty of a mountain range, or 
the splendid detail of a sunlight branch, is lulled into a reverie strikingly close to 
that which envelops Vischer as he looks upon the moon and submits to its 
energies. In effect, both modes of engagement describe an encounter in which 
nature is not viewed with any practical intent or interest.  
   Once this connection is made, it becomes possible to use conceptions of 
empathic experience to elucidate some of Benjamin’s more abstract remarks 
upon the auratic, in particular his claim that the contemplative register of auratic 
experience rests upon the transference of an exchange common in relationships 
between people onto the relationships between individuals and material or 
natural objects. In this context, the sensory immersion of genuine aura becomes 
analogous to the captivation encountered when a person’s gaze is held and 
returned by another being. Accordingly, we can conclude to experience the aura 
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of an object of perception is to imbue it with the capacity to look back at us.
99
 
Such claims imply that objects must possess an echo of human subjectivity if 
they are to suspend the subject in auratic sensation. But identifying the origins of 
this trace is problematic, as the debate between Benjamin and Adorno 
confirms.
100
  
   Responding to Benjamin’s ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, Adorno advised 
that, in his opinion, the “concept of aura” appeared to be inadequately explained, 
and in the interests of a more concrete definition suggested that it might be 
associated with the remnant of a “forgotten human moment” in an artefact.
101
 
That the trace in question was thought to derive from acts of labour allows such 
claims to be contextualised against Marx’s avowal that the worker perceives an 
echo of their consciousness in objects wrought by their own hand. Indeed, if the 
subject were able to see something of their identity reflected in the item they had 
made, then their response to it would come to approximate a relationship 
between people. Yet Benjamin dismissed this interpretation, arguing that as the 
subject’s response to nature provided the archetype for conceptions of auratic 
experience it would be unfeasible to associate the phenomenon solely with 
objects of human craft. As he put it, although trees and mountains are capable of 
holding the onlooker in auratic contemplation, they are not made by human skill. 
The only conclusion that could be gleaned from this reading was, therefore, that 
there must be another human element present in objects of perception, an 
element that does not derive from acts of labour.
102
  
   It is in response to this dilemma that empathy becomes important. If the 
contemplative sensations that underpin both auratic and empathic experience can 
be used to illustrate a connection between the faculties, then the “something 
human” present in the object of contemplation can be attributed to the 
imaginative projection that follows acts of perceptual immersion. This assertion 
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cannot be considered speculative, for there are occasions in which Benjamin 
actively engaged notions of embodiment, notably in relation to childhood.  
   For Benjamin, infants explore unfamiliar surroundings through acts of 
impersonation.
103
 He notes how the child does not only play at being a 
“shopkeeper” or “teacher”, but also imagines themselves to be “windmill” or a 
“train”. Such transformations represent what Benjamin called the “mimetic 
faculty”, the capacity to see similarities or interpret “natural correspondences” 
between people and things.
104
 In this way, this merger between subject and 
object suggests an exchange whereby artefacts gain a “subjectivity” and hence 
the power to “see” and “look back”. As such, the mimetic becomes a key factor 
in the formation of auratic experience.
105
 However, if this process is the preserve 
of children, then an equivalent impulse needs to be found to account for the 
existence of auratic sensations in adulthood. Crucially, the cognitive interplay 
established by empathy presents a framework through which this can be 
achieved.  
   For example, when Benjamin describes an individual who looks upon nature in 
a state of tranquil reverie, we can reason that as they look upon the far-off 
mountain range and engage the energies and vibrations cast by that view, the 
images and associations triggered in their mind would begin the empathic 
transfer through which the scene became a reflection of their thoughts and 
feelings. In other words, like the magical interplay that allows an individual’s 
second self or emotional and mental state to merge with external forms – or the 
mystical vision that created the emotional link between Leskov and the 
alexandrite – the vista would become a symbolic echo of the subject. 
Consequently, the introduction of this subjective element allows the spectator’s 
response to approximate a relationship between people, for when their eye traces 
the landscape they will view it not as a collection of topographical details but as 
a reflection of their mental state. The viewer’s gaze is held as it might be by 
another person because they see themselves within the object of their meditation. 
Vischer gave a clear evocation of this effect. Referring again to his 
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contemplation of the moon, he tells how his imagination is suddenly transported 
to its cratered surface, from where he can gaze down and look with melancholy 
upon his bodily self.
106
 Once established, such interplay would draw the observer 
ever deeper into immersive contemplation. Seeing their feelings ventriloquized 
in this manner renders the viewer unable to look away; hence perpetuating the 
spatial-temporal immersion of auratic sensation.  
   Crucially, one encounters such experiences in Baudelaire. An initial example 
emerges in his assertion that foul, repellent creatures are nothing but the 
animated, embodied form of the unpleasant thoughts harboured by humanity. 
Such comments bring to mind a mental or emotional unity between the subject 
and their surroundings. However, a more concrete evocation can be found in 
‘L’Homme et la Mer’ (1857), which opens by identifying the ocean as the 
“mirror” of a free man’s soul. In the rolling waves and dark reaches of the sea, 
the free man will, Baudelaire contends, perceive the depths of his “bitter” 
spirit.107 
   Crucially, the sea’s capacity to mirror mans’ spirit in this manner implies an 
empathic transfer between human subject and natural world. As the subject 
contemplates the ocean and allows the sensations cast by its surging waves to 
shape their mood, the ensuing dialogue will allow the watery surface to answer 
their gaze with a reflection of their inner most hopes and fears. In this context, 
the beholder’s meditation imbues the ocean with a subjective quality able to 
return the gaze cast upon it. Furthermore, by expressing this reciprocity the poem 
suggests that the individual who opens such a dialogue with their surroundings 
will begin an exchange that ultimately extends their sensory immersion in time 
and space. The intimate nature of the connection between subject and sea 
compels the spectator to look upon the emotional self-portrait that crystallises in 
the cresting surf before them, thereby advancing their reverie.  
   Importantly, Benjamin also argued that empathic experience was key to 
Baudelaire’s practice. He argued that empathy with matter and things was one of 
Baudelaire’s prime sources of inspiration, and pointed to the second spleen poem 
– in which the poet declares himself to be both a cemetery scorned by the moon 
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and an abandoned room littered with discarded clothes and archaic works of 
art
108
 – to validate his argument.
109
 An instance of this interplay between writer 
and object emerges in the poet’s description of a metaphorical unity that can 
develop between an individual’s imagined self and the natural world. Again, this 
implies that acts of lingering contemplation can result in the beholder becoming 
one with the thing before them. For example, Baudelaire describes the act of 
beholding a storm-ravaged tree, and notes that the event might cause his mood to 
become shaped by the sight of its windswept branches, to the extent that all other 
traces of his personality are lost. He might feel sadness because the tree conveys 
lassitude. Moreover, as his contemplation grows this connection might intensify, 
to the extent that his mind merges completely with the object of his vision.110 
   As such, when the poet looks upon its leaves and boughs, his mental state will 
look out towards him, forming a connection that replicates an exchange between 
people and thus holds him in time and space. Baudelaire will be unable to arrest 
his meditation because his own emotions and feelings have replaced the tree as 
the object of his contemplation. Consequently, if aura and empathy are 
intertwined, we can reason that Baudelaire gave voice to the conditions of auratic 
experience. Indeed, Benjamin argued that Baudelaire’s understanding of this 
“phenomenon” was such that its disintegration would leave an indelible trace 
upon his practice.
111
  
   For Benjamin, evocations of the aura’s evanescence occur in the Fleurs du Mal 
as a symbol present in almost every passage addressed to the look of the human 
eye. Indeed, Baudelaire’s verse contains numerous descriptions of eyes that have 
lost the ability to look.
112
 A (famous) example exists in ‘You’d Entertain the 
Universe…’(1857), in which the poet speaks of eyes that are lit up like shop 
windows.
113
 This might be read against Benjamin’s assertion that in the epoch of 
modernity, in the “look but don’t touch” culture of international exhibitions, the 
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subject is compelled to learn empathy with exchange values.
114
 Crucially, 
whoever attempted such a connection would share the purging of individuality, 
or disavowal of the maker’s presence, that underpins the homogenised 
production of commodities. As such, the subject’s gaze would be rendered blank 
because all their subjectivity would be eroded as they became one with a cold, 
perfect object. Further descriptions of sightless eyes occur in ‘The Blind’ (1861), 
which devotes a whole poem to the subject eyes in which no flash of life is ever 
seen.115 
   If empty, vacant eyes are to be considered symbolic of the aura’s decline, then 
we can reason that such arguments refer to a crisis in which natural or man-made 
objects are divested of the ability to meet the spectator’s vision. Undoubtedly, 
this crisis can be attributed to the shift from Erfahrung to Erlebnis enacted by the 
Pleasure Principle, the influence that eroded the subject’s ability to meditate 
upon and engage excitations cast by the world around them. The teeming climate 
of modernity would not permit individuals to become lost in a strange weave of 
time and space, as the limited mode of experience it fosters would render the 
beholder unable to engage reality through this absorptive state.  
   With this flow arrested, the dialogue that allows objects of perception to shape 
the emotions of the beholder would be cancelled. Accordingly, the subject would 
no longer see their mental state reflected in that on which they look, meaning 
each and every spectacle they encountered would be divested of a subjective 
quality and hence purged of the capacity to return the gaze it received. Put 
simply, the immersive meditation that ensnares the figure who sees in empirical 
reality an echo of their mood would become obsolete. In this context, the sensory 
immersion of the auratic would be debased, and the individual who faced the 
swarming landscape captured by ‘A Une Passante’ would feel the effects of its 
debasement. Therefore, when Baudelaire writes of sightless eyes shorn of the 
ability to look, it is the shift in modes of experience staged by everyday life that 
he evokes. The modern world would deny the poet access to the reverie through 
which the ocean became a mirror of his soul.  
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X: Distraction. 
 
   The above comments suggest some important conclusions. Firstly, by 
following arguments that aura and empathy are comparable forms of experience, 
it is possible to use the auratic as a theoretical framework against which 
Menzel’s practice can be contextualised. Indeed, if Menzel’s work hinged upon 
his ability to first view his subjects empathically – to allow the energies cast by 
objects of contemplation to shape his thoughts and feelings, thereby allowing a 
reflection of his emotional self to appear within the structure of man-made or 
organic forms – we can reason that as he painted he engaged empirical life 
through the sensory immersion of genuine aura.  
   Moreover, we can reason that such sensations will be relayed to the beholder. 
For example, tracing the shifting perspectives and divergent viewpoints 
conveyed by works such as The Scarfgraben Flooded will lull the viewer into a 
contemplative state that mirrors the lingering meditation of the auratic. Of 
greater importance, however, is the fact that by compelling the beholder to 
become an embodied presence within the composition, Menzel’s art fulfils a 
central condition of auratic experience and triggers a reverie through which the 
subject’s response to an inanimate object comes to approximate a relationship 
between people. 
   To be sure, the imaginative projection fostered by Menzel’s oeuvre imbues his 
art with a subjective quality precisely because it draws the subject into the 
composition. For instance, we have noted that as the spectator follows the “lived 
perspective” relayed by the work before them, they become the embodied 
presence it evokes. Yet what has not been considered is the fact that by entering 
the scene in this manner the beholder simultaneously invests it with a human 
presence able to look upon the physical body beyond the frame. In other words, 
because the viewer sees their “second self” in the composition, they will follow 
the examples evoked by Baudelaire and grant external phenomena the capacity to 
return the gaze it receives. 
   The subject will be held as if by the look of another because as they envisage 
the figure who stands in the depicted landscape, or who carefully handles the 
components of a still life, they will be opening a visual exchange with 
themselves. Like the figure who finds in the ocean a mirror of their spirit, the 
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beholder will encounter a projection of their mind amid the seemingly lifeless 
surface of canvas and paint, forming a link that subsequently holds them in time 
and space. Therefore, if we follow Miriam Bratu Hansen and identify the aura as 
a mode of experience that “envelops and physically connects” – and hence 
removes any distinction between subject and object – thereby transforming 
perception into a form of sensory embodiment,
116
 we can argue that the viewer 
encounters Menzel’s art auratically because his practice engenders a similar 
fusion of beholder and image. Analogous conclusions can be reached through 
Adorno, who argued that to “breathe” the aura of a work is to identify with its 
content, a process that requires the viewer to “externalise” themselves within the 
composition.
117
 Crucially, Menzel’s audience achieves this act both cognitively 
and corporeally.   
   Furthermore, once the subject becomes a corporeal presence in the artwork, the 
visual space will become their personal domain, a realm able to generate an 
experience akin to that of involuntary memory. Consequently, their silent 
meditation upon particular details – such as the skeletal poplars that flank the 
swollen river in The Scarfgraben Flooded – might begin an exchange that allows 
such features to influence their state of mind. Like Baudelaire, the beholder may 
ascribe their “passions” or melancholy to the tree before them, and thus become 
captivated by the emotional likeness that develops in its creaking boughs. 
Undoubtedly, this last comment might be construed as speculative. But what 
cannot be disputed is the fact that if the aura denotes a mode of perceptual 
experience whereby sensory immersion allows the beholder to see their self-
image merge with objects of perception – opening a dialogue that lulls them ever 
deeper into silent contemplation – then the sensations enacted by Menzel’s art 
clearly approximate the auratic.
118
 
   Secondly, if an erosion of the subject’s capacity to stage an empathic transfer 
with their environment is indicative of the aura’s destruction, then the social 
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climate against which Menzel completed his late works can be charged with the 
phenomenon’s decline. The surge of fragmentary impressions cast by The Piazza 
would deny the reverie through which an emotional dialogue could be opened 
with external forms. Therefore, when Menzel entered this space he would be 
unable to access the contemplation through which a reflection of his moods and 
feelings might take shape in his surroundings. Thus, unlike the figure absorbed in 
the beauty of nature, there would be nothing compelling him to indefinite 
sensory immersion. Hence he would not encounter the lingering meditation of 
the auratic. 
   Furthermore, beholding the image born of this environment would yield similar 
outcomes. Because the sensory landscape of The Piazza debased Menzel’s 
empathic vision and fostered a work in which the observer could not project their 
imagination, the factors that previously held the spectator amid the contemplative 
web of auratic experience – namely their ability to unite themselves, and by 
extension their emotions, with the composition – would be suspended. Unlike 
earlier pictures, the close personal connection between viewer and image would 
not evolve; hence the canvas would not lull its audience into a strange weave of 
time and space. Consequently, because this loss stems from the painter’s 
response to the visual saturation of the modern, we can situate Menzel’s practice 
in line with claims that perceptual transformations staged by works of art are 
patterned upon the perceptual landscape of empirical life.  
   This idea of artworks re-staging the visual conditions of the everyday was 
something Benjamin became increasingly focused upon. Reflecting on the issue 
he called for works able to school onlookers in the experience of the city. 
Undoubtedly, the envisaged practice would have to refuse all forms of reverie. 
Yet it would have to do so as a conscious intention, not as an indirect response to 
the environment against which it was formed. Such goals would be achieved by 
engendering a state of “distraction”, a sensation that would neutralise the 
painting’s “medusa-stare”.
119
  
   Initially, this conception would be illustrated through Dada, a movement 
distinguished by its “uselessness for contemplative immersion”. As Benjamin put 
it, the beholder would find it impossible to engage a painting by Arp or a poem 
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by August Stramm in a state of quite contemplation.
120
 Yet the philosopher 
believed that history possessed a more instructive example of such encounters. It 
would be in architecture that he located the origins of a mode of reception 
analogous to that fostered by distraction. For Benjamin, buildings were not 
engaged through meditative acts of vision. On the contrary, they were 
assimilated through “use and perception” or by touch and sight. In other words, 
there were both visual and “tactile” dimensions to their comprehension. Tactile 
was Benjamin’s term for an appropriation achieved by habit rather than attention, 
suggesting that architecture was experienced through regular movements, by 
observing the object in an incidental manner. Wherever this mode of reception 
was dominant, the sensory register of empathic projection would be reversed. 
Rather than becoming assimilated unto the spectacle, the “distracted mass” 
would absorb the object before them; hence they would have no opportunity to 
attempt acts of corporeal projection.
121
  
   To identify how artworks might relay such sensations demands a return to the 
Soviet avant-garde and the work of Lazar Mordvk Hovich Lisitskii, the Russian 
Constructivist artist more famously known as “El Lissitzky”. This name change 
holds fundamental importance in the context of the issues at hand. “El” was 
taken from an “epigraph” to New Systems in Art, a book written by Kasimir 
Malevich and subsequently published through the Vitebsk based “Free Art 
Workshops”. Like Malevich, Lisitskii belonged to the UNOVIS group based in 
the Belarusian town, the members of which collectively defined themselves 
“affirmers of new forms in art”.
122
 Lissitzky’s work of the early 1920’s – which 
in the artist’s words explored the “imaginary space” of the “non optical”, the 
realm that existed beyond the empirical world – embodied this manifesto.
123
  
   Such commitments were driven by twin impulses: a rejection of the 
“traditional, monumental and pictorial artwork” favoured by the museum and an 
attempt to free the beholder from the fixed viewing position such practices 
engendered. In this context, Lissitzky’s goals can be interpreted as the realisation 
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of images that assert an active, non-meditative response.
124
 The artist’s “Prouns”, 
an acronym of the phrase “Proekt Utverzhdeniia Novogo” or “Project For The 
Affirmation of The New”,
125
 attempted this exact task.      
   The Prouns were a series of abstract pictures that oscillated between the 
flatness of painting and the spatiality of architecture. For example, in Proun 1E 
(1919 – 1920) the observer is confronted with a series of shapes that evoke both 
a building schematic and a non-figurative canvas. Perhaps the work’s defining 
feature is the fact that it does not offer the beholder a single point of view, and 
instead forces the eye into a state of constant movement across the image.
126
 As 
Victor Margolin contends, the observer does not linger before the composition 
but moves through it, taking divergent pathways that synthesize a total image 
composed of discrete parts.
127
   
   Lissitzky’s art thus correlates with Benjamin’s conception of distracted vision, 
and hence with the feat of being able to see whilst active; a concern that became 
increasingly relevant in the sensory realm of modernity.
128
 As such, the 
philosopher was emphatic in his belief that the tasks that faced the perceptual 
apparatus of a person living in the early decades of the twentieth century were 
tasks that could not be resolved by mere contemplation.
129
 In other words, the 
possibility of dwelling on a single phenomenon was no longer viable amid the 
chaos and flux of modern life. On the contrary, a form of “practiced vigilance” 
was required to follow the frenzied congestion of the everyday.
130
  
   The discourse of “psychotechnics” was developed in response to this situation. 
Pre-dating modern psychology, leading “psychotechnicians” such as Richard 
Hamburger and Fritz Giese asserted that the successful completion of motor 
tasks hinged upon the sense organs, the eyes in particular, rather than muscles. 
Such ideas proved vital to emerging industries, notably the railway. An essay C. 
Heydt contributed to Industrielle Psychotechnik in 1924 illustrated this with 
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respect to the signalman, a figure whose occupation was mostly executed whilst 
in a state of motion. As Frederic J. Schwartz notes, a parallel exists between the 
city dweller struggling to capture information as they move through the 
metropolis and the individual required to read unclear signs on passing trains and 
point them towards their correct destination. Visual cognition was thus vital to 
the job, prompting the development of strict evaluative procedures. One such test 
featured the “tachistoscope”, a projection apparatus used to display a rapid 
sequence of city names. Applicants were required to identify each word in the 
stream, a task complicated by the use of intentionally indistinct text. Indeed, the 
rigour of the examination was pre-meditated in order to reflect the high stakes of 
the profession, for if misdirected an errant train would not only obstruct further 
travel, but would endanger human life”.
131
  
   For Benjamin, the development of reception in distraction was key to 
negotiating such dangers. Referring again to the habitual, tactile perception 
staged by architecture, he claimed that a distracted individual is able to form 
habits. A claim that subsequently informed his view that if an individual were 
able to master a given task whilst in a state of distraction, the achievement will 
prove that the solution to the project in question rests upon the ability to develop 
a habitual response to stimuli.
132
 Underpinning this argument was a distinction 
between contemplative and active states of mind. By dispersing conscious 
attention, distraction comes to represent the cognitive state of a “competent, 
experienced practitioner or technician”. Such a figure would possess the ability 
to assimilate stimuli, think and act in an instant without placing undue focus 
upon events around them.
133
 Clearly, this faculty would be indispensable to the 
signalman, and for Benjamin one creative discipline in particular was key to 
nurturing its growth. As he argued, it was in film that the observer would find a 
training ground in which he or she could become exposed to a sensation 
analogous to the intense perceptual shocks that had become increasingly 
manifest in all areas of daily existence.134 In other words, film’s ability to instruct 
its audience in the sensory alertness demanded by everyday life hinged upon the 
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medium’s ability to stage an onslaught of sounds and images equal to those 
fostered by modern urban experience.
135
  
   Montage would be key to such claims, specifically Sergi Eisenstein’s “montage 
of attractions”. Eisenstein’s art, which evolved from his early career as a set 
designer and director for the “Moscow Proletkult Theatre”, can be distinguished 
by his experiments with “multiple planes” of stage action. Such techniques 
allowed each component of the show, including the actors, to be treated as a 
“separate number”, a discrete part that could be integrated into a unified entity.
136
 
For Eisenstein, the origins of this approach existed in circus and music hall 
entertainments, also in the rhythmic structures of Jazz and the films of Charlie 
Chaplin. What united such forms was the particular mode of reception they 
demanded. They could not be experienced passively. On the contrary, a state of 
constant alertness was required to follow the striking web of unexpected 
elements that constituted a single performance. In Eisenstein’s analysis, such 
spectacles suggested a system whereby the interplay between a work’s various 
parts would generate its overall meaning and it was this process that he sought to 
replicate.
137
  
   In this context, the “Montage of Attractions” can be considered a project 
intended to foster acts of association between a work’s individual elements and 
the themes that provide its critical content. As Eisenstein summarised, a montage 
sequence will contain one piece that correlates to the themes to be developed by 
the work, and a second element that relates to the same motif. When these two 
elements are brought into unison, the juxtaposition will foster an image in which 
the creative and ideological concerns of the work will be rendered with sharp 
clarity.138  
   But the perceptual “collision” suggested by this practice also implies that an 
element of violence was required to elicit the desired reading from the 
beholder.
139
 This necessitated the drive to foster a state of visual and auditory 
shock. Attraction proceeded from this exact point. As a theatrical methodology it 
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represented a combination of every element that engendered in the observer the 
sensory or psychological impulses that would shape his or her experience. In 
other words, the montage of attractions combined every detail that could be 
planned and calculated in order to subject the beholder to a series of “emotional 
shocks” that would emerge sequentially through the work, thereby drawing the 
spectator into an emotional state whereby he or she could perceive the 
ideological focus of the piece.
140
 
   This model clearly opposes contemplative reception. As Tret’iakov argued, 
attraction placed a pre-meditated pressure on the viewer’s senses, and fostered an 
intense state of anxiousness and alarm.
141
 In Eisenstein’s words, the effects 
fostered were akin to a heavy agricultural machine ploughing furrows in the 
audience’s psyche into which could be planted the seeds of political ideology.
142
 
The transposition of this practice from stage to screen likewise demanded a 
response antithetical to meditation, a response Eisenstein would call “montage-
thinking”. Again, the process would function by punishing the audience with a 
ceaseless influx of stimuli and juxtapositions. As the director put it, any work of 
filmic art should proceed from an attempt to engender a flow of “emotional 
shocks” that, when viewed collectively, will suggest the ideas and motifs that the 
artist has sought to relay.143 
   In his discussion of such practices, Jacques Aumont outlines the techniques 
used to stage this reaction. Firstly, there was the purely visual effect created by 
the reproduction of the movement between frames. Secondly, the artificial 
representation of movement formed by the “straight cut” of a quickly changing 
montage, a process intended to influence the spectator on both physical and 
physiological levels. The creation of “emotional combinations” and 
“psychological associations” represented the third method. Finally, there was the 
“conceptual effect” used to liberate on screen action from spatial-temporal 
determinants. The scene in October (1928) where a Russian soldier appears to be 
“crushed” by a heavy tank that falls off a production line illustrates this process. 
Here the interplay between images is wholly cognitive and hinges on the film’s 
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ability to engender mental connections between seemingly disparate events. As 
such, it represents the highest evolution of the montage principle, of the potential 
of individual fragments to combine and provoke an “ideological conclusion”.
144
  
   Benjamin’s faith in cinema’s ability to replicate the psychical conditions of 
modernity can be thus associated with the rapid shifts and jarring contrasts of 
Eisenstein’s oeuvre. By compelling his audience to receive and negotiate a series 
of shocks he effectively schooled the beholder in the perceptual skills needed to 
survive the everyday. Thus we might argue that the montage of attractions, or the 
notion of reception in distraction, served to polarise the conclusions that arise 
from a study of perception informed by Freud’s Pleasure Principle, allowing the 
experience of shock to be viewed as a progressive force.   
   Yet because they deny the viewer a passive role and compel them to make 
rapid intellectual judgements, such works will refute the experience of reverie 
associated with the auratic. The same conclusions could be applied to the 
interruption of conventional perspective achieved by Lissitzky’s multi-viewpoint 
compositions. Indeed, both forms continue the experiences staged by Menzel’s 
late works. The shifting visual structures that characterise both Lissitzky’s 
Prouns and Eisenstein’s films do not allow the subject to meditate upon a single 
spectacle. As such, they offer the beholder no opportunity to receive the energies 
cast by objects of perception into their inner self and hence begin the exchange 
through which an image of their mood takes shape in the work before them. 
Consequently, both canvas and celluloid will disavow all forms of empathic 
sensation, arrest the object’s capacity to meet and return the spectator’s gaze, and 
thus suspend the interplay that fosters auratic experience.  
   The Russian avant-garde thus responds to a climate in which the sensory 
matrix of the auratic has declined by producing works intended to refuse all 
forms of auratic experience. Accordingly, this represents the second contribution 
such practices make to the aura debate. In addition to eroding the artist’s status as 
a figure of genius and arresting the veneration of their craft, the methodologies of 
Constructivism disrupt contemplative reception by instigating a new perceptual 
relationship between observer and object.     
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“The Last Reveries”. 
 
I: Pollock. 
 
   The fourth chapter of my thesis will advance the study of the auratic to an age 
beyond that explored by Benjamin’s text. Specifically, I intend to use the critique 
of the aura as a lens through which to engage the myriad practices that emerged 
in the decades that followed the Second World War, and thus trace the 
fluctuating status of the phenomenon across the period in question. Accordingly, 
I will begin by focusing upon the methodologies of Abstract Expressionism and 
the work of Jackson Pollock.   
   For the reader familiar with Benjamin’s writing, the links between Pollock’s 
work and the qualities inherent to the auratic object appear numerous. An initial 
connection emerges in relation to the idea that an artwork’s ability to suspend the 
viewer in the contemplative web of auratic sensation is indebted to the cultic 
status it receives from its position as a unique item derived from individual 
creative expression.
1
 Undoubtedly, Pollock’s oeuvre can be placed in this 
context, a claim that can be justified via a consideration of the artist’s action 
paintings.  
   Such works can be distinguished by the methodology employed in their 
creation. The defining characteristic of Pollock’s art is the fact that he allowed 
his physical movements to become an active, performative component of his 
practice. In this way, by using his hands to not merely steady his brush but create 
an impasto dictated by his own muscles and sinews, the painter captured and 
conveyed what has been called the spontaneous, the self-destructive, the 
primitive, the free, the existential.
2
 Against the background of such readings it 
becomes possible to view Pollock’s labour as a conduit for his emotions, a stage 
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on which his anguish and rage could be revealed in their most primal, untamed 
form.  
   A statement the artist drafted in 1947 provides evidence to support this view. 
Speaking of his work he avowed that his painting “does not come from the 
easel”, on the contrary its providence was attributed to the “unconscious”. As 
such, we might reason that Pollock achieved the purest distillation of the 
principles central to Surrealism.
3
 To be sure, a parallel might be drawn between 
the techniques that underpin pieces such as 1950s Lavender Mist – in which paint 
is dripped, poured and thrown across a large floor-based canvas in a manner that 
seemingly refutes any premeditated programme – and the Surrealist process of 
automatic writing, a form of “psychic automatism” whereby the author composes 
a steam of random words and phrases in order to access and release the areas of 
their consciousness that are inaccessible to willed exploration.
4
 Like the figure 
attempting this project, Pollock claimed to be unaware of what he was doing as 
he constructed his images. Each composition was approached as an entity that 
possessed its own life; a life the painter was committed to unveiling.
5
 
   But attempts to view the artist’s achievements in this manner have often 
sparked refutation from those closest to him. One such dismissal surfaced in an 
interview conducted in 1967 between Bruce Glasner of Arts Magazine and 
Pollock’s widow, Lee Krasner. At one point in the exchange, Glasner directed 
the discussion towards Pollock’s style of painting, asking Krasner whether the 
assumption that the artist worked as if in the grip of a wild outpouring of his 
emotions was accurate. Her response was to undermine such opinions. For 
Krasner, what was often absent from assessments of her husband’s art was the 
realisation that as an artist he was a sensitive, intelligent and creative person. 
Therefore, his practice did not simply unleash a mess of raw feelings. Rather, it 
gave form to the experience of being an artist and an “aware human being”.
6
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   This description provides the impetuous for Pollock’s inclusion within a certain 
category of abstraction. Namely, that which Peter Osborne has called the 
“Kandinsky/Malevich/Mondrian tradition of spiritual self-understanding”: a 
project in which the artist is charged with the revelation of “spiritual values” in 
painterly form. This methodology hinges upon the painter’s ability to become a 
“cipher” for the transcendent, and hence requires individuals blessed with the 
capacity to intuit the sublime and materialise its essence through the act of 
production.
7
 In Pollock’s work it is the painter’s mystical response to the natural 
world that provides the conduit for such visualisation. Indeed, it has been argued 
that his black and white pictures represent an attempt to evoke the “feel” of the 
winter landscape native to Long Island’s eastern shores. The sense of freedom 
suggested by a space in which bare trees yield to the endless grey of the Atlantic 
is identified as that which the painter seeks to convey.
8
  
   Accordingly, we reach the conclusion that the value of Pollock’s art is 
entwined not with its visualisation of raw, unfettered feelings, but is determined 
by the fact that in visualising those emotions his images externalise the mind of a 
figure imbued with extraordinary creative insight, a figure who views the world 
with an intensity beyond that of common perceptions and yet cannot evoke such 
sensations verbally, leaving his work as his only means of communication.  
   Immanuel Kant’s characterisation of the poet is relevant in this context. For 
Kant, the poet is a figure blessed with the capacity to give transcendent motifs – 
such as the kingdom of heaven, the mysteries of creation, or the hell of the 
damned – a “sensible” form. That is, the poet can use their imagination to present 
such mystical, abstract notions in a form that the reader will be able to perceive 
and understand, conveying them with a completeness that nature will never be 
able to rival.
9
 Krasner’s portrayal suggests that Pollock possessed the same gifts. 
Indeed, referencing Allan Kaprow’s claim that Pollock’s art threatened to initiate 
painting’s replacement with a practice centred upon participation, Benjamin 
Buchloh avows that far from destroying the medium, the Abstract Expressionists 
                                                
7
 Peter Osborne: “Modernism, Abstraction and the Return to Painting” in Thinking Art: Beyond 
Traditional Aesthetics, edited by Andrew Benjamin, London, The Institute of Contemporary 
Arts, 1991, pp 63 – 64. 
8
 B. H. Friedman: “An Interview with Lee Krasner” in Jackson Pollock: Interviews, Articles and 
Reviews 1999, pp 36 – 37. 
9
 Immanuel Kant: Critique of Judgement, Oxford, Oxford University press, 2007, p143. 
 172 
were revered as artists of mythic ability.
10
 Such arguments subsequently reveal 
how their work would be received through a sensory immersion analogous to the 
auratic.  
   The reverence Pollock attracted intimates that objects born of his hand would 
engender an equal sense of awe. As the artist and writer Robert Smithson put it: 
if the sensation of viewing art was once considered akin to acts of worship, then 
Jackson Pollock and his contemporary American “action painters” have reunited 
art with a sense of the ritual.
11
 Because it would be approached as a magical form 
and received through acts of quiet meditation – a process necessary if the 
transcendent content relayed by the composition was to be engaged – Pollock’s 
art would attain the position of a sacred item. Like the statue of Venus that 
captivated both scholars and clerics alike, each work would become a cultic 
artefact imbued with the power to hold the spectator in the indefinite weave of 
time and space crucial to genuine aura. Consequently it can be reasoned that 
Pollock re-staged the experience Benjamin associated with works that cannot be 
separated from the brilliance of the artist or their artistic achievement.
12
 
Furthermore, if this link is continued it becomes possible to consider the painter 
a drinker of quintessence, a man imbued with skills that derive from some 
otherworldly source. In this context, the aforementioned link between Pollock 
and Kandinsky can be confirmed. 
   For Kandinsky, “spiritual life” could be represented diagrammatically as an 
“acute triangle” separated into spaces of unequal size. This shape would be 
constructed so that the smallest regions lay at its highest reaches, meaning that as 
one travelled downwards the sectors would growth in size and depth. Artists 
would inhabit each and every subsection, and all practitioners would be united by 
a defining trait. As Kandinsky reasons, the artist would be identifiable as the 
figure that sees past the confines of his or her space and who thereby enables the 
progression of humanity through their innate ability to not only conceive of, but 
express, a higher reality. Clearly, Pollock may be thought of in such terms and 
identified as a person who saw past the physical limitations of his own world and 
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glimpsed the absolute, who possessed the wisdom to describe that which cannot 
be readily explained. Consequently, as with van Gogh’s late works, the aura of 
Pollock’s art becomes inseparable from that fostered by his own legend. 
Pollock’s paintings demand a cultic response because they bear the marks of 
artistic genius; they convey the soul of the man who occupies the pinnacle of 
spiritual understanding and views the everyday through a lens of “vast sorrow”.
13
 
 
II: Autonomy. 
 
   However, a parallel line of reasoning emerged which sought to eschew 
Pollock’s classification as a “natural existentialist”. Such interpretations aimed to 
assert the presence of a “questing formal intelligence” as the most important 
facet of his craft, and hence re-define him as a figure whose prime concern was 
the creation of the greatest art he could achieve rather than with the portrayal of a 
“fashionable metaphysics of despair”.
14
 The legacy of such revisions would be 
the establishment of Pollock’s work as a key point of focus for accounts 
addressing the issue of artistic autonomy. Such debates hold several implications 
for the critique of the aura. Therefore, I will offer a succinct definition of the 
subject before exploring it against the context of my thesis.  
   It is Clement Greenberg who provides the intellectual framework against which 
this task can begin. For Greenberg, artists achieved creative perfection only by 
remaining true to the material qualities of their medium. As he put it, the task 
would be to make evident not only that which was unique to art in the general 
sense, but also to explore those elements that were irreducible to individual art 
forms.
15
  
   To ascertain how this proposal would impact upon panting it is advantageous 
to first consider a manifesto drafted by Vera Stepanova. In a statement penned in 
1919, the constructivist divided all forms of painting into two categories: one 
positive, one negative. To feature in the plus column works had to display 
                                                
13
 Wassily Kandinsky: Concerning the Spiritual in Art, London, Tate Publishing, 2007, pp 14 – 
15. 
14
 Michael Fried: “Jackson Pollock” in Jackson Pollock: Interviews, Articles and Reviews, 1999, 
p97.  
15
 Clement Greenberg: “Modernist Painting” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, Volume 4: Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957 – 1969, London, University of Chicago 
Press, 1995, p86. 
 174 
faithfulness to pure painterly elements, notably space and colour. The minus list, 
however, was reserved for images that focused on “illusionism” and emotion.
16
 
So it was for Greenberg. He argued that painters had to develop methodologies 
that preserved the unique properties of paint. Therefore, their work would have 
to be flat. It would have to refuse all attempts to stage the effects of trompe-l’œil, 
the illusion of depth and perspective that compels the beholder to imagine that 
they are gazing upon a three-dimensional space rather than the surface of the 
canvas.
17
  
   Preoccupation with such details would be replaced by focus upon line and 
pigment, a project the artist would be urged to explore through non-figurative 
compositions. For example, speaking of Braque, Mondrian and Miro, Greenberg 
asserted that the merit of their work was indebted to each artists commitment to 
achieving invention and innovation in the fields of space, surface, colour and 
shape at the expense of all subjects unconnected to such factors.
18
 Hence the 
labour of such figures was deemed successful precisely because it engaged the 
craft of painting alone, because it was self-referential and represented no external 
motif.  
   Such claims suggest how an autonomous work is formed. Specifically, an 
artwork gains autonomy when it submits to the governance of its own internal 
laws and disavows the influence of all factors that are not specific to its nature. It 
is thus clear to see why a practice such as Pollock’s, which used the very 
liquidity of paint as an expressive process, might be integrated into a discourse 
concerned primarily with material elements of artistic media. Yet there is a 
certain limitation inherent to such readings inasmuch as they can offer 
interpretations only from within the context of a strictly defined parameter: 
namely that of formalism. However, it is possible to break the boundaries of such 
classifications and view the autonomous artwork as a phenomenon suffused with 
radical promise. It is this issue that I wish to engage.   
   By defining Pollock’s oeuvre as a body of work that was not only distant from 
the world, but which also set it “aside”, Clark provides an apt introduction to the 
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themes in question. For Clark, this separation from the empirical sphere was 
indivisible from the apparent rejection of political or cultural motifs engendered 
by Pollock’s painterly abstraction. As he concluded: it would be quite impossible 
to conceive of an image such as Number 1 (1948) as a part of the social relations 
of modernity beyond the unavoidable point that it was made at a given time by a 
member of the “petty bourgeoisie”. Put simply, the only social facet of the work 
was the fact that its author was a member of society.
19
 Such comments suggest 
that the autonomy inherent to Pollock’s art effectively strips it of any critical 
potential, but this is not the case.  
   We can elucidate this claim through a return to Theodore Adorno. That the 
philosopher believed art had to stand in opposition to, and hence rebuff any 
connection with, existing social relations has already been noted. Yet what we 
have not explored is the question of how such opposition might be formed. For 
Adorno, this was achieved first and foremost through the possibility of art’s 
autonomy. Because it existed as a thing-for-itself, the philosopher reasoned that 
art staged a “tacit critique” of the culture that is becoming a total-exchange 
society in which all things will exist as a “for-other”. In other words, by adhering 
entirely to its own rules and assimilating no outside phenomena, the artwork 
would stage an unspoken defiance of capitalist economy by refuting the process 
of debasement whereby things are stripped of their original meanings and recast 
as exchange values comprehensible only in terms of their price. By refusing this 
process the work of art would become an “absolute commodity”, a “social 
product” purged of the notion that it exists for the wider community. As such, the 
conviction that art’s radicalism hinges upon the capacity of painting or sculpture 
to convey direct political content is shattered. Crucially, if art embodies the 
antithesis of the “total-exchange society”, then the critical potential of the 
artwork becomes a trait engendered by the object’s “immanent dynamic in 
opposition to society”. Consequently, what art contributes to the social sphere is 
revealed to be not something that can be communicated directly, as with 
Heartfield’s montages, but rather a sense of resistance.
20
  
   These observations hold key implications for Pollock. By following Adorno’s 
thesis it can be reasoned that the autonomy intrinsic to the painter’s practice 
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imbued his oeuvre with critical potential precisely because that same autonomy 
prevented his images from becoming a for-other and allowed each canvas to 
remain a thing-for-itself. Indeed, that Pollock’s work could be viewed as a form 
of painting concerned with issues pertinent to the medium alone, rather than a 
practice suffused with political or cultural motifs, suggests that its status as an 
absolute commodity would be assured.  
   Of course, the absolute commodity is a contradiction inasmuch as the exchange 
value of the commodity hinges upon its very value as a utility. As Stewart Martin 
explains, use values represent the element of the commodity that is exchanged. 
Therefore, if something ceased to function as a utility it would no longer 
represent a viable source of exchange value. Thus at the instant in which an 
artefact became an absolute commodity it would simultaneously cease to be a 
commodity as such. But this conclusion is not regressive. On the contrary, it 
anticipates a further economic critique. The commodity that possesses no use 
value will defy the mechanisms of capitalism precisely because it has no 
exchange value and hence will not exist as a saleable product.
21
 Consequently, if 
Pollock’s pictures can be considered to be absolute commodities the definition 
ultimately highlights the political significance of his oeuvre. Because his work 
was imbued with no apparent use value it would fail to operate as an exchange 
value and would therefore refute the valorization of capital. Like fire-works, 
Pollock’s paintings could be considered an “empirical appearance free of the 
burden of empirical being”.
22
 Therein lay their radicalism.  
   Crucially, the fact that Pollock’s art possessed such qualities enables further 
connections between his painting and the perceptual conditions of the aura to be 
identified. But to explore this interplay first necessitates an assessment of the 
exchange operative between the temporal immersion of the auratic and the 
sensations experienced by the subject who encounters an object of pure beauty. 
As such, it becomes prudent to consider Kant’s work upon the Analytic of the 
Beautiful. 
   In his deconstruction of Kant, Jacques Derrida notes that the truly beautiful is 
defined as that which exists “for-itself” and adheres to no external “end”. A tulip 
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can be viewed in such terms, and thus interpreted as an embodiment of “free 
beauty”, because it exists “without a goal” and is detached from any regulation 
designed to determine the finality of the object. However, these characteristics 
also hold important implications for the manner in which such forms are 
received. For example, a botanist could examine the tulip and consider it against 
a set of premeditated rules, but this process would render him unable to 
appreciate the bloom as an entity that is beautiful in a pure sense. The scientific 
premise of his approach would situate the flower within a discourse intrinsically 
linked to questions of function and genesis; thereby undermining the very notion 
of how free beauty is formed.
23
  
   Therefore, we are compelled to conclude that assessments of beauty cannot be 
assigned any “conceptual rules”. As Kant affirmed, if we attempt to judge 
objects from a conceptual base we will always fail to appreciate their beauty.
24
 
For Derrida, this realisation explains why the discourse of aesthetics addresses 
the complex issue of pleasure through ambivalence. The aesthetic can be 
properly identified and enjoyed only when the subject adopts a condition of total 
“indifference” to external phenomena.
25
 Indeed, Kant’s thesis develops from the 
key assertion that in order to ascertain whether or not something is beautiful we 
must never “relate the representation through reason to the object for 
knowledge”.
26
 Hence the faculty for experiencing true beauty becomes one of 
contemplation, a lingering reverie in which the subject enters a state that 
seemingly refutes any practical or conceptual interest in the item before them.
27
 
Only then can the beholder attempt a judgement of taste and articulate a 
subjective response to the object of their gaze. 
   Significantly, Derrida reasoned that the Kantian notion of free beauty could be 
found in art, but only when artworks did not follow any external rationale. Thus 
to acquire the same status as the tulip, the object would have to be “without 
theme” and “without text”; hence the importance of a practice that exists solely 
on its own terms. Negating this “without” would be disastrous, as it would 
condemn art to the lesser category of “adherent beauty”, the “hypothetical 
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beauty” granted to the object that exists to satisfy a particular need or want. Once 
marked with this classification a painting or sculpture would never attain the 
pure beauty found in nature. The work would be forever tied to its sense of 
function, even if that purpose became obsolete.
28
  
   Yet if beautiful art is understood to be that which exists without agenda, it 
follows that the reception of such items would have to be similarly divested of 
any predefined framework. As Kant observed, although a work of art must be 
distinguished from the products of nature it must nevertheless follow nature and 
sever any link between its form and appearance and the rules or regulations that 
might influence those properties.29  
   Hence the conditions for engaging such works would echo the response 
demanded by the beauty of nature. That is, the subject would have to approach 
the object through a state of lingering, disinterested meditation.  
   Crucially, the autonomy that marks Pollock’s oeuvre suggests that his paintings 
could be identified as examples of pure artistic beauty. This classification thus 
implies that his practice would require the mode of reception proper to the 
judgement of the aesthetic. In other words, his works would be engaged through 
a contemplation whereby the viewer takes no practical interest in the canvas. Yet 
what must also be considered is the fact that such responses form a close parallel 
to the perceptual sensations of the auratic, which, following Adorno’s reading of 
Benjamin, we have defined as a reverie patterned upon the immersion generated 
when nature is not viewed as something to be acted upon.
30
 Therefore, it can be 
reasoned that in order to receive the pure beauty of Pollock’s art, the spectator is 
compelled to experience it through the sensory immersion of genuine aura. That 
is, the subject must view his compositions in a manner that replicates the 
disinterested reverie that engulfs the individual who admires the transcendence 
of nature. 
   Moreover, it is possible to further elucidate the auratic nature of Pollock’s art. 
Key to this proposition is Andrew Benjamin’s response to the Critique of 
Judgement. In Disclosing Spaces, he argues that although Kant maintained that 
there could be no conceptual classification to explain the existence of the 
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beautiful – and hence no account of beauty beyond the idea that the beautiful is 
the object of a “wholly disinterested pleasure or displeasure”
31
 – it is nevertheless 
possible to discern a quality specific to the artefact by exploring our reception of 
it in greater detail.
32
  
   Underpinning this idea is the fact that the “temporal register” created by 
lingering engenders a “distancing that is not marked by immediacy”. Or more 
specifically, a distancing created by the impossibility of forming an immediate 
comprehension of the object. In this context, Andrew Benjamin contends that 
what could be retained in the transition from an aesthetics to a philosophy of art 
is the sense of distancing, and hence the act of spacing, that lingering creates. 
This assertion suggests two important conclusions: firstly, that the “ineliminable 
spacing” created by disinterestedness represents a condition that must be fulfilled 
in order for the beautiful to be experienced, and secondly, the notion that the 
spacing created by this lingering becomes “constitutive” of the item. In other 
words, the indefinite meditation experienced by the person who encounters an 
artefact that cannot be classified in accordance with existing taxonomies will 
foster a separation between subject and object of contemplation, a separation that 
allows distancing to be understood as “descriptive” of the object.
33
  
   In effect, the idea presented here is that the beautiful can be defined as an 
object imbued with qualities similar to those found in the item that fosters 
conditions of auratic sensation, qualities that are created through the act of 
beholding. As we have seen, the spectacle that holds the viewer in an indefinite 
weave of time and space would come to occupy a position of irreducible distance 
from the beholder. The contemplative immersion inspired by a sacred or mythic 
form renders that same artefact forever unreachable regardless of its proximity; 
hence it becomes effectively separated from the everyday. Consequently, 
because the beautiful demands an analogous meditative response, we can argue 
that a phenomenal, auratic distance from reality will equally mark such objects.
34
  
   Therefore, because Pollock’s oeuvre demands a mode of reception centred 
upon acts of disinterested lingering we can argue that separation will become a 
defining trait of his art. Like the purely beautiful, it will always be at a remove 
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from the spectator. Hence, in addition to the ritualistic reception inspired by the 
cultic status of their creator, Pollock’s images will become auratic on a 
supplementary level because they will always occupy a phenomenal distance 
from the beholder. Moreover, this distance can be identified as key to the work’s 
critical potential. If autonomous art gains its radicalism by virtue of its inherent 
opposition to existing social formations, then the distance between subject and 
object fostered by sensations of perceptual immersion can be identified as the 
factor that ensures the object remains apart from, and thus resistant too, the 
empirical sphere. To echo Adorno once more, the void separating the aesthetic 
and the practical is analogous to the spacing created through acts of 
contemplation.
35
 Benjamin’s arguments are thus polarised and the aura becomes 
a phenomenon vital to the artwork’s political significance.  
 
III: Distance. 
 
   A further example of the distance intrinsic to Pollock’s painting can be 
identified in relation to Adorno’s reading of mimesis. In a statement analogous to 
the Kantian premise outlined above, Adorno reasoned that artworks were 
interpreted through aesthetic rather than conceptual analysis. But the mode of 
engagement he envisaged would exceed that of disinterested lingering. For 
Adorno, the subject’s response to a work of art was predicated upon notions of 
performance and re-enactment. Just as a musician re-creates a musical score by 
playing the piece in its entirety, so to must the beholder re-stage every detail of 
the image or artefact. Effectively, the viewer is called upon to mime or imitate 
the component parts of the composition, becoming assimilated to the object of 
contemplation in the same manner as the child who mimics the movements of a 
windmill or a train.
36
 Such ideas invite parallels with the empathic, particularly 
when one recalls that mimetic acts render subject and object indistinguishable.  
   Consequently, because the autonomous, “free” beauty of Pollock’s oeuvre 
implies an inbuilt refusal of assessments attempted from a logical base, Adorno’s 
notion of mimetic interaction emerges as a potential conduit through which the 
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spectator could approach his practice. Crucially, this assertion suggests that his 
art would stage perceptual sensations analogous to those I have identified in 
relation to Menzel. Indeed, we might reason that if Menzel’s late paintings reveal 
a crisis that divests realism of its ability to stage empathic reception then 
Pollock’s abstraction provides a conduit through which embodiment and 
corporeal projection could be continued.  
   Like the experience Baudelaire evoked in ‘L’Homme et la Mer’, the observer 
would engage Pollock’s work by submitting to its energies and allowing those 
impressions to shape their mood, to the extent that a reflection of their feelings 
materialised in its surface. This point is significant, for only by opening such a 
dialogue would the spectator be able to re-play the painting in the manner 
Adorno described. The aesthetics of empathy confirm that an emotional interplay 
between subject and object of contemplation is essential to the act of 
assimilation, to the experience that allows individuals to mime or become one 
with material or natural forms.  
   Moreover, because Pollock’s art called for the beholder to invest the canvas 
with a human quality able to return the gaze it received, we can conclude that his 
work fosters an exchange that can be identified as key to perpetuating the 
lingering reverie of genuine aura. As Benjamin reminds us, the interpretation of 
the aura as a transference of the social interactions of humanity onto the 
interactions between people and the natural world rests on the idea of objects 
becoming imbued the capacity to answer the onlooker’s glance.
37
 Therefore, just 
as Menzel’s audience would be unable to tear their sight from an image 
populated by a projection of their second, imagined self, the viewer of Pollock’s 
art would be immersed in time and space precisely because as they attempted to 
re-enact the canvas they would see themselves within the object of their vision.  
   Yet what must also be emphasised is Adorno’s assertion that artworks possess 
qualities that cannot be assimilated through mimesis alone. Because works of art 
defy conceptual interpretation – because they can never possess a “discursive 
meaning” – they can be considered enigmatic.
38
 As Adorno explained, what art 
imitates is neither nature nor individual examples of natural beauty, but “natural 
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beauty as such”. That is, art imitates the beauty that will be defined by its innate 
“undefinability”.
39
 Accordingly, because this enigma can be experienced only 
through the distance granted by philosophical reflection – which for Adorno 
explains why art must be interpreted by philosophy
40
 – the closeness fostered by 
mimetic union would leave the subject unable to cognise this aspect of the 
artwork. Consequently, although art objects are experienced mimetically out of 
necessity, Shierry Weber Nicholsen argues that this experience must be tempered 
by a cry of “self-liberation” that allows the perceiving subject to view the object 
as other and gain the vantage from which the enigmatic can be engaged.
41
 In 
other words, when beholding a work of art the subject is compelled to encounter 
the item as that which is distant regardless of physical proximity, an act that re-
creates the spatial dimension of auratic sensation. The non-discursive, non-
conceptual structure of Pollock’s practice suggests that it would engender this 
exact mode of reception. Therefore, to enable full reflection on the enigmatic 
quality of the artist’s work, the observer would need to be both assimilated to and 
detached from his paintings. As such, Pollock’s pictures emerge once more as 
auratic objects that appear irreducibly distant regardless of their proximity.    
   However, that works of art can be defined as inherently distant from empirical 
life does not divest such items of all connections to society. Indeed, Adorno 
avowed that there exists in all artworks a latent societal content. Initially, this 
assertion seems contradictory. If an artwork is thought to be autonomous, and by 
virtue of that distinction is interpreted as a object of great political significance – 
a significance that hinges upon notions of the work’s inherent resistance to 
dominant social relations – how can that same object be situated within the social 
sphere and still retain the qualities that engender its critical potential? 
Effectively, we must ask in what manner can painting, sculpture, or any other 
creative discipline be equated with factors that are alien to, and hence threaten to 
destabilise, their very autonomy.
42
  
   Resolving this problem was crucial, as Adorno stressed that art would never be 
understood while its “social essence” remained opaque. Furthermore, no form of 
practice would escape this dilemma; even the work that professed full 
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withdrawal from the everyday would be affected.
43
 Adorno’s solution hinged on 
the postulation that art is a discourse composed of two distinct elements, and was 
thus in possession of a “twofold” essence. As he put it, although art must 
separate itself from the social relations of empirical reality, it also belongs to the 
empirical sphere, and to the social relations that constitute everyday life.44  
   Central to this declaration is the idea that the dialectic of art resembles, but 
does not intentionally replicate, the social dialectic of everyday life. Such 
assertions further elucidate the issue of why art had no need to convey content 
gleaned from the external world. In Adorno’s thesis, the conditions and tensions 
of reality appear in works of art as the “immanent problems of artistic form”. 
This, and not the intentional introduction of objective motifs or content gleaned 
from the social sphere, was identified as the source of art’s relation to the 
everyday.
45
 Indeed, the philosopher reasoned that recognition of art’s social 
dynamic hinged upon the realisation that acts of “social labour” were implicit in 
its creation. In other words, creative practice possessed a societal dimension 
precisely because the artist is, at any given point in history, a product of the 
existing cultural climate: a figure who is produced by society and who thus 
reproduces society in turn.
46
  
   Consequently, the motifs at play in Adorno’s thesis can be placed alongside 
Marx’s reading of base and superstructure and viewed as a response to the 
contention that all forms of intellectual production are patterned upon the 
conditions generated by dominant economic systems. It is in this context that art 
can extract itself from society by refusing to engage explicit political content, 
and yet still remain linked to the social realm. As Osborne concludes, Adorno 
defined artistic labour as a historically ongoing dialectic of “expression and 
construction” in which the artist’s work develops out of the “mediations” of 
wider social relations.
47
 Against this background, the observation that Pollock’s 
oeuvre could be considered social only in the sense that its author was a member 
of society becomes paramount. Far from being defamatory, this idea allows his 
art to be fully integrated into Adorno’s philosophy. Although Pollock’s 
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abstraction denied the integration of content gleaned from empirical reality, the 
artist’s own contact with that precise sphere endowed his work with a clear social 
dimension. Key to this position is the painter’s belief that his work was indirectly 
motivated by forces manifest in daily life. This idea is given clarity through 
Pollock’s avowal that, as a modern painter, he would be unable to evoke the 
epoch of aviation, atomic technology and radio communication by using skills 
gleaned from the past. As such, the techniques he developed might be interpreted 
as part of the artist’s attempt to find a visual language capable of expressing a 
new age.48  
   The question of how post-war culture would shape creative labour was of 
similar importance for Adorno. Significantly, his reflections would echo 
Pollock’s focus upon rapid scientific development. As the philosopher argued, it 
is impossible today to walk through a forest without hearing the sound of an 
airplane overhead, an intrusion that denies art one of its primary subjects.
49
 
Nature can no longer supply the artist with the site of poetic contemplation 
because that site has been corrupted. Moreover, the industrial landscape cannot 
be considered an alternative space of celebration, because such urban sprawls 
would invite only “false poetic paeans”. Consequently, if art is purged of the 
ability to reflect upon natural beauty – and is equally incapable of meditating 
upon the forces that foster nature’s ruination – the only area for creative practice 
to engage will be that of the “non-representational”. Adorno identified this crisis 
as central to the turn towards abstraction prevalent in many disciplines,
50
 a claim 
akin to Pollock’s belief that the age of technology compelled artists to forsake 
figuration and focus instead on the internal.
51
 Therefore, because his 
methodologies are revealed as receptive to the influence of cultural formations, 
Pollock’s art achieved the dual feat of being aloof from, and yet part of, the 
“social complex” of modernity.   
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IV: Crisis. 
 
   That the issue of autonomy acquired added significance in the wake of 
transformations that eroded the cultic character of the work of art is hardly 
surprising. As Jürgen Habermas observed, the possibility that art might 
appropriate content gleaned from daily life and be disseminated throughout the 
empirical sphere imbues the idea of creative practice existing as a thing-for-itself 
with increased critical purchase. Put simply, if art filters into the everyday in the 
manner anticipated by the ‘Artwork Essay’, then the economic and political 
forces operative within that realm will threaten to corrupt art itself. This 
realisation has important implications, which Habermas explained thus: 
following the destruction of the aura, the only artwork that will be able to resist 
assimilation into the consumer economy will be the “formalistic” piece that 
remains separated and removed from the masses.52 
   But such arguments are marked by one unavoidable flaw. Autonomous art may 
offer a vital subversion of the commodity form,
53
 but that resistance does not 
render such practices invulnerable to assimilation by the mechanisms of 
capitalism. In spite of his defence of autonomy Adorno was fully aware of this 
danger, and pinpointed a notable example of such degradation in relation to 
abstraction itself. As he laments, the enshrinement of abstract expressionism in 
the “pantheon of cultural exhibits” situated the discourse firmly within systems 
of commodity exchange, causing such works to negate their “radical” origins and 
become little more than an expensive wallpaper used by the affluent members of 
society to decorate their homes and businesses.
54
  
   Pollock was not immune to this crisis, and his shift in status from radical artist 
to the figure who made pictures that satisfied the tastes of the wealthy can be 
confirmed by events which took place in 1951. In March of that year, Vogue 
magazine commissioned Cecil Beaton to create a series of images celebrating the 
latest fashions. The photographer chose Pollock’s Autumn Rhythms (1950) as his 
backdrop, and in one scene styled the folds of the model’s dress in a manner 
evocative of the swirling lines and sweeping diagonals of the composition. It has 
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been suggested that this case study offers evidence of Pollock’s skill at 
manipulating the media in order to generate publicity for his art. Yet this 
judgement has also been reversed. For Pollock’s detractors, Beaton’s photo-shoot 
provided positive proof that the autonomy of modernist art rendered it a benign 
presence incapable of preserving its critical stance against capitalism.
55
 For 
example, if a painting is deemed suitable for a supporting role in a fashion spread 
that – for all its elegance and finesse – is still tied to systems of commerce and 
exchange, how can that same painting be considered a work of critical potential?  
   Further issues emerge when one considers that recent scholarship has 
associated the art of Pollock and his contemporaries with a clandestine 
propaganda campaign waged during Cold War. To explore this idea demands 
focus upon a number of subjects, the first of which is the structure of artistic 
patronage in the epoch contemporary to the New York School. As Eva Cockcroft 
notes, because museums were often sustained by private funding, “prominent 
citizens” who controlled banks and corporations regularly held positions of 
authority on the boards of major galleries.
56
 Equally important is an awareness of 
the social-political climate of the post-war era. However, I do not want to focus 
upon the military or diplomatic context of the standoff between communism and 
capitalism, but rather question the extent to which contrasting forms of creative 
practice provided a battle-ground for exchanges between east and west. 
   That the dissemination of overt political content became central to Soviet art 
from the late 1920s onwards has already been discussed, likewise the techniques 
used to achieve such effects. Yet what has not been considered is the fact that 
such works were distributed not only in their country of origin, but were also 
intended to reach a wider audience.  
   USSR in Construction is a case in point. The journal was published in German, 
English, French and Spanish, and in addition to boosting support for state 
policies from within Russia, the paper played a major role in foreign policies 
designed to increase the Soviet Union’s allies across the globe. Significantly, 
Stalin realised that he would need aid from other nations to achieve the industrial 
development he desired, and was thus keen to foster good relations with 
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countries that might provide machinery and technical knowledge. As such, 
disseminating an image of the USSR as a modern, forward thinking state was 
identified as one way of gathering the required support. However, this portrayal 
also served other ends. Conveying an image of strength and prosperity offered a 
vital weapon against enemy states that might otherwise perceive Russia to be 
weak, impoverished and unworthy of respect in the arena of global politics. In 
this context, creative labour was used to not only to convey images of a 
“workers’ paradise” immeasurably superior to capitalist decadence, but also to 
confirm that the paradise in question was ready to repel any incursion over its 
borders.
57
  
   The need for an artistic response to counter the spread of support for the Soviet 
Union thus became a vital concern in the west. Yet because many were openly 
hostile to the idea of the politicised artwork, believing it to be redolent of Marxist 
social critique, this response could not attempt a parallel integration of political 
content into artistic forms. What was required, therefore, was a system that 
would not only convey the values needed to counteract the communist threat – 
namely notions of freedom and subjectivity, the qualities that defenders of 
bourgeois society wanted to assert as dominant in their own cultures and absent 
in Russia’s bureaucratised world of state oppression – but would present those 
ideals in a form that was itself synonymous with individuality.
58
  
   Significantly, a suitable genre existed in form of Abstract Expressionism, a 
realisation that granted the practice a new level of acceptance. Such works had 
previously aroused suspicions from those alert to the existence of global 
communist conspiracies. Speaking in 1949, US Senator George Dondero 
distinguished modern art as an engine of revolution and identified Kandinsky as 
its agitator in chief. The painter’s prominent role in the “Moscow Institute of 
Artistic Culture” (INKhUK) combined with his allegiance to Trotsky cast 
Kandinsky as an instigator of communist art. Crucially, Dondero reasoned that 
Kandinsky’s influence upon the avant-gardes of Cubism, Futurism and 
Expressionism set the conditions for the integration of “red art” into American 
society, and with it the threat of radicalisation and uprising. There was, he 
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argued, a clear danger that if practice shaped by Kandinsky’s theories on 
abstraction filtered into art schools, galleries and museums, it would 
simultaneously spread leftist ideology throughout the country. Hence all work 
that bore the trace of his presence, a category into which Pollock’s oeuvre clearly 
fell, was to be treated with caution.
59
  
   Yet because the art of Pollock and his followers centred upon notions of 
untamed individual creativity it also offered a potent metaphor for social liberty. 
As Cockcroft asserts, Abstract Expressionism engendered the assumption that 
painters were able to explore their inner most thoughts and feelings precisely 
because the governing forces of their homeland allowed them to do so. Unlike 
their Soviet counterparts, American artists were not encouraged to follow state 
sanctioned agendas that outlined what was permissible in creative labour in terms 
of both form and content. Thus their work suggested that the west was a free 
society unfettered by the regimented restrictions of the communist state.
60
  
   Initial attempts to convey this message through touring exhibitions failed due 
to excessive censorship designed to expel pictures deemed politically suspect. 
However, Cockcroft contends that such failures were reversed by the 
intervention of major galleries who organized national and international shows of 
works reflective of the notions of cultural freedom the west sought to promote. In 
this context, the fact that institutions backed by prominent industrialists 
supported events such as The New American Painting – a famous celebration of 
Abstract Expressionism – becomes a key point of concern. The parties who 
reaped the greatest rewards from capitalist economy would wish to counter the 
forces that threatened consumer society. Accordingly, Cockcroft argues that if 
creative practice was identified as one way of pre-empting this crisis, it follows 
that the wealthy would use their influence to ensure that objects deemed crucial 
to the fight against communism were brought to the forefront of public 
consciousness.
61
  
   However, integrating such pictures into systems of political discourse served to 
erode the autonomy that was once their defining trait. Like Constructivism, the 
New York School would no longer be accountable to its own intellectual system 
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but would be answerable to “utilitatrian imperatives” that destroy self-
referentiality by forcing works to serve ideological ends.
62
 Cleary, this threatened 
to corrupt the qualities that granted such practices their radicalism. Abstract 
Expressionism would be unable to critique existing social relations through its 
inherent opposition to society because it had become an agent of those relations. 
In this context, Pollock’s oeuvre would be subject to the “aging of the new”; to 
the implosion of artistic forms enacted not by time but by their incorporation into 
the neutralising discourse of the culture industry.
63
 The problems intrinsic to this 
situation are heightened when one considers that fact that a mode of practice 
imbued with the potential to, as Adorno put it, critique the “total-exchange 
society” that seeks to turn everything into a “for-other”, was used to defend that 
very culture.  
   Such declarations suggest not only an extension of modernism’s “bad dream” – 
a perpetuation of the nightmare scenario in which art was used to preserve rather 
than critique the economic conditions of empirical life
64
 – but also that the 
problems Adorno located in the non-auratic work, namely its vulnerability to 
appropriation by ideological systems, were equally pertinent to its auratic other. 
The phenomenal distance from the everyday created by the sensory immersion of 
auratic experience offered no safeguard to corruption by committed rhetoric.  
 
V: Concepts. 
 
   If an association with Cold War politics began the erosion of abstraction’s 
integrity then the derision would be completed by the open scorn of the post-
Pollock generation. Integral to their rejection of formalist ideology was a 
dismissal of the received notion that painting and sculpture were synonymous 
with the discourse of aesthetics, and hence with notions of taste and beauty.
65
 
The dissenters reasoned that artworks possessed no pre-determined link with 
these qualities, and argued instead that the perpetuation of such ideas had forced 
creative labour into a corner from where it was compelled to satisfy such criteria. 
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The “visual Muzak” offered by Pollock, Marko Rothko and Willem de Kooning 
was thus identified as merely the next link in the chain of art’s debasement. As 
Joseph Kosuth scathingly remarked, work of this type was “not art at all” but a 
pure “exercise in aesthetics”. To be sure, he avowed that “formalist painting” 
attained artistic status only through strict adherence to its “art idea”. 
Compositions would be deemed works of art only if they were conceived as a 
rectangular canvas that would be coloured with certain hues and pigments in 
order to evoke certain shapes and engender certain modes of reception. For 
Kosuth, the obvious conclusion suggested by this methodology was that it 
allowed art to be made with minimal creative effort. In this restrictive approach 
to production there was seemingly no space for real innovation.
66
 
   Redressing the negativity that had become endemic in artistic labour thus 
required artists to question the nature of art itself. But if an individual were 
simply exploring the properties specific to a given medium, as was the case with 
the self-referential project championed by Greenberg, they would never achieve 
this goal, for to work solely within a single discipline was to be bound by the 
traditions that surrounded it. As Kosuth put it, the word “art” is a general term, 
whereas words such as painting are “specific”. Hence the subject who questions 
the nature of painting alone will be unable to question the nature of art because, 
to quote Kosuth, painting denotes a “kind of art” and not a totality of artistic 
practices.
67
 Consequently, artists sought to distance themselves not only from the 
techniques that achieved dominance in the age of Abstract Expressionism, but 
also from the materials through which the genre achieved its success. The final 
passage in a manifesto published to accompany a demonstration performed at the 
1967 Salon de la Jeune Peinture – an event in which four artists, Daniel Buren, 
Olivier Mosset, Michel Parmentier and Niele Toroni, each selected a simple 
geometric motif and then, working in public view from 11: am until 8: pm, 
produced a series of paintings identical to their chosen design – encapsulates this 
opposition to artistic convention. Significantly, the participating artists claimed 
that as painting was used to reveal the aesthetic qualities of, amongst other 
things, flowers, the female form, erotica, everyday life, art, the Dadaist 
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movement, psychoanalysis and the conflict in Vietnam, they were compelled to 
renounce any connection to the medium.68  
   There is, of course, an obvious flaw in this assertion. For all their hostility to 
painting, Buren and his colleagues were still staging their attack from the 
confines of painterly practice. As such, one might reason that they were still 
questioning the nature of painting. Yet to discount their work on such grounds 
would be naïve, for their project anticipates revisions that hold radical 
implications for the evolution of the artwork. Inherent to their dismissal of 
established media was a refusal of the classical models of auratic creativity 
associated with Pollock. Indeed, their practice would continue the destruction of 
painterly expression initiated by Gerhard Richter’s Colour Chart series of 1966.  
   These were large rectangular compositions on which the artist painted uniform 
blocks of pure colour, creating an effect redolent of the sample sheets prepared 
by commercial paint suppliers. Such pieces have been received as parodies of the 
gestural traditions that govern the use of colour within abstract art, and hence as 
a form of anti-painting that emphasises the mere “chromatic relationships” 
between pigments rather than exploring colour as an emotional language.
69
 
Accordingly, the Colour Charts critiqued the expressive poetics inherent to many 
forms of abstraction by presenting paint not as a conduit for the soul but as a 
lifeless industrial product. As Thomas Crow put it, although the sheer scale of 
these works invites comparisons to canvases by Newman and Stella, their 
incorporation of motifs connected to mass manufacture also suggests a satire in 
which abstract, expressive painting is re-located within a Warholian 
methodology of machine-like, de-personalised production.
70
  
   Buren and his colleagues staged a similar revision. For example, when he 
composed a stream of indistinguishable canvases, each comprising twenty-nine 
equally sized red and white stripes, the automated mode of labour purged 
Buren’s work of every imaginable human emotion. Pain and fear, happiness and 
love, were absent from his images. The myth that art is a way of visualising 
internal emotions, of communicating the non-communicable, was deflated. 
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Sensitivity and insight were defeated, and the artist was rendered an 
“insignificant” component in the production process.
71
  
   Consequently, it is possible to identify a situation whereby an emotional 
practice centred upon the pursuit of self-expression was succeeded by a mode of 
labour that announced the disintegration and re-construction of art itself. 
Increasingly, this process came to rest upon the emancipation of the idea from 
the confines of the object, a methodology that can be elucidated by the American 
artist Sol LeWitt.  
   For LeWitt, Conceptual Art was a movement that presented the Idea as the 
central factor in a work’s production. Accordingly, all decision-making would be 
made in advance, thus rendering the execution of the project a purely 
“perfunctory affair”. As Lewitt put it: “Once the idea of the piece is established 
in the artist’s mind and the final form is decided, the process is carried out 
blindly”.
72
 Moreover, because conceptual artists were concerned solely with the 
process of “conception and realization” – because an object state was needed 
only to allow the work to be perceived – it would not matter what form the 
finished work might take.
73
 Taken to the extreme, this logic suggests that ideas 
need not be realised in physical form, a possibility that became a central concern 
for Kosuth. 
   In Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921), Ludwig Wittgenstein avowed that 
all propositions share a particular form, which is: “such and such is the case”.
74
 
Yet Wittgenstein also reasoned that certain propositions would form tautologies 
because that which they proposed would be “unconditionally true”.
75
 
Accordingly, Kosuth claimed that when an artist makes a work of art their 
activities form a tautological proposition precisely because the act of creating art 
merely proposes that a given artwork is a work of art. Crucially, this observation 
suggests that the production of objects is “conceptually irrelevant to the 
condition of art”,
76
 which thus implies that art does not need material shape, but 
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can exist numerically, as language, or in media previously understood to be 
beyond the realm of creative labour.
77
  
   Lawrence Weiner’s Statements – a series of written instructions describing 
activities that could be executed in external environments, such as a can of spray 
paint emptied out onto a floor space
78
 – offer one indication of how art 
accommodated this intellectual framework. For Weiner, each Statement could be 
realised in one of three ways: the artist could make it, it could be made by the 
figure who read the statement in an exhibition, or it could remain unrealised and 
hence exist as an idea given form through language. In making this claim, he 
highlighted the fact that because each mode of execution was equal to the artist’s 
intentions there was no way in which one method of realisation could take 
precedent over the others. As such, the decision concerning what form the work 
would take – be it object, copy or concept – was left to the individual who 
received the original text.
79
  
   For some critics, this process of dematerialisation was driven by a political 
agenda. The denouncement of art’s materiality was considered a reaction against 
the artwork’s growing status as a valuable commodity brought and sold by 
private collectors. Moreover, a sense of unease concerning allegations of art’s 
use by systems of Cold War propaganda began to emerge. As such, it was argued 
that art had to extricate itself from the system whereby forces external to the 
artist were able to take possession of their craft and use it to promote their own 
ends. In this sense, it becomes possible to view the ideologies of conceptualism 
against the wider cultural and social tensions of the late 1960s, which culminated 
in the student uprisings and national strikes of May 1986. To paraphrase Kristin 
Ross, international opposition to the Vietnam War acted as a major catalyst to 
insurrections in France, Germany, Japan, Italy and the United States.
80
 Similar 
concerns shaped the development of Conceptual Art. As Lucy Lippard observed, 
there was urgent need for a practice that could not be “brought and sold” by the 
society that claimed ownership of “everything that was exploiting the world and 
promoting the Vietnam War”. The establishment of art as idea offered a solution 
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to this problem. Because ideas were unmarketable they could not be readily 
integrated into an exchange economy, hence the artist could seemingly avoid the 
crisis that caused Pollock to be maligned.
81
 Therefore, the goals of Conceptual 
art might be compared to Constructivism’s search for the “Socialist Object”. 
Like the first generation of Russian avant-gardists, the artists that came to 
prominence in the wake of Abstract Expressionism sought to create work that 
would not only dismantle the citadels of bourgeois art, but would negate the 
dreams and desires fostered by capitalism and the commodity fetish.
82
  
   But the key issue engendered by dematerialisation in the context of this chapter 
is undoubtedly the notion that the process held crucial implications for the aura 
of the artwork. Such ideas can be introduced via an interview conducted between 
Buchloh and Warhol. Following a discussion concerning the malleable 
boundaries between Conceptual Art and Pop, Buchloh reasoned that common to 
both was a Duchampian critique of the belief that the artist was an author, an 
innovator, or a figure who fashioned precious items.
83
 Such assessments suggest 
that by denying the significance of authorship and craftsmanship, Conceptualism 
challenged the artwork’s status as a unique item born of individual creative 
insight and hence divested it of qualities that engender an immersive, auratic 
response. Furthermore, because Conceptual Art fostered a transformation in the 
material state of creative practice, from traditional painterly or sculptural forms 
to art-as-idea, the movement would disrupt the reverie of genuine aura by 
denying the beholder access to an object of contemplation in the traditional 
sense.  
 
VI: Index. 
 
   These claims can be can be expounded through Lewitt’s assertion that 
conceptual artists sought to challenge the viewer on a mental level,
84
 a process 
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that would find its exemplar in the work of the British Art & Language group. 
An editorial in the first issue of Art-Language, the collective’s self-published 
journal, illustrates the critical background to their practice. The text opened with 
the following challenge: what would happen if an editorial statement written in 
order to answer the question “what is conceptual art” was itself classified not as a 
piece of writing, but as a conceptual art work? That is, if creative practice has 
attained a point of development whereby written language is employed as a 
representational tool, then does the ensuing intellectual framework provide a 
context in which an essay can be viewed as an artwork? Key to such questions 
was a blurring of the boundaries that separated artist and theoretician. As Art & 
Language explain, the artist has been historically personified as a figure who 
creates works that subsequently require a series of elucidating “support 
languages”. In Conceptual Art, however, art itself has begun to assimilate those 
discourses – for example, Kosuth’s assimilation of Wittgenstein and analytical 
philosophy – suggesting that the making of art and the writing of theory have 
become synonymous. Advancing this connection thus invites the issue of what 
might happen if an essay were exhibited as an artwork. Would the surrounding 
environment compel the viewer to behold the sheets of paper as a visual art 
object, or would they simply read them as a “notice”? Equally pertinent is the 
question of ontology. Would the essay be denied artistic status because it lacks 
the visual characteristics historically required of an artwork, or is it possible for 
art to exist as both “theoretical” and “concrete” forms?
85
   
   To some extent, the implications posed by this hypothesis were explored by the 
Index 01 project of 1972. The piece comprised two main elements. Firstly, 
eighty-seven texts that had either been published in Art-Language or written by 
members of the expanded Art & Language collective were arranged and 
exhibited in a series of eight filing cabinets. Secondly, an enlarged typescript that 
listed every text included in the work was displayed on the surrounding walls. 
On this typescript, each piece of writing was assigned a number, and a key was 
used to signal its compatibility with the other essays in the installation. A + sign 
was used to denote an ideological or philosophical connection, a – sign was used 
to express incompatibility, and a letter T was used in instances where two texts 
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were so different in content that to attempt any comparison would be 
unfeasible.
86
  
   Although shorn of painterly elements the structure employed by the project 
enables its classification as a picture in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term. For 
Wittgenstein, propositions were pictures of reality. Key to this claim is the 
philosopher’s assertion that the world exists as a “totality of facts”. That is, 
reality is determined by the existence or non-existence of “atomic facts”: the 
possibility or impossibility of occurrences between objects, entities and things.
87
 
Once this is understood it can be argued that to say such and such is the case 
depicts reality because it describes a fact and thus pictures the “logical features 
of reality”. Consequently, propositions can be compared to hieroglyphics 
inasmuch as they create a “symbolic relationship” between language and the real 
world.
88
 By proposing a series of positive or negative associations between a set 
of theses, the Index achieved just such a representation. To paraphrase the 
Tractatus, the act of declaring the connections and non-connections manifest in a 
critical discourse conveyed unto the beholder a “picture of facts”,
89
 a “state of 
affairs” that may exist in “logical space”.
90
  
   Clearly, the project that offered such a picture would demand a non-traditional 
mode of engagement, a process that Index 01 supplied. Rather than contemplate 
the work as an aesthetic object, the subject was invited to follow the wall-
mounted key, read the materials contained within the installation, then decipher 
the relations and oppositions suggested between them. As such, Charles Harrison 
has commented that the work represents an attempt to map an ongoing 
conversation detailing the “condition of art”, and also to encourage the individual 
to participate in that dialogue. Hence rather than operate as an object that awaits 
the beholder’s gaze, the Index becomes an artwork that is mobilized through 
mental activity.
91
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   Accordingly, what becomes crucial in the context of the auratic is the fact that 
Index 01 would foster a mode of reception that represents the antithesis of 
lingering meditation. Writing about Hans Hacke, Benjamin Buchloh argued that 
Hacke’s practice had transformed the bourgeois mode of aesthetic experience – 
which centred upon passive contemplation – into a mode of reception focused 
upon interaction, participation and collaboration.
92
 The same can be said of Art 
& Language. Unlike the examples presented above, the Index would not exist as 
an object of pure beauty because it was intended to convey and perpetuate an 
intellectual dialogue.  
   The work’s appropriation of such heteronomous content might be traced to the 
crisis in artistic autonomy initiated by abstraction’s integration into the spheres 
of fashion, consumerism and Cold War propaganda. As Jeff Wall asserts, 
autonomous art had reached a point whereby it could only be created through a 
rigorous simulation of the “non-autonomous”.
93
 Individuals seeking to question 
the nature of artistic production in the manner proposed by Kosuth – an activity 
that implies an autonomous practice inasmuch as it calls for artists to critique the 
ontological condition of art through creative labour – thus had to attempt their 
enquiry by aligning their work with themes gleaned from areas beyond the 
aesthetic. Hence granting their practice a utility divorced from the internal laws 
governing art itself. For Wall, Art & Language achieved this through their 
entwining of art and “critical commentary”. This act allowed their practice to 
question the boundaries of what art might be, how it might exist, and how it 
might operate. But because this interrogation was staged through projects centred 
upon the non-art categories of discourse and philosophical debate, such questions 
were posed in a manner that did not focus on the artwork’s formal properties of 
form, colour, line and shape. Similarly, their works would not profess separation 
from discernable use values precisely because they were intended to archive 
arguments about artistic production and provoke further discussions within that 
field. As such, we might argue that Art & Language anticipated Osborne’s 
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reading of Adornian autonomy and made autonomous art by uniting their work 
with anti-art elements.
94
  
   That Index 01 encapsulates this methodology confirms that to approach it 
through the state of disinterestedness demanded by the purely beautiful would be 
inappropriate. If the subject were to explore the intellectual territory mapped out 
before them, they would have to adopt a position of critical interest in relation to 
the essays relayed by the project. Therefore, by inviting cognitive exploration 
rather than reflective reverie, Index 01 refused the perceptual immersion fostered 
by Pollock’s art and disavowed the sensations of phenomenal distance 
engendered by objects that trigger such experiences. Moreover, if we accept that 
the heteronomous factors responsible for this transformed act of beholding were 
introduced in response to an exchange economy that rendered traditional notions 
of autonomous art problematic, it becomes possible to locate a further example 
of how art’s ability to foster auratic sensation is subject to the influence of 
economic relations.    
   Additionally, because the Index refutes modes of engagement traditionally 
employed in response to the aesthetic it can be reasoned that the observer would 
have no need to experience it mimetically. The spectator would not have to 
follow Adorno’s example and interpret the work through reflection, assimilation 
and eventual re-enactment, because the installation was intended to elicit an 
indefinite conceptual analysis. As such, the corporeal projection experienced by 
the beholder of Pollock’s art would be suspended, and with it the onlooker’s 
ability to perceive their emotional self coalesce with the object. The observer 
would not encounter the externalization of their thoughts and feelings amid the 
clerical suite of filling cabinets, and the reams of text within would not return the 
beholder’s gaze. Hence Index 01 would disavow an exchange essential to the 
perpetuation of genuine aura and be rendered non-auratic by the particular 
response it demanded from its audience. Such would be the outcome of 
exhibiting textual material in the gallery space.  
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VII: Gas Stations. 
 
   But if Conceptual Art’s contribution to the aura debate is to be fully engaged 
then the role photography played in its ideologies must also be explored. This is 
not an arbitrary claim, for if the movement found its “primary material” in 
language then the photograph represented its “second form”. The relationship 
can be introduced thus. Because conceptualism placed emphasis on ideas rather 
than materials it frequently took art into the realm of performance. Gilbert and 
George’s Singing Sculpture of 1970 is a good example of this. Intended as a 
“living sculpture”, the piece featured the two artists miming the song Underneath 
the Arches whilst dressed in matching suits and identical bronze face paint. But 
what truly distinguishes this, and other projects of its type, is the work’s 
transience. It exists only in the moment of execution and needs to be fixed in 
time to endure beyond its ephemeral life span. Crucially, the archival potential of 
photography provided a means with which this could be achieved.
95
  
   Such readings imply that photography’s relationship to Conceptual Art might 
be contextualised against the exchange between the parergon and the ergon. 
Kant offers an initial definition of these concepts by comparing paregea to 
ornaments, or more specifically to items that are not internal elements of an 
object or artwork, but are external additions to such things.
96
 However, Derrida 
provides greater illumination by revealing the parergon to be something that is 
“against, beside and in addition to the ergon”, which is the work, the item, the 
project. As he argues, the parergon attaches something that is an extra 
component or exterior to the actual thing. Consequently, it is not an intrinsic 
property of the work, but a “supplement” of the artefact, a quality that completes 
it. The parergon intervenes with the ergon only to the extent that the object is 
both lacking in “something” and lacking “from itself”.
97
  
   Therefore, because photographic documentation does not represent an internal 
part of works by figures such as Gilbert and George – yet corrects a lack inherent 
to their art by fixing for posterity that which would be otherwise lost – the 
process might be considered a parergon to the ergon of conceptual practice. In a 
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climate where creative labour encompassed the pattern outlined by Wiener’s 
Statements, the photograph provided a form of visual evidence able to indicate 
that a particular activity had been performed.  
   However, to assert that photography’s relationship to Conceptual Art was 
limited to that of a supporting player would be naive. On the contrary, the non-
art, anti-auratic character of the photographic image made a vital contribution to 
the movement’s ideology. Importantly, the utilitarian nature of the camera 
rendered the apparatus an ideal ally for artists seeking to renounce the factors 
traditionally associated with the auratic object. Creative insight and uniqueness 
are qualities absent from the image produced by the automated workings of a 
mechanical device.
98
 Therefore, photography offered a visual language that could 
evade integration into the traditions and histories that surrounded painting and 
sculpture.
99
  
   Accordingly, even though they displayed little familiarity with debates 
addressing the medium’s creative merit, artists from Ed Ruscha onwards 
approached photography in a manner that recalled Benjamin, Heartfield and the 
Russian avant-garde insofar as they perceived it to be an overtly “non-art” 
form.
100
 That is, they used the camera as an anonymous mode of production able 
to remove any “overt authorial comment” from their work.
101
 Perhaps such 
perceptions are indebted to the connection between photography and radical 
politics that developed in the 1930s, an exchange that hinges upon the 
assumption that photographers are able to record reality without “subjective 
expression”.
102
 Ruscha’s photographic books of the early sixties certainly 
conform to such notions of emotional neutrality. For example, in Twenty-six 
Gasoline Stations (1963) – a work in which the artist documents a series of such 
sites on stretch of the famous Route 66 highway from Los Angeles to Oklahoma 
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City
103
 – the eponymous structures are recorded with a technique that has been 
variously described as depersonalised, unaesthetic, deadpan.
104
  
   This methodology is aptly suited to the motifs engaged by the work in 
question. Clear equivalence exists between the bland, amateurish style of 
Ruscha’s images and the faceless ubiquity of his subjects. His books explored the 
banal and vernacular structures that Margaret Iversen would call “anti-
landmarks”. They evoked the vistas Jack Kerouac described in On The Road 
(1955) and visualised a world of prefabricated houses and drive-in movie 
theatres, the “ragged promised land” that existed on the outer edges of 
America.
105
 Hence we might assert that Ruscha sought to capture an 
unremarkable landscape in any equally vapid image.  
   As Melanie Mariño has suggested, this interplay between impassive 
photography and non-descript locations created an act of social critique. In her 
analysis, what Ruscha emphasised was not the “singularity” of each location, but 
their “homogeneity”. As if to highlight the standardization or eternal return of the 
same, to use Benjamin’s terminology, engendered by capitalism.
106
 But the 
artist’s commitment to photography’s anti-aesthetic potential went beyond this 
apparent synergy between the object and execution of his work. As Ruscha 
himself declared: photography has no place in the world of fine art, it can only 
function as a provider of technical information for the commercial sector.
107
 In 
other words, Baudelaire’s avowal that the camera should limit itself to the 
archiving of visual fact was embraced as a credo for creative practice.  
    Such commitments betray the influence of Marcel Duchamp. Like his 
predecessor, Ruscha wanted to incorporate mass-produced, readymade objects 
into the field of creative practice. It would be his embrace of photography’s 
mechanical character that allowed this to be realised.
108
 As Crow put it, the 
denial of any creative, aesthetic presentation that characterised Ruscha’s books – 
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likewise the fact that they were printed in large numbers in a fashion redolent of 
the factory production line – made them a perfect embodiment of Duchampian 
strategies.
109
 In this context, the radicalism inherent to works like the gas station 
piece is rendered apparent. A project that fostered non-auratic items bereft of 
subjectivity, imagination and human skill would simultaneously yield objects 
purged of “the genius theory”; the quality Lippard identified as that which the 
ruling classes prized most in works of art.
110
 Ruscha achieved this exact feat. 
Consequently, he issued a vitriolic challenge to the New York School and their 
wealthy patrons, thereby setting a standard for critical practice to follow. 
   Moreover, it is possible to expand arguments focused upon the non-art 
character of photography and discern a supplementary example of the medium’s 
significance to Conceptual Art. At stake here is the contention that the camera 
became a key protagonist in the emergent drive to usurp the growing 
commodification of the artwork itself. Ian Burn sketched the extent of this 
growing dilemma, lamenting that artworks do not only become commodities, but 
are also cast as commodities from the moment of their inception.
111
 Yet as Wall 
declares, because the booming market for painting had no photographic 
equivalent it was argued that the medium held the potential to negate the 
“commercial-bureaucratic-discursive order” responsible for transforming 
artworks into exchange values.112 
   Again, such readings acknowledge that the critical power conceptual artists 
located in the photograph was indivisible from their perceptions of its utilitarian, 
anti-auratic status. If photography were perceived to be a sub or non-art practice 
it would not elicit the same enthusiasm from patrons who sought the prestige of 
owning a work of “creative insight”. The status of having a Pollock or van Gogh 
amid your private possessions would not encompass those images that were 
associated with the lowly labour of the technician. Ensuing decades have, of 
course, rendered such claims problematic. Today, photographs hang in galleries 
and fetch prices comparable to paintings. Yet in the years contemporary to 
Ruscha this situation was yet to evolve. The possibility that photography might 
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negate a culture that viewed artworks as little more than sources of exchange 
value thus rendered the medium key to the strategies of the Neo-Avant-Garde. 
Therefore, although ensuing years would reveal the precarious nature of such 
idealistic claims, in the late sixties it still seemed improbable that buyers would 
pay large sums for a set of images recording a transient event.
113
      
 
VIII: Smithson. 
        
   In what follows I want to explore the interplay between photography and 
Conceptual Art in greater detail. As such, I intend to address a body of work in 
which I locate a defining example of the camera’s ability to facilitate 
methodologies radically opposed to High Modernism, namely the art of Robert 
Smithson.  
   Although not immediately concerned with language, Smithson shared 
conceptualism’s critique of the artwork’s object state.
114
 However, he engaged 
this project by attempting creative practice through media previously absent from 
the artistic canon rather than through strict acts of dematerialisation. The 
“earthwork” offers an exemplar of this approach. Essentially, it was radical 
sculptural form created by working directly with the earth’s geographic and 
geological features. Much of Smithson’s oeuvre can be viewed in such terms, 
with arguably his most celebrated piece emerging in 1970 at the site of the Great 
Salt Lake in Utah.  
   The decision to work in this environment was inspired by its unique 
characteristics. In particular, Smithson was drawn to the “wine red” hue of water; 
a colouration formed by the micro bacteria that lived in the lake and gave its vast 
liquid expanse the appearance of tomato soup. Equally enticing was the 
phenomenon known as “icebergs”. Liquids of high saline content seldom freeze, 
but the lake was also fed with fresh water by streams that drained into its depths. 
In calm conditions this water would not mix with the lake, but would float 
benignly on its surface. And when such conditions persisted into winter the 
falling temperatures would cause this aquatic skin to solidify and form thick ice 
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sheets across which coyotes would run. For Smithson, the possibility of staging a 
project in this surreal landscape was simply too much to resist.
115
  
   Following initial explorations, a place roughly one hour north of Rozel Point – 
a post-industrial area littered with the remnants of attempts to extract oil from a 
nearby tar pool, an activity rendered near futile by the corrosive, salt rich 
atmosphere that swiftly turned useful machinery into rust – was chosen as the 
location for the project. It was a site rich in geological features, and it would be 
in response to these details that the resulting earthwork was conceived. 
   Misshapen limestone beds and vast quantities of black basalt formed the 
topography of the area. The waters of the salt lake lapped against this fractured 
landscape, and from the shoreline one could see the cracked mesh of mudflats 
that lay beneath its pink-tinted depths. As Smithson looked on this site its terrain 
suggested an “immobile cyclone” in which the whole landscape appeared to 
shudder. It was, he argued, as if a long dormant earthquake had suddenly 
unleashed its energy and spread out from its point of origin, pulling everything 
into “a spinning sensation”, but one shorn of any trace of motion. As the artist 
concluded, the space was like a curling tempest that had become a prisoner of its 
vast rotating geography, and from that impression emerged the idea of the Spiral 
Jetty.
116
    
   The twisting, serpentine form of the salt lake monument was inspired by a 
space that evoked a swirling vortex into which solid and liquid collapsed.
117
 In 
this sense, all aspects of the project stemmed from an attempt to inscribe this idea 
onto the landscape. The work’s characteristic shape was initially marked out 
using lengths of string secured to a series of stakes, and then contractors working 
with dump trucks, tractors and mechanical diggers were enlisted to construct the 
jetty from earth and basalt gathered from the shoreline. Once completed, 
Smithson’s spiral measured fifteen hundred feet in length, was approximately 
fifteen feet wide and – as Ginfranco Gorgoni’s photographs attest – was capable 
of supporting the weight a fully-grown man. 
   That the work was documented was significant. A project that was vulnerable 
to the ravages of erosion and was staged in an isolated location needed to be 
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recorded in a manner that allowed its original state to be preserved. But the 
significance photography occupied in his work is not limited to this simplistic 
observation. The camera was also essential to Smithson’s dialectics of “site” and 
“non-site”. 
   In Smithson’s terminology the “site” was the location of the project, the 
physical environment in which it was situated, whereas the “non-site” was the 
work, the creative intervention in the land that was made out of the land itself.
118
 
As Smithson elucidates, the “non-site” was created out of the site because ground 
from the “site” was incorporated into the art, rather than the art being merely 
added to the landscape.
119
 Applying this logic to the Salt lake project thus casts 
Rozen Point as the “site” and the Spiral Jetty as its corresponding “non-site”.  
   Yet the “non-site” was also viewed as something that could be communicated 
to spaces beyond its original locale, thereby initiating a critical exchange 
between the vast expanses of nature and the enclosed “room space” of the 
gallery. The artist first addressed this idea in 1967, speculating that technology 
could be used to relay projects staged in remote places – like the New Jersey 
Pine Barrens or the frozen artic wilderness – to a wider audience.
120
 The resultant 
methodology was clarified in an essay titled “Aerial Art” (1969). Originally 
written as a proposal submitted to the Dallas-Fort Worth regional airport, the text 
outlines Smithson’s plan for a series of earthworks or “non-sites” to be staged on 
the perimeters of the complex. Due to their location on the airport’s outer fringes, 
these pieces would be visible only from the air. Therefore, the artist envisaged a 
parallel installation that would take the form of a gallery exhibition. This display 
would feature images, diagrams and maps detailing the position and construction 
of the Aerial Sites, and would have the effect of expanding the central zones of 
the terminal to the outer reaches of the airfield.
121
 Hence Smithson’s practice 
evolved beyond the production of artefacts to become a discourse that contrasted 
outdoor sites that do not host objects with interior spaces where objects may be 
found.
122
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   Crucially, it is possible to view this relationship as key to the artist’s critique of 
the gallery system, and hence as a continuation of conceptualism’s wider 
resistance to the influence of collectors and private finance. Smithson was deeply 
hostile to the museum and the process of exchange it initiated. He identified the 
institution as a key component of the process that alienates the artist from their 
own labour in a manner analogous to the economy that separates the worker from 
the products of their toil. As Smithson observed, the artist works in isolation, 
making an endless stream of objects, and then watches as other individuals 
confer value upon the results of their craft.
123
  
   Such claims elucidate why Smithson viewed traditional notions of the art 
object as problematic. In his analysis, the critic who focuses upon the material 
product of the artist’s labour ignores the cognitive processes that create the work 
in question, and instead infers on the artefact a commodity value that can be 
perpetuated only by “systems independent of the artist”.
124
 Furthermore, as if to 
reiterate the problematic legacy established by Pollock’s appropriation by Cold 
War rhetoric, Smithson avowed that once it is re-cast as a commodity artists may 
find that their work is integrated into ideological or political values that contrast 
with their own views.
125
 However, because he developed a project that would not 
exist as a single object – but would operate as a critical exchange between 
divergent points in space and time – we can echo Lippard’s analysis of 
conceptualism and argue that Smithson initiated a practice imbued with the 
potential to evade the art market and allow artists to retain a sense of possession 
over their work. Sculptures and paintings might be brought and sold, but a 
project conceived as a dialectic or dialogue that contrasts two polarised locations, 
cannot. The ideological focus of the piece would have no material existence, and 
as such no third party would be able to claim ownership of it.
126
 
   That photography was instrumental to this discourse cannot be overstated. Its 
presence allowed works that were physically inaccessible to an exhibition in 
interior space to be situated within its confines. Michael Kirby’s claim that 
photographs can bridge distances in a cognitive manner by directing our attention 
that which is not there, and thereby unite for the viewer two sections of the same 
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work that are physically separated, provides an apt summary of how Smithson 
employed the camera.
127
  
   His use of such strategies can be confirmed by his plan for a Mirror 
Displacement to be staged at the Lake Cayuga Salt Mine, an installation that 
hinged upon the exchange between museum and nature. As the artist put it in an 
interview held before the event, he intended to visit the salt mine, place his 
mirrors in various arrangements within that location, photograph the piece, then 
situate those images within a gallery interior alongside samples of raw material 
gleaned from the salt mine itself.128  
   Again, this description highlights the fact that without the camera’s 
intervention the dialectic Smithson intended to create would fail. Without 
photography, the outdoors would not seep into the exhibition environment and 
highlight the “abstractness” of the gallery room.
129
 Similarly, if the work’s 
photographic element were removed it would cease to exist as a dialogic piece 
able to resist the commodity form. But this was a regression into which the 
Spiral Jetty would not fall. On the contrary, it would follow the exhibition plan 
outlined in the ‘Ariel Art’ schema. It would exist as “double path” of “signs, 
photographs and maps”, a duality of two and three-dimensional components. 
Hence the beholder would not view the project as a sacred object, but would 
experience it as a conflict between a central point and a periphery.
130
  
 
IX: Frame. 
 
   However, the importance of the photographic image to Smithson’s practice 
would be far greater than these observations imply. Specifically, it served to 
maintain the artist’s personal manifesto concerning the nature of creative 
production. As Blake Stimson explains, Smithson strongly opposed the tradition 
that defined the artist as an individual who possessed an innate capacity for 
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emotional expression and “aesthetic experience”.
131
 Indeed, he dismissed such 
qualities as shackles that tethered artists to the “vile laws of culture”, and called 
upon all producers to seek emancipation from the snares of craft and chains of 
creativity.
132
   
   Yet for all his opposition to notions of creative genius, Smithson’s own words 
contrive to render him that which he despised. Revisiting his account of the 
Spiral Jetty suggests that an empathic experience similar to that evident in the 
work of Leskov and Menzel was central to its creation. The artist stands and 
meditates upon the space before him, the space begins to swirl, and as he allows 
the ensuing energies to permeate his consciousness he becomes one with the 
vortex. As Smithson recounts, his eyes became engines that churned “orbs of 
blood” that blazed with the intensity of the sun.
133
 Like Pollock, or Friedrich’s 
Nature Artist, the author of this account might be considered a “romantic or 
transcendentalist”, a figure blessed with the capacity to experience the natural 
world on a deep, profound level.
134
 Accordingly, although the ensuing monument 
would be made with machines rather than physical labour, it can be argued that a 
trace of this sensitivity would permeate his work and prompt the viewer to 
engage it through a state of silent awe. Therefore, we must ask how Smithson 
avoids this contradiction and remains true to his radical position? How does his 
practice negate what John Berger has called “bogus religiosity”: the false 
enshrinement of artworks as objects akin to “holy relics”, a judgement made in 
recognition of their author’s prodigious gifts?
135
 I want to argue that it is 
Smithson’s use of photography that enabled his art to avoid such regression. 
   Crucially, Smithson’s engagement with photography is strikingly close to that 
of Ruscha. Although he experimented with formats particular to photographic 
practice – notably the photo-essay style of The Domain of the Great Bear – he 
viewed the camera not as an expressive medium, but as a tool with which to 
convey visual information about material or man-made forms. He even favoured 
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cheap, lowly forms of printing.
136
 As if to confirm the purging of human 
presence such choices imply, Mariño suggests that there exists a clear parallel 
between the style of photography employed by Smithson and Walker Evans’ 
notion of photography being practiced without an operator.
137
 That is, as a 
process in which it is the “object” and not the photographer that makes the 
image.
138
  
   For Smithson, such acts of recording yielded a decisive effect. He believed that 
once photographed an artefact or vista underwent a series of transformations that 
fundamentally changed its character. For instance, an interview conducted by 
William C. Lipke saw the artist claim that photography “squares everything”. As 
Smithson comments, the camera catches and holds every possible vista in the 
confines of a rectangular box, and hence nullifies the romantic possibility of 
seeking out “the beyond”, of chasing the promise of infinite space.139  
   A fragment gleaned from a later discussion clarifies exactly what this squaring, 
this renouncement of any romantic resonance, means for the artist. As Smithson 
argued, photographs steal a work’s spirit.
140
 Therefore, if an artwork is subject to 
photographic documentation – or is en-framed as a photographic print – the 
process will achieve the iconoclastic feat of de-mythologizing the object. 
   A clear example of this deflation occurs in the “photo-painting” technique 
developed by Richter. As the name suggests, such works are pictures made after 
a photographic image. Yet the methodology does more than simply transfer the 
subject of a photograph onto canvas. On the contrary, it sets out to re-create the 
photographic form in paint itself. Richter wanted to transcend the notion that 
photographs were the product of a chemical process and instead “make” 
photographs through materials traditionally understood to be external to the 
medium.141 
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    The effect of this approach would be profound, for by using the photograph to 
create a readymade painting Richter advanced his rebuttal of the principles of 
High Modernism. Like his Colour Charts, Photo-painting allowed the physical 
and material properties of paint to be explored in a manner that did not spark 
regression into outdated notions of self-expression.
142
 As Steve Edwards 
observes: claims for the presence of subjective creativity are inappropriate to the 
image in which the evidence of the artist’s hand is supplanted by the inhuman 
imprint of technology.
143
 Richter’s avowal that he blurs his images in order to 
divest them of any connection with art or craft, and instead suggest a parallel 
with the smooth perfection of technological production,
144
 offers compelling 
evidence to support this reading. Hence it can be concluded that the photographic 
context into which Richter placed his work served to imbue it with “non-art” 
characteristics, an act that would subsequently influence the manner of its 
reception.  
   As argued above, Benjamin avowed that photographic reproduction debased 
the artwork’s ability to stage a contemplative, auratic response by subverting 
notions of “uniqueness and authenticity”.
145
 Rather than gazing in silent wonder 
at the item wrought by creative genius, the beholder engages the object in a 
revised form from which all traits that rendered the original psychologically 
unapproachable are purged.  
   Adorno provides a thesis able to confirm such claims. In a reiteration of the 
argument that an artwork’s capacity to be experienced auratically hinges upon 
the beholder’s recognition of the artist’s authorial presence, the philosopher 
reasoned that the aura is like a hand that gently, and with almost loving affection, 
strokes and softens the contours of an art object.
146
 Yet if a work is transfigured 
as a photographic document, the trace of this hand, of the artist’s conscious 
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manipulation of their materials,
147
 will be masked beneath the precision of a 
purely indexical image.  
   Richter’s work achieved something similar. By encouraging the observer to 
view his work through the context of photographic practice – and hence through 
connotations of automation and the mechanical – he divested his paintings of the 
qualities that engender acts of veneration. If photographic reproduction turns 
artworks into images that are commonplace, unimportant, ubiquitous and 
cheap,
148
 then a project that assimilates traits specific to photography will also 
prompt such readings. Therefore, despite the undoubted skill of its creator, 
Richter’s practice would not foster the ritualistic reception demanded by 
Pollock’s art, a revision that can be interpreted as key to the painter’s ideology. 
Indeed, Buchloh contends that Richter was sceptical of the historically 
determined convention to identify artists as producers of auratic artefacts, and 
thus sought to refuse such distinctions. Aligning his oeuvre with the vernacular 
products of the camera allowed this goal to be achieved as it reconciled his 
practice with the mass-produced rather than the sacred.
149
       
   Similar readings can be ascribed to Smithson. Although the act of photographic 
documentation would not remove the intellect and imagination that had 
conceived of and shaped the original, it would nonetheless frame his practice in 
an image from which all traces of aesthetic insight and capacity for feeling are 
purged, thus diluting the resonance of his authorial presence. As with Richter’s 
work, the low-plane, utilitarian implications of the photograph and “indifferent 
mechanical eye”
150
 of the camera would diminish the transcendence of both the 
artwork and its maker, thereby transforming the reactions of the beholder.  
   For example, in a claim redolent of Benjamin’s thesis Berger notes that there 
exists a tendency to view art under the guidance of given assumptions, namely: 
“beauty, truth, genius, civilization, form, status and taste”.
151
 Conceivably, the 
spectator could engage Smithson’s oeuvre in such terms and receive his 
earthworks as precious forms. However, because the site/non-site dialectic 
permits the spectator to encounter such objects through the banality of the 
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mechanical picture, this situation will be reversed. Regardless of how fantastic 
the piece may be, its potential to announce itself as the hallowed product of 
artistic sensitivity is arrested by the artless, mass-produced print through which it 
is received.  
   In effect, the photograph invites the viewer to approach the Smithson’s land-art 
through a document that cannot engender a state of reverent meditation. 
Consequently, the presence of this non-auratic image becomes central to the 
work’s eschewal of mythic classifications. Put simply, the project resists 
assimilation into the canon of magical artefacts born of celebrated genius 
because the camera’s intervention renders the observer unable to engage it as 
such. Photography thus completes Smithson’s work by allowing it to resist the 
spheres of craftsmanship and creativity antithetical to his methodology. 
   On this basis, it is viable to state that all conceptual artworks that were 
recorded by a utilitarian documentary image would be held within a similar non-
auratic frame, a frame that refutes the cultic veneration of insight, imagination 
and artisanal skill. Therefore, the camera is again revealed as key to 
conceptualism’s resistance of artistic tradition. The archival use of photography 
negates the “genius myth” because it serves to exorcise any trace of creative 
consciousness that might haunt an artefact or performance piece.  
   Moreover, if we return to a recurring motif in these arguments – to the 
assertion that photography’s technical origins placed it somewhere outside of, or 
incompatible with, the aesthetic
152
 – we can reason that a practice framed by the 
camera lens would refuse the expanded explanations advanced in order to 
elucidate the artwork’s ability to lull its audience into spatial-temporal 
immersion. For instance, if the photograph is considered a non-aesthetic image 
the viewer will be disinclined to engage it as they might an object of pure beauty. 
Thus it will not be approached through a Kantian meditation devoid of any 
practical interest in the object of contemplation. Accordingly, because the 
document does not compel the observer to indefinite reverie, the work it depicts 
will not become suffused with the irreducible spacing such acts engender. Hence 
it will not attain a position of phenomenal distance from the beholder and will 
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not mirror a defining trait of the artefact that suspends the onlooker in time and 
space. 
   It is possible to argue that this refusal of sensory immersion provided a perfect 
rebuttal of Greenberg himself. In a review written in 1941 the critic stated that 
pictures had to exist as self-enclosed dramas. Even if they were only landscapes 
or still lives they still had to be something in which the beholder’s eye could “fix 
and involve itself”.
153
 Such comments might be interpreted as evidence that 
Greenberg championed images able to arrest the viewer and stage the aura’s 
spatial-temporal web. From this point of view, because their practice fostered a 
polarised mode of reception we might reason that artists such as Smithson or 
Richter negated Greenbergian Modernism not only by undermining the writer’s 
particular reading of medium specificity, but also by refuting the precise mode of 
experience he believed works of art had to facilitate. 
   However, these conclusions do not signal the end of the aura debate. Rather, 
they point to its continuation. Although Conceptual Art engaged photography in 
a manner that emphasised its banality and automation, the frequency with which 
such forms were used paradoxically cast the medium as paintings heir apparent. 
This, combined with the profusion of projects employing lens-based media, 
allowed the photographic image to become a constant presence in the gallery, 
thereby subjecting it to a dramatic shift in status. The anti-art associations that 
photography endured throughout the age of modernism were replaced by a new 
post-modern interpretation that viewed photography a standard form of creative 
labour. Hence, rather than remaining as lowly documents, the products of the 
camera were transfigured into objects that could be experienced in the manner 
once reserved for painting.
154
  
   But if photography had finally secured entry into the artistic canon, it follows 
that the iconoclasm it once engendered would be lost, and with it the potential to 
disrupt qualities essential to the conditions of auratic experience. Such ideas 
suggest that the aura could once more become a conduit for approaching works 
of art. As Nicholsen notes, the assimilation of photography by the gallery sets the 
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stage for the “re-auraization” of the photographic image.
155
 This situation will be 
explored in conclusion to my thesis, which seeks to assess the status of the aura 
today.                 
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Conclusion. 
 
I: A to B.  
 
   In chapter five of From A to B and Back Again, Andy Warhol described a 
dilemma arising from his growing celebrity status. The incident in question 
centred on a request made by a private company keen to develop a working 
relation with the artist. However, the organisation did not want him to act as a 
designer or creative consultant. On the contrary, they sought something more 
elusive. As Warhol recounts, they did not want to buy his “product” but his 
“aura”. What was meant by this plea remained a mystery to the artist. Yet 
because his suitors were offering a large sum of money for it, he deemed it 
prudent to attempt a definition. To that end, the following explanation took 
shape. For Warhol, the aura was something that was visible only to other people, 
but there would be a limitation upon how much of it they could see, as 
individuals would only be able to view “as much of it as they want to”. In this 
sense, Warhol would comment that the aura was not necessarily located in a 
particular subject, but in the eyes of the beholder. Furthermore, although he 
believed that the aura could be seen “on people”, Warhol claimed that it would 
be visible only on figures that the spectator was unfamiliar with, or had never 
met.1  
   The artist gave an anecdotal explanation to illustrate his idea. One evening, he 
was enjoying a meal with all the members of his “office”. Because these people 
knew Warhol well and saw him every day, they felt no awe or humility when in 
his presence. As Warhol put it, they all treated him “like dirt”. But among the 
dinner guests was an individual who had never met the artist before, and his 
reaction upon encountering him was one of sheer wonderment. In Warhol’s 
analysis, the response of this person offered an important clue about what the 
                                                
1
 Andy Warhol: The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again), San Diego, 
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1977, p77. 
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auratic might be. Put simply, Warhol suggests that the figure in question had not 
seen his corporeal form, but had actually perceived his aura.
2
 
   What is significant about this reading is the fact that Warhol indirectly evokes 
the myriad ideas I have endeavoured to elucidate. In particular, the artist’s 
assertion that true aura develops through the observer’s response to external 
stimuli anticipates a central motif of my thesis. Specifically, I have striven to 
correct a frequently formed misconception and argue that the auratic is not a 
material quality or given property of specific artefacts but a category of 
perceptual experience: a phenomenon formed in the exchange between subject 
and object of contemplation.  
   An example of the sensation under discussion lies in the beholder’s reception 
of the natural world, a response Adorno characterised as an act of beholding 
through which flora and landscapes are viewed in a manner divorced from any 
sense of practicality. Significantly, this reaction can be attributed to the fact that 
a horizon enriched with mountainous peaks or a forest illuminated with shafts of 
sunlight – the examples Benjamin used in his initial definition of the auratic – are 
both vistas that serve no external ends. Like Kant’s flower, they are exemplars of 
pure beauty. Forests and mountains exist without need to satisfy agenda or 
criteria, and thus cannot be assessed against rules designed to determine the 
perfect specimen. Hence if an individual sought to decipher the mystic truths 
latent in a wilderness untouched by the hand of progress or industry, they would 
have no choice but to adopt a position of lingering disinterest in the space before 
them.  
   Such ideas serve to clarify the relationship between aura and the autonomous. 
Because autonomy does not denote a mode of sensory experience it cannot be 
considered directly analogous to the aura. But autonomy can be identified as one 
of the factors able to induce acts of auratic experience. The object that refutes the 
forces of heteronomy and exists as a thing-for-itself will appear to defy 
conceptual analysis, allowing contemplation to become the primary means 
through which such forms might be best received. As such, the grandeur of 
nature demands a mode of reception akin to silent meditation: an approach that 
subsequently fosters the spatial-temporal web of genuine aura. 
                                                
2
 Ibid, p77. 
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   Against the background of this example it becomes clear that, for Benjamin, 
the auratic denotes a situation whereby the subject becomes immersed in an 
external form. Furthermore, although the natural world is not the only spectacle 
able to induce genuine aura, the specific conditions of the beholder’s response to 
nature offer the exemplar against which attempts to identify further examples of 
auratic sensation can proceed. Aura develops when an object is received through 
the same contemplation Benjamin identifies in the figure who becomes lost in an 
alpine scene. Such notions elucidate precisely why the auratic must be 
considered an experiential, and not material, category. Of course, this claim is 
seemingly contradicted by Benjamin’s tendency to identify specific artefacts as 
things that do possess an aura. Hence what must be emphasised is the fact that 
when Benjamin offers such descriptions he is not suggesting that a mystical 
energy radiates from certain forms, but that the item in question holds the 
capacity to engage the subject in a contemplative state comparable to that 
triggered by the glories of nature.  
   Yet if these claims cement the assertion that the auratic refers to an experiential 
category, then they also raise the contention that the subject’s inability to engage 
external forms in this meditative manner will signal the aura’s evanescence. This 
change does not result from subjective will. It is the outcome of social and 
economic factors. As argued above, the origins of the aura’s deterioration emerge 
against the crisis of experience evoked by Baudelaire. The allegorical transience 
of the Second Empire assaulted the subject with a rapid influx of stimuli and 
turned Paris into dream world born of the ceaseless streams of commodities 
intended to soothe the danger of insurgency; a phantasmagoria that would be 
perpetuated by the hordes of intoxicated consumers who massed in pursuit of the 
capital’s ever-evolving flow of goods. Amid this ephemeral space the 
temporality of sensory immersion was lost and replaced by the constrained 
sensations of the glance. Events and spectacles were no longer contemplated but 
wrested from the kaleidoscopic chaos of the metropolis with the swiftest 
movement of the eyes, a situation that made the auratic obsolete.  
   Further evidence that the aura’s degradation follows transformations in the 
economic base emerge when one considers that the new patterns of experience 
mediated by the modern world developed as a psychically necessitated response 
to the ephemeral climate of commodity culture. As we have seen, the onslaught 
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of impressions that battered those who paced the city streets – likewise those 
who worked in the automated halls of modern industry – had to be deflected in 
order to negate the twin threats of shock and trauma. Yet the need to negotiate 
the jolting, jarring space of daily reality did not only foster a truncated mode of 
engagement that rendered subjects able to receive modernity’s rush of images 
and sounds only in the precise moment of their manifestation, it also made 
perceptual immersion an archaic faculty.  
   The defensive intervention of consciousness that provided the central reflex of 
Freud’s Pleasure Principle may have diluted the danger of excessive stimulation, 
but by disciplining the subject in the habitual deflection of excitations it also 
imposed a sense of indifference whereby external forms would be received in a 
restricted, ineffectual manner. Accordingly, even if an individual were able to 
view a scene of natural beauty unmarked by the chaos of urban existence, the 
establishment of Erlebnis as the dominant pattern of experience in empirical life 
would destabilise their ability to behold the transcendent in a manner able to 
engender the meditative web of the auratic. Their response would not be one of 
wonderment but a reaction that might be contextualised against Simmel’s notion 
of the “blasé”. Thus, wherever a restricted pattern of experience was enforced, 
we can reason that the sensory matrix of genuine aura would fail.       
   Furthermore, the crepuscular hours would not afford any respite from this 
situation. At the request of Louis Napoleon an increased number of lamps were 
installed to illuminate Paris. Their glow afforded consumers a sense of security 
on the capital’s nocturnal streets and allowed shops to remain open long into the 
evening, but this would not be their only effect.
3
 Indeed, such innovations imply 
that nightfall would offer no respite from the noise and chaos that compelled 
pedestrians to engage their surroundings through a restricted pattern of 
experience. Consequently, twilight would offer no safe haven in which the 
auratic could retreat and resurface. The city would remain one of swarming 
movement.  
 
 
                                                
3
 Walter Benjamin: “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” in Walter Benjamin: 
Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938 – 1940, London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003, pp 28 – 29. 
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II: The Answering Gaze.  
            
   However, the aura debate does not pertain to the experiential climate of 
empirical reality alone. On the contrary, the contemplative web of the auratic 
also accounts for the sensations historically encountered by the individual who 
beholds a work of art. Revisiting Adorno suggests one explanation for this 
occurrence. Just as the notion of nature being looked upon in a manner shorn of 
any practical interest offers a potent metaphor for the reverie of the auratic, so to 
does a contemplation divested of conceptual concerns represent the context in 
which the subject is required to approach works of art inasmuch as such objects 
might be defined by their autonomy. Thus the autonomous is once more revealed 
as a pre-condition of auratic experience. 
   But this does not mean that the perceptual experiences manifest in daily life 
have no impact upon those fostered by creative practice, as Manet’s 
Impressionism confirms. The methodological techniques that distinguish the 
artist’s oeuvre not only indicate his intent to capture the sights of the metropolis, 
they also relay the visual immediacy with which those same subjects would be 
encountered. For example, in canvases such as Le Chemin de Fer it is the 
painter’s attempt to evoke the fleeting sensory climate of the everyday that 
engenders the spectator’s instantaneous reception. This interplay validates 
notions of a link between spaces that disavow acts of auratic experience and the 
opposition to sensory immersion that marks works completed against such 
environments. Adorno argued that human reactions to works of art are not 
triggered by the specific nature of the object, but are meditated by social and 
economic conditions.
4
 Accordingly, if the viewer’s response to Manet can be 
defined as anti-auratic, then the causes of this response can be pinpointed as 
being derived from those societal forces that rendered the experiential landscape 
of nineteenth century France as inherently opposed to the sensations of genuine 
aura. 
   Manet’s inability to facilitate Benjamin’s “strange weave of time and space” 
can be thus attributed to his evocation of a climate wherein the influence of 
commodity exchange rendered the auratic an archaic faculty. Such conclusions 
                                                
4
 Theodore Adorno: Aesthetic Theory, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984, p324. 
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offer critical evidence to support Benjamin’s claim that if transformations in the 
perceptual experiences staged by works of art can be considered indicative of the 
aura’s decline, then the factors deemed responsible for that shift can be 
simultaneously used to illuminate the social roots of the aura’s decay. Like 
Baudelaire before him, Manet presents capitalism as the key protagonist in this 
equation.  
   Yet the experiential conditions of modernity are not the only factors that 
impede art’s ability to induce acts of sensory immersion. To elucidate this claim 
it is helpful to re-consider Warhol’s suggestion that people as well as things can 
foster auratic sensations. Although an artwork’s capacity to suspend its audience 
in the indefinite sensory immersion of the auratic has traditionally been entwined 
with the onlooker’s recognition of the object’s sacred, magical status, what must 
also be emphasised is the fact that in the post-Renaissance epoch this cultic 
response is increasingly indebted to acknowledgements of the artist’s standing as 
a figure of unique creative insight. The person blessed with the sensitivity to see 
beyond the material limits of their reality and evoke a higher force would be 
celebrated. Their genius would influence relations with others, inviting a 
reception equal to that generated by the sacred. The complexities of this interplay 
have been detailed by my interpretation of Baudelaire’s ‘Perte d’auréole’, but for 
the purpose of this conclusion a simplified analogy might be located in Warhol’s 
description of the young visitor to the Factory. The individual who greets an 
artist with a sense of prevailing awe will view their practice with the same 
reverence, thereby reinforcing the ritualistic manner in which original works of 
art are engaged.  
   In this context, the artist becomes locus of the work’s aura and hence the figure 
responsible for the beholder’s compulsion to engage products of creative labour 
in a manner akin to the meditative reception of nature. But if the artwork is 
purged of the cultic character it derives from the genius of its creator – or if the 
artist renounces or loses their claim to such status – then it will simultaneously 
lose its auratic qualities. Photography staged this exact transformation. The 
camera’s mechanical status suggests an automated mode of labour shorn of any 
subjective intervention. Therefore, in addition to disrupting an object’s hallowed 
spirit by replacing the unique item with endless identical copies, a photographic 
reproduction will simultaneously encourage the beholder to view the work 
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through an image that refuses notions of creative authorship. A photograph of a 
painting or sculpture will not be received in the ceremonial manner reserved for 
the original because it will not be perceived as the magical product of 
“transcendent” insight. Rather, it will be approached as the utilitarian outcome of 
a chemical or technological process. As Jürgen Habermas put it, whenever the 
structure of the artwork is subject to change, a corresponding transformation will 
occur in manner in which people perceive and engage works of art.
5
 It is this 
change of reception that denotes the decline of the artwork’s aura. Accordingly, a 
practice employing photography as its primary medium will perpetuate this 
dialogue and become purged of traits that traditionally inspire acts of auratic 
contemplation, thereby granting the viewer a critical focus upon the social and 
political motifs relayed by the work.   
   That the work of Eugène Atget underpinned Benjamin’s belief in 
photography’s power to divest things of the capacity to generate spatial-temporal 
immersion has already been discussed. Yet a central argument of my dissertation 
suggests that Atget’s images paradoxically possess the ability to foster conditions 
of auratic engagement, thereby placing the validity of Benjamin’s thesis in doubt. 
To explore this idea it is necessary to return to a question posed in the 
introduction, specifically, my intent to address the relationship between aura and 
the empathic.  
   If aura approximates a meditation through which the subject invests external 
forms with the capacity to cast an answering gaze, then the auratic can be 
considered analogous to empathic projection. Because empathy allows the 
beholder to perceive their second self coalesce with external phenomena, it 
suggests a mode of experience able to account for the transposition of a 
relationship between people onto the relationship between the spectator and an 
artefact wrought by human skill, a natural form, or a work of art. Hence the 
empathic explains how things can become imbued with a subjective presence 
able to cast an answering gaze, and thus perpetuate the spatial-temporal web of 
the auratic. Finally, an undated fragment from Benjamin’s archive seems to 
compare the perceptual register of empathic projection to the phenomenal 
distance woven by the contemplative web of genuine aura – when an individual, 
                                                
5
 Jürgen Habermas: “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism – The Contemporaneity of 
Walter Benjamin” in New German Critique, No 17, Spring, 1979, p34. 
 223 
creature, or inanimate object meets and returns our gaze with a look of its own, 
we are “drawn initially into the distance”
6
 – thereby reiterating the parity 
between the categories.  
   Against the background of this reading it also becomes possible to view the 
issue of mimesis with greater clarity. The mimetic is strikingly similar to the 
empathic because both denote an imagined union between subject and object of 
perception. Furthermore, the categories have related implications for the act of 
beholding works of art inasmuch as they both describe a sensation whereby the 
spectator assimilates their second-self, as Vischer put it, unto the composition. 
Of course, unlike the pattern of embodiment I have explored in relation to 
Menzel, mimetic reception is not initiated by the work’s perspectival structure. 
Yet notwithstanding this fact, the interplay between subject and object denoted 
by mimesis clearly echoes the empathic qualities of genuine aura. Moreover, 
mimesis underpins the mode of auratic contemplation engendered by works of 
art that can be understood as works of aesthetic autonomy. For example, the 
cultic connotations of Pollock’s painting will inspire a state of lingering reverie. 
But because the image defies analysis by conceptual means the spectator is also 
compelled to engage it by re-performing its component parts. Crucially, this 
process will imbue the work with a human presence able to cast a reciprocal gaze 
and hence extend the spectator’s immersion in time and space. Thus we can 
conclude that mimesis perpetuates the sensory immersion of the auratic in a 
manner analogous to an aesthetics of empathy.    
   As we have seen, Benjamin did discuss the empathic in his work. However, 
that he made no attempt to read Atget against the dialectical interplay between 
empathy and the auratic might be considered an oversight. To be sure, a key 
feature of the photographer’s albums is their ability to evoke an embodied 
spectator comparable to Wolhiem’s notion of the “protagonist”. For example, 
Métiers, boutiques et étalages de Paris creates empathy by encouraging the 
observer to identify with the figure of the shopper. Its sequential flow mirrors the 
un-resting gaze of the worker who scans the capital’s labyrinthine web of stalls 
and kiosks, thus suggesting an embodied act of looking the spectator can use as a 
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conduit to feel their way into the scene.
7
 A parallel thus emerges between Atget’s 
oeuvre and Blake Stimson’s interpretation of the photo-essay’s ability to foster 
corporeal projection by conveying images that encourage the subject to imagine 
themselves moving from place to place.
8
 Such claims imply that because the 
viewer of Atget’s documents is invited to imbue the object of their perception 
with a subjective presence able to return the gaze it receives, his work will stage 
the silent reverie and spatial-temporal web of the auratic.   
   But this does not guarantee that the corporeal projection initiated by Atget’s 
work would re-create the true sensations of genuine aura. What cannot be 
overestimated is that any perceptual sensations arising from the subject’s 
imagined entry into Métiers, boutiques et étalages would represent the antithesis 
of quiet contemplation. Central to this claim are the sensory experiences endured 
by the character with whom the spectator is encouraged to identify. Significantly, 
the shopper evoked by Atget is an individual who does not linger: their eye is in 
constant motion as they search out their desired goods. Similarly, such a figure 
would be traversing a space constituted entirely of fragmentary impressions. The 
chaos of crowds and speeding carriages, the noise of barter and intoxication of 
commodities, would surround them. Hence they would be obliged to encounter 
their environment in a limited, peripheral manner in order to arrest the risk of 
sensory overload. That the photographer’s ability to evoke a protagonist rests 
precisely on his ability to imply the fleeting, snapshot-like glance with which the 
city dweller momentarily freezes sights, confirms the brief gaze needed to 
explore the capital.  
   Consequently, because it is the beholder’s ability to take possession of this 
look that enables their mind to wander the streets of Paris, we can only conclude 
that once they have become the character in question they will encounter the 
depicted environments through a mode of vision that disavows any possibility of 
auratic sensation. Like the beholder of Manet’s art, Atget’s audience will explore 
the city through a glance that matches its ephemerality. Therefore, although his 
use of sequence seemingly stages the conditions of genuine aura, Atget’s work 
simultaneously resists immersive reverie by compelling the viewer to become a 
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figure for whom the capacity to experience empirical life in such a meditative 
manner has become an impossibility.  
   However, legitimate grounds exist for claiming that if a photographer 
attempted to stage the variety of embodiment implied by Atget’s practice the act 
need not be considered regressive. The possibility of a project that invites 
individuals to identify with the life of the worker is one suffused with radical 
promise. If expanded and perfected, the artwork that fosters an empathic relation 
with the proletariat could highlight the inequalities fostered by capitalism by 
compelling the beholder to not only view impoverishment and degradation, but 
also see their imagined-self enduring such conditions. Against this framework, 
the act of facilitating a shared gaze between subject and object of contemplation 
would become suffused with new vitality.  
   But there is a major problem with this assertion. As Molly Nesbit notes, that an 
onlooker is encouraged to adopt the “look” of the working-class shopper 
provides no guarantee that they would understand “how to use” the look in 
question.
9
 The class differences separating the subject and beholder of an image 
could be so great that even if they approached the work through a state of 
tranquil contemplation the onlooker’s imagination would be simply unable to 
assimilate impressions of the worker’s everyday life. Crucially, this restriction 
would corrupt the emotional exchange that allows the spectator’s self-image to 
become the individual depicted, or implied by the composition, a situation that 
would subsequently arrest the picture’s potential to engender social change 
through the act of empathy. 
   Moreover, Fried contends that photography poses undeniable barriers to the 
creation of empathy. Central to this argument is a preparatory drawing Menzel 
developed to support his epic transcription of industrial labour: the Iron Rolling 
Mill. The image is titled Transport Truck (1872) and combines two views of the 
eponymous vehicle, one frontal and one from below. Sketches of other pieces of 
equipment, and numerous chainlike hooks and links, complete the composition.
10
  
   For Fried, the defining feature of this image is Menzel’s ability to relay “the 
play of opposed forces” between the heavy hooks, links and chains as they move 
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and pull against each other, a feat that allows the beholder to appreciate the 
stamina that would be expended by anyone attempting to utilise the depicted 
objects. But details of this type are deemed woefully absent in photographic 
studies of manual toil. For example, Lewis Hine’s Top of the Mooring Mast, 
Empire State Building (1931) is cited as a work that cannot re-create the 
subtleties of the Transport Truck because it is constrained by the camera’s 
“linear perspective”. Whereas Menzel can imagine that he interacts with the 
object of his vision, and then relay the impressions fostered by that exchange – a 
process evident in his ability to intuit the physical exertion of labour by 
suggesting the sheer effort needed to wield the cumbersome apparatus of 
industry – the photographer is limited to documenting external forms through a 
mechanical eye. Because the camera is an instrument of indexical precision it 
will not share painting’s potential to produce pictures shaped by the subjective 
imprints of lived time and inner history. As Andrew Benjamin concurs, because 
photography freezes single points in time – and thus conveys the instant alone – 
the medium will ultimately fail to present the “true nature and content of 
memory”.
11
 It is for these reasons that the brush rather than the lens becomes the 
pre-eminent tool with which to represent and communicate experience.  
   If these conclusions are applied to Atget they imply that the onlooker would 
not encounter the same sensations experienced by Menzel’s audience because the 
photographer would be unable to relay the details of his emotional engagement 
with his subject. Although he saw the homes of the chiffoniers, the medium with 
which he transcribed these spaces would not evoke his personal response to the 
environments in question. For example, I have argued that the observer is able to 
view Menzel’s viola studies and fantasize that they are playing the instrument 
precisely because the artist imagines himself in role of the musician then 
expresses the sensations generated by that projection. Atget, however, could not 
stage the same process. Upon contemplating the rag picker’s hottes he may have 
intuited the bodily exertion of carrying such a vessel loaded with goods. 
Furthermore, the ensuing sensations might have coloured Ategt’s feelings to the 
extent that he began to see himself as the figure burdened with such a weight. 
Yet if we accept Fried’s claim that photography captures appearances alone we 
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must deduce that Atget would be unable to express the impressions of his 
imagined empathy with the ragman. As such, his prints would be purged of the 
conduit through which the spectator might project their self-image into the 
picture and thus imbue the work with a subjective presence able to return the 
gaze it receives.  
 
III: Jeff Wall. 
 
   Collectively, such arguments counter any doubts surrounding photography’s 
status as an non-auratic medium, thereby confirming the radical potential 
Benjamin located in the camera’s ability to foster revised patterns of beholding 
antithetical to passive contemplation. But what has not been considered is the 
possibility that Benjamin’s aspirations for the interplay between art and 
technology were not limited to these developments. This does not mean that 
photography’s ability to evade cultic connotations and convey political rhetoric 
can ever be considered supplementary to the philosopher’s ideology. The 
contrary is clearly the case. Essential to expounding this claim are the writings of 
Filipo Tommaso Marinetti, notably his commitment to the glorification of war.
12
 
As Benjamin observed, the artist sought to present human conflict as an aesthetic 
act. To confirm this claim the philosopher cites an infamously chilling passage as 
evidence, noting how Marinetti reasons that “war is beautiful” because it initiates 
humanity’s domination of machines, a supremacy evident in the development 
and use of gas-masks, megaphones, armaments and modern forms of artillery. 
Moreover, by causing individuals to wear and wield such inventions, Marinetti 
claimed that war achieved the wondrous feat of cladding the human body in a 
metal skin. Finally, and perhaps most shockingly, Marinetti avowed that war 
could be deemed beautiful because it will sow the flaming blooms of gunfire in a 
newly flowering field.13 
   An extract from Benjamin’s denunciation of Ernst Jünger’s War and Warriors 
explicates the dilemmas raised by this credo. Like Jünger, Marinetti offered 
                                                
12
 Filipo Tommaso Marinetti: “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism”, in Art in Theory: 
1900 – 2000, edited by Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 
p148.  
13
 Filipo Marinetti, quoted by Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility (Third Version)” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 
4, 1938 – 1940, p269.  
 228 
nothing but a clear and unrepentant transposition of the doctrine of l’art pour 
l’art onto warfare,
14
 a realisation that suggests an ominous conclusion. If hails of 
bullets and volleys of shells are deemed exemplars of autonomous beauty, the 
observer will be encouraged to find aesthetic enjoyment in devastation. 
Accordingly, faced with a situation in which combat is cast as a creative act – 
and the masses are seduced by the maxim: “create art – destroy the world”
15
 – 
Benjamin believed the direct politicization of art represented the only way to 
awaken a society encouraged to look upon its own obliteration with a sense of 
joyous wonder. Crucially, photography and film offered a conduit through which 
this task could be achieved. Both mediums allowed critical content to be 
disseminated in a form that could not be approached in the manner reserved for 
mythic objects. As such, the potency of the work’s message would not be 
obscured by acts of reverie.  
   In this context, the camera’s inherent potential to divest or reform qualities that 
once fostered lingering, auratic immersion becomes emancipatory. Moreover, 
that Benjamin’s promotion of photographic practice – and critique of 
methodologies embracing self-expression rather than the communication of 
radical ideology – stemmed from a drive to challenge the rise of Nazism further 
illustrates how the corruption of art’s ability to act as a vehicle for the sensations 
of genuine aura is shaped by events manifest in empirical life.  
   Yet if we unpick the intricacies of the Artwork Essay we encounter the 
possibility that the development of a photography able to relay ideology did not 
represent the extent of Benjamin’s ambitions for politicised art practice. Vital to 
this claim is the philosopher’s contention that Fascism’s entwining of politics 
and aesthetics raises a condition of “self-alienation” whereby the subject 
becomes divorced from their perceptual and corporeal relationship to daily life. 
In other words, portraying politics as synonymous with the autonomous beauty 
engenders a situation whereby cultural and economic events will be perceived 
through a faculty comparable to disinterestedness. As Benjamin portentously 
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declared, humanity is no longer a spectacle contemplated by Olympian Gods 
alone. On the contrary, the privilege now extends to the masses, creating the 
situation whereby society can experience its destruction as an aesthetic 
pleasure.
16
  
   In this way, Buck-Morss has used such assertions as a framework against 
which to reason that Benjamin’s notion of politicized art was not confined to the 
transfiguration of creative labour into a mode of ideological critique, but also 
encompassed an attempt to initiate tasks of greater complexity. Namely, to 
reverse humanity’s alienation from its perceptual and corporeal senses for the 
sake of its self- preservation, and to achieve this not by forsaking new 
technologies, but by actively engaging them.17   
   This task is given added urgency when one considers that the transformation of 
politics into an “aestheticized spectacle” is not limited to a specific point in time, 
but is an ongoing concern throughout history. The change is perpetuated by the 
evolution of technology, achieving its zenith in our televisual age of media 
communication.
18
 As Jean Baudrillard speculated, advances in information 
technology mean that the public will increasingly come to perceive reality in the 
same manner as the astronaut who views the earth from the window of their 
shuttle. In his analysis, each individual will depend upon machines to facilitate 
acts of communication and interaction, and will thus find that they have become 
suspended in a state of total isolation that renders them completely disconnected 
from the real world.
19
 
   Such claims suggest that the project Buck-Morss identifies in the closing pages 
of the ‘Artwork Essay’ must be completed in order to arrest a deepening crisis. 
The problem with this assertion, however, rests on the fact that the 
transformation in question is fraught with difficulty. Art is called upon to re-
stage the subject’s perceptual and bodily engagement with everyday life in order 
to undo the beholder’s estrangement from the empirical sphere. Hence we might 
reason that the task facing creative labour is to re-assert that the human subject 
exists within the corporeal and sensory landscape of empirical reality, and thus 
                                                
16
 Walter Benjamin: “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility (Third 
Version)”, 2003, p270.   
17
 Susan Buck-Morss: “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: 1997, p377. 
18
 Ibid, p376. 
19
 Jean Baudrillard: “The Ecstasy of Communication”, in The Post-Modern Reader, edited by 
Charles Jencks, London, Academy Editions, 1992, p152. 
 230 
cannot view the social relations of the modern world from a detached vantage 
point. Conceivably, once this connection is registered the spectator will no longer 
be able to approach events as war with meditative calm.  
   How, then, might creative practice complete this task? One solution emerges in 
relation to the art of embodiment. If an artist were to revivify the aesthetics of 
empathy they would reverse the estrangement of humanity from society by re-
asserting the existence of a physical and emotional connection between subject 
and object of contemplation. For example, the imagined projection that Menzel’s 
audience is invited to perform negates any alienation between the viewer, their 
senses and their surroundings because it compels them to interact with an item or 
explore a landscape as they might in the everyday. Therefore, to re-establish the 
relationship between human perception, corporeal sensation and empirical life, 
artistic labour could follow Menzel and assert that the lived body always 
occupies a lived experiential relationship to the empirical realm.
20
  
   Accordingly, the equivalence between aura and empathy implies that a return 
to the principles of embodiment would require artworks to once more facilitate 
the sensory conditions of auratic perception. But as Menzel’s late works indicate, 
the experiential transformations enacted by the sensory climate of modernity 
renders any attempt to rejuvenate empathic experience, and by extension genuine 
aura, problematic. The fragmented optical climate of modernity restricts the 
observer’s ability to enter the meditative state whereby they might open an 
emotional reciprocity with external phenomena, and hence, perceive an image of 
their moods and feelings coalesce with the object of their vision. As Baudrillard 
put it, “people no longer project themselves into their objects”.
21
  
   This loss is decisive, for if empathy represents the faculty that allows the 
subject to engage impressions of the world, then the ruination of such sensations 
might be considered a root cause of the perceptual estrangement that renders 
individuals sensorially disassociated from their surroundings. And hence as that 
which must be resolved in order to negate the dilemma to which Benjamin 
alludes. Yet the difficulty of this task is compounded when one recalls that 
painting, the medium identified as key to the facilitation of the spectator’s 
empathic projection – particularly in Fried – has become increasingly 
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marginalised as a critical discourse. The transformations in creative labour 
espoused by the avant-garde and continued by Conceptual Art are a case in point. 
This fact, combined with Buck-Morss’ assertion that Benjamin intended to undo 
the alienation of the human sensorium by using technology, implies that if art 
were to revive embodiment the project would be achieved through media other 
than easel painting.  
   Crucially, a case exists for claiming that Jeff Wall has achieved this exact 
outcome. Although early works such as the Landscape Manual parallel 
Smithson’s de-personalised use of the camera, much of the artist’s oeuvre recalls 
the tableaux of Rejlander and Peach Robinson. For example, in pictures such as 
A Sudden Gust of Wind digital technology is used to fuse myriad images into a 
coherent whole, creating a scene that evokes Katsushika Hokusai’s famous 
impression of a windswept landscape in rural Japan. The synergy between both 
works is evinced by Wall’s replication of the spiralling papers caught in the 
breeze, the tall trees buffeted by the gale, and the scattered figures who brace 
themselves against its force.
22
 
   In part, this eschewal of the dead-pan, anti-aesthetic documentation central to 
the use of photography in Conceptual Art can be traced to Wall’s assertion that 
because photography is irreducibly tied to depiction it could never replicate the 
dematerialisation offered by language. Recognition of this fact thus prompts the 
realisation that the camera was ultimately compelled to transcend the ideals of 
photoconceptualism and re-engage the pictorial project previously exemplified 
by easel art.
23
  
   Yet Wall’s practice has also been driven by an attempt to re-stage Baudelaire’s 
painting of modern life. Indeed, for Wall the task of focusing upon “the everyday 
and the now” was a project of great artistic significance. Nevertheless, the 
decision to address this brief through photography remains perplexing. The 
question of whether photography could be considered an appropriate medium 
through which to give aesthetic form to the everyday was raised in discussion 
with David Shapiro. But Wall did not expound his attempt to revivify a painterly 
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practice through photography beyond the claim that the term painter was 
indivisible from that of artist or creator and thus might be applied to practices 
that exceeded the material components of the medium.
24
   
   Yet a critical text dating from 1984 offers a different explanation, one that 
necessitates a brief recourse to Baudelaire’s original ideas. To reiterate the poet’s 
thesis, each point in history possesses a style of behaviour, a mode of dress and 
an act of looking particular to itself.
25
 Hence the artist who captured such details 
would be considered truly modern because they transcribed the demeanours, 
mores and styles unique to their lifetime. Wall, however, claimed that this idea 
created a problematic legacy for future painting to negotiate. Specifically, he 
argued that the aforementioned need to negotiate psychical shocks in everyday 
life had compressed the gestures and behaviours of the masses into “reflex 
actions” and “compulsive responses”. These condensed, violent movements were 
identified as incompatible with classical aesthetics, prompting Wall’s turn to 
photography in order to isolate and enlarge the “micro gestures” of modernity. 
As the artist reasoned: the compressed actions that lend themselves particularly 
well to photography are the only remnants “of the older idea of gesture as the 
bodily, pictorial form of historical consciousness”. A continuation of 
Baudelaire’s manifesto thus had to appropriate photographic techniques to fully 
express the modern condition.
26
 
   But in developing this project Wall would simultaneously re-open a further 
methodology. Here I refer to Fried’s contention that Wall’s oeuvre belongs to a 
body of recent photography that engages a specific tradition of creative practice: 
namely, the attempt to stage the illusion of the beholder’s non-existence by 
depicting figures who make no attempt to acknowledge the onlooker stood 
beyond the frame.
27
 Historically, this has been achieved in two ways. The painter 
either portrays individuals who are absorbed in a particular task to the exclusion 
of all external stimuli, or else depicts a group that appears utterly engrossed in 
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the dramatic events unfolding within the picture space.
28
 As Fried concludes, 
such works can be considered anti-theatrical inasmuch as they refute conscious 
attempts to address the viewer, a notion that finds its exemplar in the art of Jean-
Baptiste-Siméon Chardin. For example, in The Card Castle (1737) Chardin 
paints a young man attempting to build a house of cards. This protagonist 
appears so lost in his occupation that he becomes oblivious to the open draws 
and upturned cards that surround him. These details are natural points of 
attraction for the viewer, yet the youth’s indifference to them suggests that his 
state of mind excludes all external factors, the spectator included.
29
  
   For Fried, such interpretations can be applied to Wall’s oeuvre. He locates the 
1992 composition Adrian Walker, Artist, Drawing from a Specimen in the 
Laboratory in the Dept. of Anatomy at the University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver against the sense of captivation expressed by images like The Card 
Castle, noting how the eponymous artist who sits and draws from the somewhat 
ghoulish subject of a severed hand seems so focused on his task that he becomes 
impervious to all distractions.
30
 As if to confirm this connection, Wall has 
himself compared the deep concentration displayed by Adrian Walker to that 
evoked by Chardin and, furthermore, has advanced Fried’s reading of absorption 
as a thesis that could be used to contextualise his own art.
31
 But if this is the case, 
it follows that Wall will also replicate the particular mode of reception initiated 
by works centred upon the portrayal of absorptive motifs. It is this notion that I 
wish to engage.  
   Importantly, Fried reasons that pictures conveying figures in absorptive states 
will lull the spectator into deep contemplation.
32
 This position might be applied 
to Wall’s practice, which Fried suggests fosters an act of beholding analogous to 
the “total immersion” through which Wittgenstein engaged the worlds and 
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environments visualised on the cinema screen.
33
 But the effects of absorption are 
not limited to these sensations. To be sure, compositions featuring individuals 
lost in their own interests would not only arrest the spectator, but would compel 
their mind to enter the scene. Fried illustrates this through examples gleaned 
from the writings of Dennis Diderot, the pre-eminent art critic of Chardin’s era. 
An extract from his salon review of 1763 introduces the motif of corporeal 
projection in relation to Philippe-Jacques de Loutherbourg’s Un paysage avec 
figures et animaux. As he views the picture, Diderot begins to imagine that he 
has entered the work and is walking through the depicted landscape. This fantasy 
is so intense that his senses become influenced by the illusory reality of the 
scene, as evidenced by his wish to pause and gain respite from the burning sun 
overhead.
34
  
   Yet it is the critic’s response to Jean-Baptiste le Princé’s Pastorale Russe 
(1765) that epitomises such acts of embodiment. The image depicts an old man 
who sits beneath the shade of a tree and listens intently to a boy playing what 
appears to be a flute or pipe. A young girl standing at the man’s side is similarly 
absorbed in this performance. As Fried recounts, the sense of captivation 
expressed by these figures first arrests Diderot, then draws his imagination into 
the canvas. He finds himself standing within the reality conveyed by the picture, 
and this merger is one that conveys a full range of corporeal and emotional 
sensations. First, the critic will lean against the tree – between the old man and 
the young woman – and share their contemplation of the younger man’s music. 
Then, in his mind, a wholly new scenario evolves. He imagines that once the 
youth has stopped playing, and the old man takes up his balalaika, he will 
happily rest and listen to his recital. And when darkness begins to fall, Diderot 
says that he and his new companions will retire to the old man’s hut, as if to 
continue their impromptu concert.35 
   Such observations imply that the pictorial motif of absorption yields an effect 
strikingly similar to empathy. Like the beholder of Menzel’s art, the audience of 
le Princé enters a meditative state whereby they perceive their self-image merge 
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with the canvas. Hence if Wall updates the project initiated by such practice, it is 
eminently possible that his work will provide a similar union between beholder 
and image.  
   Initially, this might seem like speculation, but the proposition proceeds from a 
critical base. For Fried, the process of embodiment described by Diderot was a 
sensation engendered by specific varieties of work: that of genre painting or 
images of the everyday. Unlike the intense drama of history painting, the 
vernacular themes displayed by such scenes would be inadequate to the 
“passionate feelings” and “extreme states of mind” needed to successfully 
neutralise the beholder’s presence. Consequently, painters working in these 
categories would have to compel the viewer to metaphorically enter the image, as 
this would be the only way in which they could sustain the fiction that there was 
no spectator stood before the canvas. As Fried notes, artists achieved this by 
intensifying the sense of absorption conveyed by the protagonists of their work 
in order to create an “existential reverie”, a sensation wherein the viewer loses all 
interest in their physical surroundings and becomes fully immersed in the subject 
of the painting, to the extent that their imagination begins to coalesce with the 
image.
36
 Wall’s practice might be viewed in such terms, for although it has been 
read as an art of absorption it also represents an attempt to evoke the details of 
daily life. Thus if his work continues the manifesto of anti-theatricality and, 
moreover, focuses that project upon the depiction of figures engrossed in 
everyday activities, it becomes feasible to reason that it will follow Le Princé and 
initiate a corporeal merger between subject and object of contemplation. 
   For instance, in an image like Untangling (1994) – which depicts a workman 
struggling to unravel a coiled mass of entwined rope – the sheer focus displayed 
by the central figure might captivate the viewer, and through that captivation 
draw them into the scene. Similar assessments could be applied to works like The 
Guitarist (1987), which bears several similarities to the Pastorale Russe. Both 
depict individuals engrossed in the activity of playing a musical instrument, in 
Wall’s case the eponymous girl who plays an electric guitar; and both feature an 
onlooker who seems to be engrossed in the performance. The male character 
seated to the right of Wall’s composition displays a sense of captivation similar 
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to that expressed by the old man who listens to the young musician in Le 
Princé’s scene. Accordingly, if the synergy between the pictures is advanced it is 
viable to suggest that the observer of Wall’s tableaux will be engrossed by the 
sense of concentration it evokes, and will thus find that their imagination is lulled 
into the image.     
   Interestingly, an interview he conducted in 1989 implies that Wall intended 
such sensations. As the artist elucidates, “My experience of the works I have 
really admired is a kind of out-of-body experience”. The sensation in question is, 
Wall explains, a continual dialectic of “identification and dis-identification” with 
the object, a process he identifies as potentially crucial to the possibility of 
experience itself.37 
    That Wall considers an act of embodied seeing or experiential exchange 
between viewer and work as key to ambitious practice invites the hypothesis that 
he sought to stage a similar interplay through his own art. Therefore, we might 
argue that Wall drew upon his declared familiarity with Fried’s writing and 
developed an art centred upon absorptive motifs in order to achieve this very 
effect. Similarly, the fact that Wall has classified his oeuvre as “autonomous 
art”
38
 suggests that it will necessitate the mimetic reception appropriate to the 
composition that exists as a thing-for-itself, and thus require the subject to 
assimilate themselves unto the composition. However, the strongest evidence to 
support claims that Wall wanted to engender sensations akin to Baudelaire’s 
“Holy Prostitution of the Soul” emerges in the following comment. Not only 
have I worked upon pictures detailing the motifs of “resistance, survival, 
communication” and “dialogue”. I have also striven to create “scenes of 
empathy, and empathetic representation”.
39
 What is here called “empathetic 
representation” suggests a project strikingly close to that attempted by Menzel. 
Thus we might conclude that Wall’s photographic tableaux were intended to 
initiate an emotional exchange between viewer and work.  
   One possible explanation of how Wall achieves this feat emerges when once 
considers the fact that he constructs photographs rather than taking them. 
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Because he is not documenting a contingent scene, but creating what he calls 
“near-documentary”, Wall, we might reason, is able to return to the mode of 
production I have described in relation to Leskov. That is, Wall’s practice is not 
limited to the recording of appearances, but can proceed from a perspective 
influenced by the data of his experiences and memories. Like a painter, Wall can 
exert complete control over his composition, directing, staging and re-shooting 
his models until he has achieved the fullest evocation of the sensations he wishes 
to convey, thereby breathing a sense of inner life into the figures that populate 
his pictures. Accordingly, this imagined repertoire – to borrow Wollhiem’s term 
– of thoughts and feelings, might be identified as that with which the viewer 
engages in order to empathise with the characters depicted by Wall’s work. Thus 
we might claim that the observers of Adrian Walker are able to empathise with 
the artist’s quiet meditation of his work – and thus imagine themselves sat at his 
desk, sharing in both his activity and the patient reflection it inspires – because 
Wall has created an image that offers a highly concentrated representation of 
such motifs.  
   Together, these arguments intimate that by inviting acts of imagined projection, 
Wall’s work will become imbued with a subjective presence able to foster the 
returned glance characteristic of the auratic. Undoubtedly, it is possible to 
dismiss the return to pictorialism that has enabled Wall to engender such 
sensations as a reactionary retreat into past styles. Similar judgements might be 
levelled at Wall’s methodologies, which have been associated with an attempt to 
re-assert the validity of artistic creativity, subjectivity and craftsmanship, thus 
negating the ideologies espoused by Tret’iakov, Heartfield and Kosuth. But to 
discount the artist’s work on such grounds would be to overlook the wider 
implications of his labour. Importantly, by developing a practice able to stage a 
pattern of beholding that invites the onlooker to explore and engage the 
composition as a corporeal presence, Wall also introduces into the spectator’s 
consciousness a range of tactile, optic and sonic sensations that can potentially 
undo the sensory alienation that divorces the subject from daily life and hence re-
assert the reciprocity between the individual, their senses and the everyday, 
thereby reversing the crisis highlighted in the closing paragraphs of the ‘Artwork 
Essay’.  
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   As such, we might claim that the value of Wall’s art rests on two interrelated 
points: Firstly, Wall’s photography possesses the ability to facilitate and re-
awaken a mode of experience that has been divested from daily life. Secondly, 
the experience his work revivifies can be identified as key to the resolution of the 
crisis posed by sensory alienation. Indeed, if the pattern of reception fostered by 
Wall parallels that initiated by images of absorption, then the observer of his art 
will seemingly encounter sensations comparable to those described in Diderot’s 
salon reviews and find that their senses are stimulated and directed by the object 
of their vision – as if to suggest a lived relationship to the reality conveyed by the 
photograph, and by extension the empirical sphere itself.  
   Such arguments serve to imbue the empathic matrix of the auratic with a clear 
political significance. But this does not mean that we can simply identify the aura 
as essential to critical practice, nor claim that photography can become valid as 
fine art only when it is able to succeed painting and become the locus of 
Benjamin’s strange weave of time and space. Rather, what must be emphasised 
is the fact that because the aura is subject to the influence of economic and social 
relations its critical potential will undergo violent oscillations and become 
polarized by ruptures and revolutions in the conditions of daily life itself. As 
Miriam Hansen has asserted, the possibility that auratic experience might be 
liberated from the “dead-end of cult and social privilege”, and be transfigured 
into a progressive social force, hinges upon a moment of transformation in the 
existing conditions of economic production.40  
   As such, we cannot claim that Wall’s oeuvre offers irreducible proof that 
empathic, auratic art possesses a critical value greater than its non-auratic other. 
Rather, we must assert that if the auratic, embodied perception offered by Wall’s 
oeuvre can be deemed progressive it is only because the economic conditions 
contemporary to the artist have staged a climate in which it becomes possible to 
view the phenomenon in such terms. The question of whether the aura can retain 
this position in light of ensuing mutations in, or cleaving of, dominant social 
relations will, no doubt, provide the impetus for future critical practice and 
philosophical engagement. 
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